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This dissertation presents two lines of research, each aimed at developing and
assessing psychologically-motivated economics research in the realm of public
policy.
In the first chapter I present a theory of tax sheltering activities motivated
by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), where a loss-averse citizen
frames a refund as a gain and a tax payment as a loss. A unique implication of
this theory is a discrete drop in the marginal benefit of tax sheltering once cross-
ing the threshold into the gain domain. This drives excess tax sheltering among
individuals owing money on tax day, and an excess mass of individuals to shel-
ter precisely to the gain/loss threshold. I investigate these implications in 1979-
1990 IRS panel of individual returns and find strong support for loss aversion.
A mixture-modeling approach is developed to estimate model parameters and
conduct policy simulations. Estimates suggest that psychologically-motivated
framing effects can have substantial impact on tax revenue. I discuss the impli-
cations of these results for the detection and deterrence of tax evasion, the im-
plementation of tax-incentivized public programs, and forecasting behavioral
response to tax policy changes.
The second and third chapters assess current uses of happiness or subjective
well-being (SWB) data in economic settings. Economists and policy makers of-
ten estimate the tradeoffs individuals accept and forecast the choices they will
make. An increasingly-used approach to this exercise uses survey responses
to SWB questions as a direct measure of economists’ notion of utility. The re-
search presented here directly assesses these practices across a variety of set-
tings. Chapter 2 reports the results of three surveys eliciting choice and SWB
over alternatives in a battery of hypothetical scenarios. Chapter 3 reports the
results of a field study of medical residency choice, allowing the side-by-side
comparison of choice-based and SWB-based tradeoff estimates. Across these
studies, we find that while choice and SWB rankings are often reasonably well
aligned, systematic differences exist, and are particularly problematic for infer-
ence on marginal rates of substitution. We discuss the implications of our results
for the use of SWB measures in economic applications and the comparative per-
formance of different SWB-based approaches.
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CHAPTER 1
LOSS AVERSION MOTIVATES TAX SHELTERING: EVIDENCE FROM
U.S. TAX RETURNS
Alex Rees-Jones
Abstract: This paper presents evidence that tax avoidance and evasion are
influenced by loss aversion. I present a reference-dependent theory of individ-
ual response to taxation in which refunds are framed as gains and payments are
framed as losses. The primary implication of this theory is a discrete drop in
the marginal benefit of tax sheltering once crossing the threshold into the gain
domain, leading to bunching in the distribution of balance due at the reference
point. I investigate these implications in the 1979-1990 IRS panel of individual
returns. The distribution of the balance exchanged with the IRS exhibits a point
mass precisely at zero, and the distribution for those owing a tax payment is
shifted in a manner consistent with higher pursuit of sheltering. This behav-
ior is shown to be particularly prevalent among high-income filers and driven
by those experiencing positive income shocks which are not mechanically with-
held. Additionally, a number of proxies for the pursuit and employment of
tax shelters are discontinuously prevalent precisely at the referent. A structural
model of this behavior is developed to quantify the resulting excess tax shelter-
ing, as well as the fraction of tax filers exhibiting loss-averse sheltering behavior.
I discuss the application of these results to the detection and deterrence of tax
evasion, as well as the forecasting of behavioral response to tax policy changes.
1
1.1 Introduction
Economists routinely model how individuals value money, as captured by the
tradeoffs or risks they will tolerate in exchange for a marginal dollar. Our most
common models offer tractable, principled, and “rational” approaches to fore-
casting such decisions, but abstract from many of the subtle psychological con-
siderations which are often at work. The last 30 years have seen a flurry of
interest in augmenting standard models with insights from psychology, with
the most well-studied and famous example arguably being “prospect theory”
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In a recent review of this work and the sub-
stantial literature it has inspired, Barberis (2013) notes that prospect theory and
its modern variants are widely accepted as leading models of decision making
in experimental settings. This positive assessment is tempered by the acknowl-
edgment that “there are relatively few well-known and broadly accepted appli-
cations of prospect theory in economics,” which could permit the interpretation
that this model may be “less relevant outside the laboratory.”1
In this paper I present evidence that the insights of prospect theory are di-
rectly relevant to our understanding of a large-scale field setting of unambigu-
ous economic importance: the manner in which individuals perceive and react
to income taxes. The rationale for how gain/loss framing might affect a tax-
payer is straightforward. Throughout the year, a taxpayer earns taxable income,
takes actions which might be tax advantaged, and makes tax payments based
on a forecast of the tax liability that will ultimately be owed. In preparation
1Examples of existing field tests of loss aversion include the study of taxi-driver labor supply
(Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler, 1997; Farber, 2005; Farber, 2008; Crawford and
Meng, 2011), housing prices (Genesove and Mayer, 1999), the putting behavior of professional
golfers (Pope and Schweitzer, 2010), the effect of alternative policies to reduce shopping bag use
(Homonoff, 2013), and behavior in financial markets (reviewed in Barberis, 2012).
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for tax day, these activities must be precisely documented and reported to the
IRS, and the “balance due”—the difference between the total taxes owed and
the tax payments made—must be settled. If the balance due is positive, the tax
filer must send payment to the IRS, and thus incur a loss in a very literal way.
If the balance due is negative, a refund is due to the taypayer, yielding a literal
gain. A loss-averse citizen would react to this framing by experiencing a dis-
crete increase in the marginal disutility of a dollar taxed as balance due crosses
the gain/loss threshold. This disutility can impact observable behavior by influ-
encing the taxpayer’s pursuit of income adjustments, deductions, and credits,
or by influencing decisions on the amount of taxes to illegally evade. Identify-
ing and quantifying the effect of loss aversion on these tax sheltering decisions
will be the central focus of this paper.
The possibility of reference dependence affecting perceptions of the income
tax has been the topic of a considerable amount of research. Several papers have
presented theoretical treatments of loss-averse taxpayers, and have shown that
loss aversion can rationalize a variety of features of the tax code, such as over-
withholding and the rate of voluntary compliance.2 The presence of this type
of tax-framing effect has also seen support in a number of small-scale surveys
and lab experiments.3 Despite encouraging results from this line of research,
direct study of this phenomenon in the field has been limited, presumably due
to data constraints and the difficulty of identification.4 This paper contributes
2See, for example, Elffers and Hessing (1997), Yaniv (2001), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004),
Kanbur, Pirttila¨, and Tuomala (2008), and Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007, 2010).
3See, for example, Chang, Nichols, and Schultz (1987), Copeland and Cuccia (2002), Kirchler
and Maciejovsky (2001), Robben et. al. (1990), Robben, Webley, Elffers, and Hessing (1990), or
Schepanski and Shearer (1995). Schadewald (1989) presents experimental results where manip-
ulations of reference points did not have significant effects.
4Notable related field studies include Feldman (2010), which utilized a change in tax with-
holding law to study the role mental accounting plays in retirement savings. Engstro¨m, Nord-
blom, Ohlsson, and Persson (2011) demonstrate a higher take-up rate of a specific deduction in
Swedish tax code among individuals who are underwithheld and discuss the implications of
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to the literature by presenting observable implications of loss aversion resulting
from broadly-defined sheltering activities, which permits both the detection of
this mechanism in the field and the estimation of its aggregate impact to tax
revenues.
Section 1.2 presents a theoretical framework which underlies the identifi-
cation strategy. Motivated by recent applications of “bunching” identification
strategies in public finance,5 I explore the unique implications of loss aversion
on the structure of the distribution of final balance due. This approach embraces
the fact that the balance due reported to the IRS is not exogenously assigned;
rather, it is manipulable by the taxpayer through the sheltering decisions de-
scribed above. If the taxpayer’s assessment of the value of a marginal dollar is
discontinuous and discretely higher in the loss domain, then the resulting dis-
tribution of manipulated balance due will itself be discontinuous. Individuals
in the loss domain pursue excess tax sheltering activities relative to individuals
in the gain domain. Moreover, a discrete fraction of taxpayers will be willing
to shelter to precisely the gain/loss threshold, then discontinue pursuit of addi-
tional shelters due to the sudden drop in their marginal return.
Section 1.3 describes the data used to test these predictions, the IRS Statistics
of Income 1979-1990 panel of individual returns. This dataset follows a panel of
randomly-drawn taxpayers and contains information on most of the individual
components of a tax calculation, allowing a detailed look at the sources of in-
come and the nature of adjustments, deductions, and credits claimed. Repeated
observations of the same individual over time allows direct observation of the
manner in which taxpayers have modified their behavior, permitting the ob-
their results for loss aversion.
5For example, Saez (2010), Kleven et. al. (2011), and Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri
(2011).
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servation of new avoidance activities and of changes in reported income. My
primary sample consists of 229,116 tax returns filed by 53,177 taxpayers.
Section 1.4 turns to this data and tests the identifying distributional implica-
tions of loss aversion. As predicted by the model, significant excess mass is seen
precisely at zero balance due. While present across all income quartiles, this ex-
cess mass is especially pronounced among high-income tax filers, particularly
those with large income shocks to non-mechanically-withheld income sources.
A variety of behaviors indicative of excess tax sheltering are associated with
this bunching behavior. Taken together, these results are exactly in line with the
theoretical predictions of the loss-averse model, and are difficult to rationalize
with a non-reference-dependent baseline.
Section 1.5 considers a variety of alternative theories and possible con-
founds, and demonstrates their inability to explain the patterns observed in the
data. In particular, this behavior can not be plausibly generated from fixed costs
of being in the loss domain,6 avoidance of underwitholding penalties, liquidity
constraints, discontinuities in the tax schedule, or hyperaccurate tax forecast-
ing. Additional theoretical concerns, such as the interaction of loss aversion
with paid tax preparers or the choice of the reference point, are discussed and
ruled out as confounding factors.
Section 1.6 develops and estimates a structural model to quantify the im-
plied excess sheltering. The distribution of balance due is modeled as a mix-
ture of the distributions generated from loss-averse and “standard” types, with
heterogeneity in model parameters and distributions permitted as a function
of observables. These estimates suggest that approximately 29% of tax filers be-
6Examples include a belief in a jump in audit probability or the annoyance of having to write
a check.
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have in a manner consistent with loss averse sheltering, with this behavior again
shown to be driven by high-income filers. Estimates of the total excess shelter-
ing motivated by loss aversion amount to approximately 278 million dollars
per year, expressed in 2013 dollars. Policy experiments on the revenue effects of
changes in withholding laws are conducted, and shown to be potentially highly
cost-effective means of revenue generation.
Section 1.7 concludes.
The analysis and results contained in this paper contribute to the literature
in three primary ways. First, this paper constitutes one of the largest field tests
of loss aversion to date, both in terms of the number of individuals affected and
the magnitude of the economic consequences. Second, this paper informs a puz-
zle in public finance, seen by contrasting Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri
(2011) and Saez (2010): why don’t middle- and high-income American taxpay-
ers bunch at kinks in the tax schedule, as would be predicted by standard theory,
and as has been seen in other countries? While many factors are likely involved,
the analysis presented here suggests that psychological gain/loss framing, com-
bined with the wide availability of tax shelters, motivates some taxpayers to
bunch along an alternative dimension. American taxpayers do bunch at kink
points, but the kink generating the most dramatic response is psychologically
motivated. Finally, this framework enables the estimation of the aggregate im-
pact of loss-averse tax sheltering, allowing a precise study of the resulting rev-
enue costs and policy implications which was unavailable in the past literature.
6
1.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I present a theoretical framework for understanding the role of
loss aversion in tax sheltering decisions, and formally characterize the resulting
distributional features which allow the detection of this psychological mecha-
nism. In particular, I develop a model of the decisions of citizens who are in the
process of filing their annual tax returns.
In preparation for tax day, taxpayers must complete and submit form 1040
or one of its variants, formally documenting their tax-relevant information for
the year.7 Completing this form involves identifying oneself, documenting all
taxable income, claiming credits or deductions to that taxable income due to
participation in tax-incentivized behaviors, calculating the total taxes owed, and
finally comparing these taxes owed to taxes already paid.8 These components
are summed to the “balance due,” the amount of money that must be exchanged
between the taxpayer and the IRS.
In the processes of filing form 1040, taxpayers have the opportunity to ma-
nipulate their balance due through legal or illegal tax sheltering. Legal means
of tax sheltering typically entail reporting some tax-advantaged behavior which
entitles the taxpayer to a reduction in tax or taxable income.9 Illegal channels for
tax sheltering take the form of underreporting taxable income or overreporting
7Individuals with particularly simple taxable behavior may fill out shortened and simplified
versions of this form, 1040A or 1040EZ.
8The US tax system is “pay as you go.” As citizens earn income throughout the year,
they should periodically be paying portions of their tax for the year to the government, ei-
ther through direct withholdings or estimated tax payments. To incentivize these payments,
sufficient underwithholding results in a penalty. However, forecasting tax liability to-the-dollar
is often a difficult task due to the uncertainty in most individuals’ future income and behaviors.
As a result, such a level of accuracy is not expected, required, or incentivized.
9Concrete examples of legal means to reduce taxes include reporting sales of losing invest-
ments to realize capital losses, donating money to charity, investing money in a tax-preferred
savings account, or writing off business expenses.
7
of tax-advantaged behaviors.
Finding and employing tax shelters is costly. For cases of legal tax avoid-
ance, these costs include the effort necessary to find tax benefits for which the
taxpayer qualifies, as well as the time and effort needed to document and claim
those tax benefits. For the case of illegal evasion, these costs can include literal
accounting effort as well as the expected future penalties that will be incurred
if the evasion is detected. Any psychological stigma costs incurred by either
evasion or avoidance can similarly be incorporated.
This framework introduces a tradeoff between the value of reducing tax pay-
ments and the cost which must be incurred to do so. Sheltering decisions made
in light of this tradeoff can be represented by the utility maximization problem:
max
s∈R+
u(bPM, s, θ) = m(bPM − s|θ)︸         ︷︷         ︸
utility over money
− c(s)︸︷︷︸
cost of sheltering
(1.1)
In the equation above, bPM denotes the “pre-manipulation” value of balance
due, and is modelled as a realization of a continuous random variable. s denotes
the additional sheltering pursued in an attempt to manipulate balance due.
θ captures additional included variables, such as wealth in the final-wealth-
dependent case and the reference point in the loss-averse case. m(·) denotes the
utility from money, while c(·) denotes the disutility generated from the costly
pursuit of sheltering. Assume that c(·) is increasing and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable. Further assume that c(·) is convex, which equates to assuming that
the taxpayer pursues shelters with the lowest marginal cost first. The actual
balance due reported to the government is the final, post-manipulation amount
b = bPM − s. If this value is positive, the IRS is owed money; if this value is
negative, a refund is due to the taxpayer.
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Below we will compare alternative sets of assumptions on the structure of
utility over money in this model, and consider the implications of these struc-
tures on observed balance due.
To model a non-reference-dependent “baseline” case, assume that utility
over money depends on weakly-concave, smooth preferences over final wealth:
m(bPM − s|θ) = mFWD(w − bPM + s). The primary distributional implication of this
model is the continuity in balance due which it generates, expressed formally in
proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. In the final-wealth-dependent sheltering model, if mFWD(·) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable and the PDF of bPM is continuous, then the PDF of b = bPM − s
is continuous.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Put simply, smooth preferences combined with a smoothly-distributed pre-
manipulation balance due generate a smoothly-distributed final balance due.
As an illustrative example, consider the case where m(·) is linear with slope β,
thus abstracting from the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. Assuming that
some positive amount of sheltering is desirable,10 optimal sheltering would be
determined by s∗ = c′−1(β). c′−1(·) denotes the inverse function of the derivative
of c(·), which is guaranteed to exist and be increasing due to the assumed mono-
tonicity and convexity of c(·). The final balance due is b = bPM − c′−1(β), and the
distribution of b corresponds to the distribution of bPM shifted downward by
the constant value c′−1(β), thus preserving the continuity of the distribution.
Now consider instead a loss-averse taxpayer, who has m(bPM − s|θ) = −bPM +
10Formally, assuming that c′(0) < m′(w − bPM) = β.
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s + φ(−bPM + s − r). The sum −bPM + s reflects the value of an avoided dollar of
taxes in the same manner as in the linear case above, while the φ(·) component
allows for the influence of reference dependence. To capture loss aversion, φ is
specified according to a piecewise-linear version of the prospect theory value
function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979):
φ(x) =

ηx if x ≥ 0
ηλx if x < 0
(1.2)
λ is the coefficient of loss aversion, assumed to be greater than 1. η captures the
weight on the loss-averse utility component relative to the direct utility compo-
nent. r is assumed to be an exogenously determined reference value of balance
due. In the sections to follow we will assume that the reference point is zero bal-
ance due. This decision is motivated by the intuitive appeal of that referent in
this context, as well as the supporting results of experimental studies mentioned
in the introduction. Furthermore, Carroll (1992) presents data from journals of
tax-related thoughts in which subjects directly report considering taxes in terms
of out-of-pocket gains or losses at the time of filing. Alternative theories of refer-
ence points, and their implications for the results of this paper, will be discussed
in section 1.5.
To rule out corner solutions where sheltering is not pursued, assume c′(0) <
1 + η. The implied optimal sheltering behavior resulting from this model is
expressed by the piecewise solution:
s∗(bPM) =

c′−1(1 + ηλ) if bPM > c′−1(1 + ηλ) − r
bPM if bPM ∈
[
c′−1(1 + η) − r, c′−1(1 + ηλ) − r
]
c′−1(1 + η) if bPM < c′−1(1 + η) − r
(1.3)
In words, a sufficiently large pre-manipulation balance due results in high level
of sheltering, c′−1(1 + ηλ). A sufficiently small pre-manipulation balance due
10
results in low level of sheltering, c′−1(1 + η). For an intermediate range of pre-
manipulation balance due, the level of sheltering chosen will be exactly the
amount necessary to offset the pre-manipulation tax bill and reach the gain/loss
threshold.
The fundamental difficulty of identifying this behavior is that pre-
manipulation balance due is unobservable. To proceed, these results must
be translated into distributional implications for the observed balance due,
after the additional sheltering has taken place. Denoting the PDF of pre-
manipulation balance due with f PMb and the distribution of final reported bal-
ance due as fb, equation 1.3 implies that:
fb(x) =

f PMb (x + c
′−1(1 + η)) if x < r
FPMb (c
′−1(1 + ηλ)) − FPMb (c′−1(1 + η)) if x = r
f PMb (x + c
′−1(1 + ηλ)) if x > r
(1.4)
A graphical representation of this solution, and the relationship between the
pre- and post-manipulation distributions, is presented in figure 1.1. The qualita-
tive distributional implications which contrast with the final-wealth-dependent
case are summarized in propositions 2 and 3 below.
Proposition 2. Consider the loss-averse sheltering model. If r is in the support of the
balance due distribution, then the PDF of balance due is discontinuous at r due to the
point mass of individuals who shelter to reach that point.
Proposition 3. Consider the loss-averse sheltering model and assume r is in the sup-
port of the balance due distribution. For all x , r, fb(x) can be expressed as a horizonal
shift of f PMb (x), with a greater amount of shifting present when the balance due implies
a loss (x > r).
Both propositions follow immediately from the implied balance due distri-
11
Figure 1.1: Implications of loss-averse utility for sheltering behavior
PDF of pre-manipulation balance due with loss-averse utility
PDF of final balance due with loss-averse utility
Notes: Implications of loss-averse tax sheltering for the distribution of balance
due. The first panel presents a hypothetical distribution of “pre-manipulation”
balance due and indicates the optimal sheltering behavior from equation 1.3.
The second panel indicates the final balance due that would be observed after
loss-averse sheltering. The entire distribution is shifted to the left, with a fixed,
larger shift for taxpayers with positive balance due. The darkly shaded region
of taxpayers all shelter until reaching zero balance due, leading to a point mass
in the observed distribution.
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bution in equation 1.4. Proposition 3 is expressed relative to the unobserved dis-
tribution f PMb . However, additional assumptions on the structure of f
PM
b yield
additional testable predictions. For example, if f PMb is single peaked, and if that
peak p maps to the gain domain (consistent with the general phenomenon of
overwithholding), then the implied shifting will result in an appearance of too
little mass across the loss domain.
The propositions thus far have characterized the distribution of balance due
induced by “standard” versus loss-averse agents. In reality, if loss aversion is
present, it is likely that this psychological concern would only influence some
fraction of tax filers. By assuming a mixture of these two types, additional
testable hypotheses may be generated regarding the behaviors and character-
istics of loss-averse shelterers. Intuitively, due to the excess accumulation of
loss-averse taxpayers at the reference point, the relative frequency of this type
will be especially high at this unique value of balance due. Examining the dis-
continuities in individual characteristics which occur at this point will be infor-
mative as to the traits of loss-averse individuals, particularly those who are able
to shelter precisely to the referent.
To formalize this idea, assume that taxpayers make sheltering decisions ac-
cording to equation 1.1, as above. Let fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of taxpayers act ac-
cording to an increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable final-
wealth-dependent utility function mFWD(w − bPM + s|θFWD) − c(s|θFWD). Fraction
(1−p) act according to the loss-averse utility function −bPM+s+φ(−bPM+s−r|θLA)−
c(s|θLA). As above, assume c(·) is increasing, convex, and twice-continuously dif-
ferentiable. Let (w, θFWD) and (η, λ, θLA) be vectors of heterogeneous model pa-
rameters for each type. Assume that c′(0|θLA) < 1 + ηλ for all (η, λ, θLA), ruling
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out the possibility of the degenerate s∗ = 0 sheltering solution for loss-averse
types. Regardless of their motivations, the behavior of individuals for whom
c′(0|θLA) ≥ 1 + ηλ does not depend on positioning relative to a referent, and can
be rationalized by a non-reference-dependent utility. As a result, these individ-
uals are best grouped with the final-wealth-dependent types.
Refer to this joint set of assumptions as the “mixed-type sheltering model.”
Proposition 4. Consider the mixed-type sheltering model. If r is in the support of the
balance due distribution for the loss-averse type, then there exists a threshold value c
such that E[s∗LA(λ, η, θLA|bPM = 0)] − E[s∗FDW(w, θFWD|bPM = 0)] > c > 0 implies:
a) E[bPM |b = r] > limb→r+ E[bPM |b] and E[bPM |b = r] > limb→r− E[bPM |b]; and
b) E[s|b = r] > limb→r+ E[s|b] and E[s|b = r] > limb→r− E[s|b].
Proof. See appendix A.1.
In words, proposition 4 says that if the average amount of sheltering among
loss-averse types at zero balance due is sufficiently large relative to the the av-
erage amount of sheltering among final-wealth-dependent types reporting zero
balance due, then the conditional expectation of both pre-manipulation balance
due and sheltering should be discontinuously high at precisely the reference
value. This result may be unsurprising, as it is essentially an immediate result
of the excess mass of loss-averse taxpayers reporting the reference value. How-
ever, it is worthy of emphasis, because it offers additional testable predictions
of this model. It is reasonable to assume that individuals pursuing loss-averse
tax sheltering are pursuing a relatively high level of sheltering compared to the
14
general population, particularly since the population includes many individu-
als who pursue no sheltering at all. If that is the case, then we should expect
proxies for both sheltering behavior and shocks to pre-manipulation balance
due to exhibit a positive spike in prevalence at the candidate reference point.
This offers an additional means of confirming the theory above, and a method
for detecting the precise tax provisions used to manipulate final balance due to
the referent.
This theory as a whole formalizes the notion that loss aversion will motivate
individuals in the loss domain to work harder to reduce taxes, and that an ex-
cess mass of tax filers will cease their sheltering efforts at the referent due to the
sudden drop in perceived payoff. Using the identifying features of such a model
proposed above, the empirical results in section 1.4 will confirm these basic in-
tuitions. Of course, decisions on how taxes are determined and how payments
are made are quite complex, and this theory leaves a number of components un-
modelled, such as the determination of initial withholding. Possible theoretical
complications will be revisited in section 1.5, so we may jointly consider their
effect on the theory and the ability of such concerns to generate the observed
patterns in the data.
1.3 Data
The data considered in this study come from the the 1979-1990 IRS Statistics of
Income (SOI) Panel of Individual Returns. The SOI Panel of Individual Returns
is an unbalanced panel which follows a random sample of tax filers. Random-
ization occurred over social security numbers: five four-digit numbers were
15
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drawn, and tax filers whose last four SSN digits matched one of these codes
were included in the sample. Not all five codes were sampled in all years; ap-
pendix table A.1 illustrates the sampling pattern over time. These data contain
many line items from the 1040 tax form and the relevant supplemental sched-
ules, allowing direct observation of balance due and many steps of its calcula-
tion.
In the process of preparing the dataset, I exclude data according to several
critera. First, I restrict my sample to taxpayers in one of the 50 states or the
District of Columbia. Second, I remove a small number of observations which
were sampled under a different, stratified sampling regime.11 Finally, I drop any
data for filing years before 1979.12 These exclusions remove 3,051 observations
from the raw data, and yield a sample size of 291,275 person-years for 64,027
tax filers.
For most of the analyses surrounding loss aversion, I will further restrict the
data to only individuals with non-zero tax liability (before the application of tax
credits) as well as non-zero tax prepayments. This restriction excludes 62,159
observations from the data. The theory above assumes some degree of taxable
activity has been pursued, and that some tax prepayments have taken place.
The inclusion of individuals for whom this does not hold is problematic. For ex-
ample, individuals not in the work force do not fit well with the theory laid out
11As mentioned above, this sample was generated by randomization based on social security
numbers, but not all numbers were sampled in all years of the panel. In years where a given
social security number was excluded from this panel, it was not excluded from other IRS sam-
pling frames. As a result, a small number of those taxpayers were randomly sampled to be part
of that year’s IRS tax model file. These observations were subsequently included in this panel,
but flagged. Since these employed a different, stratified sampling technique, I exclude them to
preserve the sampling structure of the primary panel.
12Tardy tax returns filed during the sampling period appear in the raw data, and thus a small
number of tax returns for years before the sample began appear in the raw data. These obser-
vations are excluded.
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in section 1.2, and will have balance due in the immediate region around zero
for mechanical reasons. I refer to the dataset with these individuals excluded as
the “primary sample,” in contrast to the full sample above. This sample consists
of 229,116 tax returns filed by 53,177 taxpayers, and basic summary statistics are
presented in table 1.1.
1.4 Evidence of loss aversion
In this section, I will test the predictions of the loss-averse sheltering model
presented in section 1.2.
To begin, we will first examine the raw distribution of balance due among
individuals in the primary sample. Figure 1.2 presents a frequency histogram
with a bin size of $1. As is visually apparent, this distribution is reasonably
smooth and bell-shaped, although clearly with higher kurtosis than a standard
normal distribution. Consistent with proposition 2, a sharp point mass is seen
precisely at zero, and consistent with proposition 3 the distribution of balance
due exhibits an apparant shifting for those with positive balance due.
To help formalize these notions, I fit a parametric distribution to the his-
togram of negative values of balance due (the gain domain). I then extrapolate
predicted frequencies into the region of positive balance due (the loss domain).
Specifically, I model the conditional distribution of negative balance due as
f (b|b < 0) =
∑3
i=1 piφ
(
b−µ
σi
)
∑3
i=1 pi
(
Φ
(−µ
σi
)
− Φ
(b−µ
σi
)) (1.5)
This equation defines a three-component mixture of normal distributions, with
the normal PDF and CDF denoted with φ and Φ, respectively. While a single
18
Figure 1.2: Distribution of balance due
Notes: Histogram of balance due in $1 bins. The graph is centered on −300
with range restricted to [−1700, 1100]. For details of the calculation of the fitted
distribution, see equation 1.5 in section 1.4.
normal distribution exhibits somewhat poor fit due to the high kurtosis dis-
cussed above, a mixture of several normals closely fits the sharp peak observed.
A common mean is assumed to preserve symmetry. pi denotes the mixing prob-
abilities. The denominator ensures that this conditional distribution integrates
to 1 on its restricted range.13 I estimate parameters for this model via maximum
likelihood and overlay the predicted frequencies in figure 1.2. As is visually
clear, the frequency distribution of balance due exhibits substantial excess mass
precisely at zero, and frequencies in the loss domain are substantially lower than
would be forecasted from the remainder of the distribution.
13b is the lowest value of balance due considered, set to -1700 in figure 1.2.
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Due to difficulties about to be discussed, this fitted distribution is not meant
to be interpreted as a structural estimate of the true counterfactual distribution
without loss aversion. Rather, it is intended as a rough guide to help demon-
strate the unique regime change occuring precisely at zero balance due.
A possible concern with the interpretation of figure 1.2 is that it ignores
cross-group heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is clearly an important deter-
minant of this distribution; for example, differences are expected between high-
income and low-income individuals since they have different income sources
and available tax shelters, and since greater earnings allow for greater under- or
over- withholding. Figure 1.3 plots the histogram of balance due separating ob-
servations into year-specific adjusted gross income quartiles. Clear differences
can be seen in the distributions: while it is generally quite smooth and dispersed
for high AGI individuals, it is more irregular and concentrated for those with
low AGI. However, across these quite different distributions, the predictions of
propositions 2 and 3 still hold.
An additional concern with the interpretation of figure 1.2 is that the fitted
distribution relies on an assumption of symmetry. However, the detection of
missing mass in the loss domain does not rely on this assumption. To illustrate,
figure 1.4 presents a histogram of balance due “zoomed in” on zero, restricting
the range to [−100, 100]. To estimated a fitted distribution, I proceed in a man-
ner similar to that in Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) and model
balance due as a seventh-order polynomial, allowing for a discontinuity at zero
and “dummying out” the spike itself. Formally, I estimate
C j = α +
n∑
i=1
βi · bi + γ · I(b j = 0) + δ · I(b j > 0) +  j (1.6)
j indexes each dollar amount of balance due b from -100 to 100, with corre-
20
Figure 1.3: Distribution of balance due by year-specific AGI quartile
Notes: Histogram of balance due in $1 bins, graphed separately for different
year-specific AGI quartiles. Each graph is centered on −300 with range re-
stricted to [−1700, 1100].
sponding counts C j. The polynomial approximates the smooth distribution of
b, although it allows for a discontinuity at zero through the inclusion of δ. These
estimates are reported in column 1 of table 1.2, and the predicted distribution is
graphed over the histogram in figure 1.4. The negative and statistically signifi-
cant estimate of δ indicates a downward shift in the distribution when crossing
the gain/loss threshold.
This framework additionally allows for quantification of the excess mass
seen at zero balance due. The ratio γ
α
measures this mass at zero in percentage
terms, relative to the mass predicted from the distribution in the gain domain.
To clarify the interpretation of this ratio, note that an estimate of 0 would im-
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of balance due in vicinity of zero
Notes: Histogram of balance due in $1 bins. Range restricted to [−100, 100]. For
details of the calculation of the fitted distribution, see equation 1.6 in section 1.4.
ply that the frequency observed at the referent is precisely that predicted by the
gain-domain polynomial. An estimate of 1 would indicate 100% excess mass
at this point; the difference between the actual frequency and the predicted fre-
quency (γ) is the same as the predicted frequency itself (α). The estimates from
column 1 imply that there is 86% excess mass at zero balance due (95% confi-
dence interval: [65%, 108%]).
One might question whether this constitutes a large or small amount of ex-
cess mass. For the sake of comparison, consider the amount of excess mass
generated by other features of the tax system studied with comparable bunch-
ing identification strategies. Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) es-
timated the elasticity of labor supply based off of the excess mass generated
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by a discontinuity in the marginal tax rate faced by Danish workers. In their
full-sample analysis, they found an excess mass (argued to be due to behav-
ioral response to this discontinuity) which amounted to 81% of the height of the
smoothed distribution. Saez (2010) looked for bunching at a variety of discon-
tinuities in the tax schedule, both due to jumps in tax rates as well as the two
kinks in the EITC schedule. Bunching was not observed at most kinks, although
excess mass was seen at the first EITC kink and the first kink in the tax schedule
(where the marginal tax rate jumps from zero to positive). Overall, Saez’s final
conclusion is that we actually see very little bunching at all. Furthermore, unlike
the bunching seen in these papers, which is diffuse around the predicted point,
this bunch is a specific pointmass at the precise location theoretically predicted.
Relative to other applications of bunching identification strategies, these results
are notably sharp.
The remaining columns of table 1.2 repeat this exercise while restricting the
data to different AGI quartiles. While a significant amount of excess mass is
seen at zero across all four quartiles, it is clear that this bunching behavior is
markedly more pronounced among high-AGI tax filers. The distribution of the
top year-specific AGI quartile exhibits 174% excess mass at zero (95% confi-
dence interval: [121%, 227%]), substantially higher than the excess mass in the
first three quartiles (89%, 57%, and 50% respectively). By and large, this phe-
nomenon appears to be primarily driven by high-income individuals.
Having confirmed the basic distributional predictions of loss-aversion, we
now turn to the prediction implied by proposition 4. If loss-averse shelterers
pursue a relatively high level of sheltering relative to the general population,
we should expect individuals reporting zero balance due to have unusually
24
high values of pre-manipulation balance due and unusally high pursuit of tax
shelters. While neither of these variables are formally observed, proxies associ-
ated with their levels may be constructed through the examination of different
components of the total balance due calculation.
Inference on the pre-manipulation value of balance due may be conducted
by examining individual-level income shocks. Tax withholdings are determined
based on estimates of your taxable income for the year. To the extent that these
estimates were forecasted from prior years’ taxable income, individuals with
stable income streams are insulated from large shocks to balance due. In con-
strast, individuals experiencing a large and positive shock to taxable income
will face a relatively large balance due unless their income shock was fully an-
ticipated. Such individuals are likely to face a loss.
To explore the income shocks experienced by individuals at zero balance
due, I make use of the panel nature of these data. In tables 1.3 and 1.4 I report
estimates from models of the form
∆AGI = α + βI(b = 0) + CΓ +  (1.7)
where CΓ represents the relevent included controls. In all such regressions, stan-
dard errors are clustered by taxpayer. If the individuals at zero balance due are,
on average, recipients of unduly-large income shocks, we would expect the co-
efficient on I(b = 0) to be positive.
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Table 1.3: Estimates of AGI shocks at zero balance due
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable : ∆ AGI
Balance due = 0 3766∗∗ 4133∗∗ 5460∗∗∗ 3752∗ 4922∗∗ 4971∗∗
(1373) (1375) (1451) (1696) (1717) (1643)
Balance due > 0 -16 693∗∗∗ 624∗∗∗ 1213∗∗∗
(102) (99) (130) (114)
Filing-year fixed effects X X X X X X
Balance due polynomial X X X X
Lagged AGI polynomial X X
Taxpayer fixed effects X X X
N 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325
R2 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.41
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by taxpayer, in parentheses. Xs indicate
the presence of filing-year or taxpayer fixed effects, a third-order polynomial
in lagged AGI, or a third-order polynomial in balance due interacted with
I(balance due > 0) to allow for discontinuity at zero. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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The first column of table 1.3 indicates that relative to all other taxpayers, in-
dividuals precisely at zero balance due report an additional $3,766 of income
growth, on average. In spirit similar to the excess mass estimates of the pre-
vious section, column 2 estimates a model where ∆AGI is a smooth function of
balance due but allowing for a discontinuity at zero. The third column addition-
ally allows the amount of AGI growth to depend on a third-order polynomial
in last-year’s AGI, which can capture the notion that a larger absolute amount
of year-to-year income growth is expected among higher-income individuals.
The fourth through sixth columns repeat these exercises with the inclusion of
taxpayer-specific fixed effects. Across these regressions the estimated excess
amount ranges from $3,752 to $5,460. It is worthy of note that despite the large
overall sample size, these estimates are still reasonably imprecise, as they are
identified solely from the individuals precisely at the referent. While this impre-
cision means these reported magnitudes come with a fair degree of uncertainty,
it is clear that all estimates are positive in a statistically significant manner and
their confidence intervals suggest an economically significant magnitude, giv-
ing strong evidence of relatively large income shocks being experienced by these
bunching individuals.
The ability of an increase in income to generate a shock to balance due de-
pends on the source of income. For example, if a taxpayer’s earnings are primar-
ily from a fixed wage or salary, an increase to that salary can relatively easily be
accounted for in the employer’s withholding calculations. On the other hand,
income from non-wage and non-salary sources often have more complex re-
quirements for accurate tax withholdings. For example, a small-business owner,
whose income is reported through schedule C, must forecast his earnings at the
beginning of the tax year. If this filer subsequently outperforms his predicted
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Table 1.4: Estimates of AGI shocks at zero balance due interacted with income
source
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable : ∆ AGI
Balance due = 0 564 577 1018 113 280 774
(650) (651) (680) (815) (863) (801)
Income from Schedule C-F 90 -1570∗∗∗ -959∗∗∗ 252∗ -824∗∗∗ -606∗∗∗
(52) (66) (61) (105) (107) (109)
Balance due = 0 7654∗ 9308∗∗ 11019∗∗∗ 8229∗ 10652∗∗ 9596∗∗
× Income from Schedule C-F (3136) (3137) (3260) (3654) (3649) (3511)
Balance due > 0 439∗∗∗ 1119∗∗∗ 424∗∗∗ 1217∗∗∗
(99) (99) (129) (120)
Balance due > 0 120 -311∗ 523∗∗ 75
× Income from Schedule C-F (124) (123) (170) (159)
Filing-year fixed effects X X X X X X
Balance due polynomial X X X X
Lagged AGI polynomial X X
Taxpayer fixed effects X X X
N 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325
R2 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.41
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by taxpayer, in parentheses. Xs indicate the presence
of filing-year or taxpayer fixed effects, a third-order polynomial in lagged AGI, or a
third-order polynomial in balance due interacted with I(balance due > 0) to allow for
discontinuity at zero. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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earnings, that shock will carry through and result in underwithholding.
To investigate the relationship between income sources and the income
shock at zero I calculate a dummy variable indiciating the filing of schedule
C (business income), schedule D (capital gains and losses), schedule E (royal-
ties, partnerships, S corporations, rental real estate, etc.), or schedule F (farm
income). Income from these sources is likely unpredictable at the beginning
of the tax year, allowing large shocks to these income categories to translate
into shocks to pre-manipulation balance due. The structure of table 1.4 exactly
follows table 1.3, but includes a dummy variable indicating that the taxpayer
filed any of the above-noted schedules, as well as an interaction variable be-
tween this dummy and I(b = 0). Among individuals without income from these
sources, no statistically significant excess income growth is detected. However,
as inferred from the interaction term, individuals who file one of this group
of schedules and report a balance due of zero are experiencing exceptionally
high income growth, with estimates of the excess growth ranging from $7,654
to $11,019.
The results of tables 1.3 and 1.4 serve as a confirmation of the first prediction
detailed in proposition 4. The second prediction of this proposition suggests
that sheltering measures must also be discretely higher at zero balance due.
In table 1.5, I present estimates of the relationship between the employment
of tax-reducing provisions and the value of balance due. After the calculation of
total income on form 1040, the tax filer may subsequently reduce this value by
reporting adjustments to income and by claiming deductions. After the result-
ing tax is calculated, it may be further reduced by claiming tax credits. For these
three categories of activities, I examine if—conditional on year, balance due, and
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the prior year’s reported AGI—individuals reporting zero balance due are more
likely to pursue a tax shelter in that category. I similarly examine if the raw
amount of sheltering in that category is markedly increased. The estimates of
columns 1, 3, and 5 indicate that pursuit of non-zero amounts of all three shelter-
ing categories are higher precisely at zero, although the effect is only statistically
significant for the pursuit of adjustments to income. The estimates of columns
2, 4, and 6 indicate that the raw amount of all three sheltering categories are
higher precisely at zero, although the effect is statistically insignificant for the
pursuit of credits. Overall, the evidence supports the prediction that the indi-
viduals bunching at zero, and the behavioral type they represent, are pursuing
tax-reducing activities to a greater degree than relevant comparison groups.
Unaudited tax returns, like these, are not ideal for direct inference on the
rate of illegal tax evasion. However, methods for conducting indirect inference
on the degree of evasion have been suggested by Slemrod (1985) and Feldman
and Slemrod (2007). While these methods are not ideally suited to this setting,
for completeness I use each to generate proxies for tax evasion and estimate its
prevalence in the vicinity of zero balance due. These analyses are reported in
appendix section A.2, and briefly summarized here.
The approach proposed by Slemrod (1985) is based on the incentives intro-
duced by the bin thresholds in tax tables. Since tax tables are not used by the
higher-income individuals driving the primary bunching result, responsiveness
to these thresholds is not observed to be discontinuously prevalent at zero bal-
ance due, constituting an (understandable) null result.
The approach proposed by Feldman and Slemrod (2007) is designed to esti-
mate the rate of underreporting of different sources of income based on the rate
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Table 1.5: Sheltering-relevant behaviors at zero balance due
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adjustments Itemized Deduction Credits
> 0 Amount > 0 Amount > 0 Amount
Balance due = 0 0.10∗∗ 516∗∗ 0.02 911∗ 0.02 179
(0.03) (172) (0.03) (436) (0.03) (144)
Balance due > 0 0.05∗∗∗ 138∗∗∗ 0.00 293∗∗∗ -0.01∗ 27∗
(0.00) (20) (0.00) (48) (0.00) (10)
Filing-year effects X X X X X X
Balance due polynomial X X X X X X
Lagged AGI polynomial X X X X X X
N 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325 148325
R2 0.19 0.10 0.38 0.53 0.47 0.05
Notes: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the individual level. Xs indi-
cate the presence of filing-year fixed effects, a third-order polynomial in lagged AGI, or
a third-order polynomial in balance due interacted with I(balance due > 0) to allow for
discontinuity at zero. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
of charitable giving. By assuming that the income elasticity of charitable giving
is invariant to income source, the rate of income underreporting can be esti-
mated based on cross-income-category rates of charitable giving.14 I implement
14The authors assume that the rate of income reporting on schedules C-F is potentially less
than 100%, whereas the rate of reporting on other incomes sources is 100% due to factors such
as the effectiveness of income reports. These assumptions are supported by evidence from IRS
estimates of voluntary reporting ratings, which show that the 1988 voluntary reporting per-
centages (VRPs) for income sources associated with the above schedules range from 18.6% for
informal supplies income to 92.5% for partnership and S corporation income. This contrasts
with the 99.1% VRP for wages and salaries. The primary explanation for the differences across
income sources are the degree of “visibility” of the income to the IRS, and thus the scope for
undetected evasion.
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a variant of their estimation strategy in my data and use it to form a metric of
total underreporting. This metric is shown to be sharply spiked at zero balance
due, consistent with higher income underreporting at that point.
To summarize, this section has documented a clear excess mass of tax fil-
ers reporting zero balance due. This excess mass is primarily driven by high-
income filers and is strongly associated with experiencing a large, positive in-
come shock from a source of income with nonmechanical withholding. A vari-
ety of correlates and proxies for sheltering are notably spiked at zero. These re-
sults are precisely in line with the predictions of the loss-averse theory presented
in section 1.2, and suggest that psychologically-motivated gain/loss framing
impacts the filing of taxes.
1.5 Alternative theories and robustness concerns
In this section, I consider several candidate alternative theories and their abil-
ity to generate the behavior observed in the previous section. While previous
literature and intuitive considerations bring several options to mind, ultimately
they are not well suited to explaining the patterns in the data. I will additionally
consider several possible complications with the theoretical model presented in
section 1.2, and their relevance in explaining the highlighted results.
Fixed costs incurred in the loss domain: If a substantial fixed cost were assigned
to individuals as they crossed the threshold into positive balance due, this could
naturally generate bunching at zero through incentivizing additional tax shel-
tering. Possible sources of such a fixed cost include the annoyance of having
to write out a check (which is unnecessary if balance due is non-positive), or
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beliefs of a discretely different and higher audit probability among individuals
with positive balance due. While these fixed costs are clearly not large in objec-
tive terms, a large subjective belief in their value might occur. Such a fixed cost
would determine a threshold b¯ such that the individual would shelter to zero if
pre-manipulation balance due fell within [0, b¯]. Put simply, if the cost of writ-
ing a check to the IRS were such that taxpayers were willing to incur the costs
associated with up to $100 of additional sheltering, taxpayers would shelter to
zero if dealt a baseline balance due between $0 and $100. If baseline balance due
did not fall within this region, marginal incentives would not be affected, and
the distribution would be no different than in the case with no fixed cost. Thus,
these incentives can generate bunching at zero, but have different implications
for the distribution over positive balance due amounts. This theory would sug-
gest a region with no probability mass immediately to the right of zero, but
farther in the tail the distribution would be consistent with the no-fixed-cost
baseline. This pattern does not conform with the distribution observed in figure
1.2, suggesting that perceptions of a substantial fixed cost being incurred while
passing zero are not driving this behavior.
Avoidance of the underwithholding penalty: The underwithholding penalty, and
the discontinuity in the tax schedule it induces, can drive bunching behavior
in tax sheltering activity without the presence of loss aversion. However, it is
important to note that the threshold for underwithholding is not at zero (or
indeed very close). Across the years in the sample, there is a grace window
fixed in percentage terms (typically 10% of total tax due, a substantial amount
for the high-income filers driving the observed bunching behavior), with the
size of the window bounded below at a minimum of several hundred dollars.
The bunching behavior we see precisely at zero is not at the threshold for the
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underwithholding penalty, and cannot be rationalized in this manner.
Liquidity constraints: Taxpayers who are liquidity constrained must eliminate
their balance due or face a payment they cannot make, which can naturally lead
to higher rates of tax sheltering for individuals with positive pre-manipulation
balance due. However, if liquidity constraints covered a range of small but non-
zero asset values, it would imply a diffusion of excess mass to the right of zero
in figure 1.2. Such a diffusion is clearly not present. This fact, combined with
the general implausibility of the lack of literally any liquid assets among such
high-income filers, suggests that liquidity cannot be the primary driver of this
bunching behavior.
Bunching due to discontinuities in the tax schedule or extremely accurate forecast-
ing: As demonstrated in Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011), discon-
tinuities in the tax schedule, formed by the discrete jumps in the marginal tax
rate as one crosses into a higher tax bracket, can naturally generate bunching
in the distribution of total taxes owed. This bunching is naturally somewhat
diffused by things such as adjustment costs, as explored in that work. Saez
(2010) reports not finding evidence of this behavior for higher-income taxfilers
in US data, which limits the concern that this could be a confound. However,
if some population of taxfilers were attempting to bunch at these threshholds,
had the ability to do so precisely, and planned their tax prepayments assum-
ing their final tax liability would precisely land on this threshold, this would
naturally generate point mass in the distribution of bPM at zero. However, this
would require these taxpayers to have literally zero imprecision in their fore-
casts of their taxable behavior for the year and in tax prepayments. Given that
some degree of forecasting error is an unambiguous reality of this decision en-
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vironment, we would instead expect the excess mass induced by this type of
bunching to be diffuse around zero. That no such diffusion is observed in fig-
ure 1.2, combined with the results of Saez (2010), suggests that this explanation
is not plausible. Furthermore, the primary drivers of this bunching behavior
are individuals with non-wage non-salary income (which is inherently difficult
to forecast) who are having dramatically atypical, high-income years, making
to-the-dollar accuracy of forecasting implausible.
Interaction with tax preparers: A substantial fraction of taxpayers do not han-
dle their own tax returns, but instead relegate this task to a paid tax preparer.
In principle this could complicate the manner in which sheltering decisions are
made. A simple reformulation of the baseline model in section 1.2, accounting
for this complication, would be:
max
s
uP(mC(−bPM) + cC(s)︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
utility of client
) − cP(s)︸︷︷︸
costs to tax preparer
(1.8)
The subscripts P and C refer to the tax preparer and client, respectively. In this
formulation, the tax preparer balances the utility gains from customer satisfac-
tion (capturing concerns such as the increased probability of return service and
good recommendations) and the costs of pursuing additional sheltering. If uP
is an increasing, concave, twice-differentiable function, the qualitative results of
section 1.2 above hold without modification—if the client has smooth utility, the
distribution of balance due will be smooth, and if the client is loss averse, the
distribution will bunch at zero due to higher sheltering in the loss domain.
Interestingly, the use of tax preparers is particularly prevalent among indi-
viduals reporting zero balance due, even when controlling for prior AGI. An
estimate analogous to those reported in table 1.5 indicates an increase in the
probability of using a paid tax preparer of 15 percentage points (standard error:
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6.3 percentage points).
Tax returns filled out by a paid preparer are completed by an individual with
much greater knowledge and command of the tax code, leading to a richer va-
riety of tax shelters that could be expected to be brought to bear. Furthermore,
using audited returns from 1979, Erard (1993) demonstrated that tax noncompli-
ance is dramatically higher among individuals with CPA- or lawyer-prepared
returns, as opposed to self-prepared returns.15 Under this interpretation, the use
of paid tax preparers may be serving as a proxy for high pursuit of sheltering,
in which case its discontinuity at zero serves as further evidence in support of
the loss-averse model.
Choice of the reference point: The theoretical discussion of loss aversion has
assumed a common framing of a zero balance due referent, consistent with past
experimental studies and with Kahneman and Tversky’s original presentation.
This modeling decision seems plausible in the framing of balance due, given the
literal gain or loss that will occur relative to that point.
An alternative approach prevalent in recent literature is the expectations-
based reference-dependent model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Variants
of this model have been successfully employed in several recent papers (see,
e.g., Crawford and Meng (2011), Ericson and Fuster (2011), or Gill and Prowse
(2012)), although it has also been challenged by difficulties in explaining the
endowment effect (Heffetz and List, 2012). The approach of the papers listed
above, as well as other prevalent reference-dependent work (Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein, and Thaler, 1997; Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Kahneman, Knetsch,
15Self-prepared returns understated their income 39.2% of the time, with a mean level of non-
compliance of $244. CPA or lawyer-prepared returns understated their income 63% of the time,
with a mean level of noncompliance of $1,786.
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and Thaler, 1990; Pope and Schweitzer, 2010) is to pursue a particular model of
the reference point and generally “assume away” model heterogeneity in the
reference point formation process. Given the sum of this literature, it seems
reasonable to imagine that across different individuals and contexts, different
factors might determine the reference point.
The bunching observed at zero balance due suggests that a referent of zero,
in the “narrow frame” of balance due amount, is indeed considered by some
positive fraction of the population; however, it is possible that some additional
fraction is reference dependent relative to an alternative model not studied in
this paper. The exploration of alternative reference points in this process is em-
pirically challenging, but a potentially fruitful avenue for future research.
1.6 Structural estimation and policy experiments
Given the results of the previous sections, it appears clear that the observed ex-
cess sheltering and bunching behavior is driven by loss aversion. In this section,
I will develop and estimate a structural model of this behavior to answer several
remaining questions.
While the evidence of the preceding sections suggests that some individu-
als are loss averse, it is not informative as to the precise fraction of individuals
exhibiting evidence of these psychological considerations. Knowing the frac-
tion of individuals behaving in a manner consistent with loss aversion is of sig-
nificant interest to both behavioral economists (to determine the prevalence of
this widely-studied behavior) and to tax policy makers (to accurately forecast
their behavior), the structural model I develop will explicitly allow a mixtures
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of “standard” types and loss averse types and estimate the fraction of each, per-
mitting inference on the number of individuals driving the observed bunching
behavior.
It would additionally be desirable to explicitly estimate the preference pa-
rameters of loss-averse individuals, such as the coefficient of loss aversion. Un-
fortunately, these preference parameters cannot be separately identified from
the parameters of the cost function, but this does not hinder the use of this
model for quantifying the effects of loss aversion.16 The amount of additional
sheltering pursued in the loss domain relative to the gain domain is identified.
I will use these estimates to conduct a counterfactual policy experiment, con-
sidering the implications of shifting the distribution of baseline balance due, as
could be achieved by, e.g., more lenient withholding laws. Such a shift would
move a range of individuals into the loss domain, and thus motivate additional
tax sheltering for this group. Quantifying this effect is helpful in understanding
the magnitude of effects this behavior would generate when manipulations to
tax law are made.
The structural model I estimate is an extension of the theory laid out in sec-
tion 1.2. There are two types, standard agents and loss-averse agents. As before,
the distribution of balance due of loss-averse agents is given by equation 1.4,
which is reproduced here after a change-in-variables helpful for understanding
identification:
f LAb (x|µ, ν, f ) =

f (x − µ) if x < 0
F(−µ + ν) − F(−µ) if x = 0
f (x − µ + ν) if x > 0
(1.9)
16The lack of separate identification can be immediately inferred from equation 1.3.
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Define µ = E[bPM]−c′−1(1+η) and define ν = c′−1(1+ηλ)−c′−1(1+η). µ can be inter-
preted as the mean of a counterfactual distribution in which the taxpayer always
pursues the low sheltering amount. ν measures the difference between the high
and the low sheltering amount. The constant shift induced by ν is clearly iden-
tified, and its estimate permits inference on the difference in sheltering across
gain or loss framing.
Denote the fraction of loss-averse taxpayers with pLA. The remainder are
standard agents, and do not pursue different sheltering strategies based on the
realization of baseline balance due. The distribution of their balance due is thus
determined as
f S Ab (x|µ, ψ, f ) = f (x − µ + ψ) (1.10)
Standard agents will likely have a different baseline sheltering behavior, or po-
tentially even a different mean level of baseline balance due (capturing differ-
ences in withholding behavior). The inclusion of the term ψ allows for these
differerences.
As in section 1.2, the solutions presented have assumed some positive
amount of sheltering for loss-averse taxpayers, at least in the loss domain. If
an individual is reference dependent, but only has access to tax sheltering tech-
nologies that are perceived to be so costly that they go unused, no asymme-
try in sheltering behavior can be observed, because no sheltering behavior ex-
ists. Since these individuals’ behavior can be rationalized by a non-reference-
dependent utility function, they are grouped with the standard agents. Esti-
mates of the fraction of loss-averse shelterers sheltering thus exclude individ-
uals with loss-averse motivations but insufficient access to sheltering technolo-
gies.
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The presence of these two types of taxpayers generates a mixture distribu-
tion, parameterized by pLA, f , µ, ν, and ψ. Formally,
fb(x|µ, ν, ψ, pLA, f ) = pLA · f LAb (x|µ, ν, f ) + (1 − pLA) · f S Ab (x|µ, ψ, f ) (1.11)
f is of unknown form, and will itself be modeled as a mixture of normal dis-
tributions, f (x) =
∑2
i=1 qiφ
(
x
σi
)
, in order to capture the high-kurtosis bell shape
observed in figure 1.2. This introduces the additional parameters q1, σ1, and σ2
which must be estimated.
As emphasized in section 1.4, heterogeneity in model components across
both years and income levels is to be expected. Furthermore, the results of pre-
vious sections suggest that high income filers are those driving the observed
loss-averse behavior, suggesting that the probability of being a loss-averse type
should be allowed by vary by AGI level. To model this heterogeneity, I allow all
model parameters to be year specific, and to be a function of AGI (normalized
within year). For unrestricted parameters, I model this as a linear relationship.
For parameters constrained to be positive, I model this as a log-linear relation-
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ship. Probabilities take logit form. Formally,
µt = c
µ
t + β
µ
t · std(AGI) (1.12)
ψt = c
ψ
t + β
ψ
t · std(AGI) (1.13)
ln(νt) = cνt + β
ν
t · std(AGI) (1.14)
ln(σ1t) = c
σ1
t + β
σ1
t · std(AGI) (1.15)
ln(σ2t) = c
σ2
t + β
σ2
t · std(AGI) (1.16)
q1t =
eθ1t
eθ1t + 1
(1.17)
θ1t = cθ1t + β
θ
1t · std(AGI) (1.18)
pLAt =
eγ1t
eγ1t + 1
(1.19)
γ1t = cθ1t + β
θ
1t · std(AGI) (1.20)
I estimate the 168 parameters17 of this system of equations via maximum
likelihood. Numerical optimation is conducted through alternating application
of Newton-Raftson and the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithms. Parameter
estimates are reported in appendix tables A.2 and A.3, and the predicted fit of
the mixtures is graphed in appendix figures A.1 - A.6.
Examining the raw estimates, two results become immediately clear. First,
consistent with prior results in this paper, loss-averse behavior is estimated to
be rare among low-income filers, but is prevelant among high income filers. As
reported in figures A.1 - A.6, the estimated probability of reference dependence
for an individual with AGI 1 standard deviation below the year-specific mean is
low, ranging from 0% to 9%. In contrast, the estimated probability of loss aver-
sion for an individual with AGI 1 standard deviation above the year-specific
mean ranges from 43% to 94%. As reported in table 1.6, the estimated fraction
177 constants and 7 AGI coefficients for each of the 12 panel years.
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of the population exhibiting loss aversion, unconditional on income and aver-
aged across years, is 29%.
I will now turn to calculating the total excess sheltering these estimates im-
ply, as well as the counterfactual exercise described above. These calculations
require two additional sources of data. First, to make dollar amounts compara-
ble across years, I use the consumer price index calculator of the BLS to translate
year-specific dollar amounts into 2013 dollars. Additionally, calculations of to-
tal sheltering require multiplying per-capita estimates by the total number of
tax filers in each year, which I obtained from estimates published by the IRS.
To calculate an estimate of the per capita additional sheltering motivated
by loss aversion, I multiply the posterior probability that an individual is loss
averse18 by the predicted amount of excess sheltering the model would forecast
for a loss-averse type (conditional on year, AGI, and reported balance due). This
excess sheltering is zero for all individuals in the gain domain, ν for individuals
in the loss domain, and the necessary amount to reach zero for individuals at
the referent. Relevant estimates are reported in rows 2-4 of table 1.6. Overall,
expressed in 2013 dollars, the estimated model implies a yearly average of 278
million dollars less tax revenue collected due to tax sheltering motivated by loss
aversion.
While this raw total is interesting, it is not the ideal number for policy con-
siderations. This number captures the total amount of additional tax revenue
18Formally, the posterior probability that an observation was generated by the reference-
dependent component, conditional on the parameter estimates and the observed value of bal-
ance due x, is calculated with a simple application of Bayes rule:
f LAb (x|µt(AGI), νt(AGI), σ1t(AGI), σ2t(AGI), q1t(AGI))
fb(x|µt(AGI), νt(AGI), ψt(AGI), σ1t(AGI), σ2t(AGI), q1t(AGI), pLAt(AGI)) (1.21)
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which could be captured if loss-averse filers could be induced to always behave
as if they were in the gain domain. It is unclear what type of policy could ac-
tually accomplish this. A more practical consideration focuses on what would
happen if specific steps were taken to move the gain/loss threshold. The pri-
mary policy lever available to manipulate loss-averse sheltering is changing the
framing of the taxes owed at tax day. For example, changing withholding laws
to yield a different average baseline balance due would, for a range of taxpay-
ers, affect whether they are in the gain or loss domain, and thus affect their
sheltering behavior.
This is directly relevant to the phenomenon of overwithholding (for related
behavioral study of overwithholding, see Jones (2012)). Most tax filers get re-
funds, and in my full sample, the average balance due is -$324. This overwith-
holding is often discussed as undesirable for taxpayers, as these excess tax pre-
payments constitute a (small) interest-free loan to the government. As discussed
in previous literature, this overwithholding is beneficial in the presence of ref-
erence dependence, as it reduces the motives for additional tax sheltering. With
the structural estimates provided, we may precisely characterize the magnitude
of such an effect.
To do so, I calculate the additional loss-averse sheltering that would be ex-
pected as a result of shifting the balance due distribution by $300 to offset over-
withholding. Examining figure 1, this is conceptually recentering the distribu-
tion such that zero balance due falls closer to the peak, rather than in the right
tail of the distribution. Estimates of the change in sheltering are calculated in
the precise same manner as the totals previously considered, and the increases
in sheltered tax revenue are reported in rows 5-7 of table 1.6. These estimates
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imply that such a shift would result in 51 million dollars of new sheltering,
expressed in 2013 dollars and averaged across years. These results suggest that
attention to these psychological considerations while designing and implement-
ing tax changes can have substantial effects on collected revenue, and, to the
extent that such manipulations are “cheap,” may prove highly cost effective.
1.7 Conclusion
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that loss aversion has a signifi-
cant role in the economic psychology of taxation, and affects the behavior of tax
filers in substantial ways. The observed sharp bunching at zero and the concur-
rent shifting of the balance due distribution for positive values are immediate
implications of loss aversion, and the distribution they generate is reasonably
implausible under existing alternative theories.
These results contribute to the growing literature demonstrating the im-
portance of loss aversion in the field (e.g. Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein,
and Thaler, 1997; Genesove and Mayer, 1999; Farber 2005, 2008; Pope and
Schweitzer, 2010; Crawford and Meng, 2011), and demonstrate the applicability
of this model for improving our understanding of tax behavior. Estimates of
the population rate of loss-averse sheltering suggest that this behavioral phe-
nomenon is remarkably prevalent in population, at least for this particular set-
ting. Furthermore, the estimates presented in section 1.6 suggest that substan-
tial amounts of sheltering are being motivated by these simple and predictable
psychological concerns.
Several immediate policy recommendations can be drawn from the results
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of this study. First, this model implies that individuals reporting near-zero bal-
ance due are especially likely to be employing tax shelters. To the extent that
illegal means are used to achieve this sheltering, targeted auditing of these in-
dividuals would assist in enforcing tax compliance. Second, this study suggests
that the phenomenon of overwithholding is even more beneficial to the IRS than
previously expected, as it ensures that a reasonably small fraction of tax filers
face the additional sheltering motivations associated with underwithholding in
their baseline balance due. Consideration of the psychological consequences,
and the increase in sheltering they would motivate, should be taken into ac-
count when considering manipulating withholding laws. Finally, this study
suggests that consideration of psychological motivations may be essential to
understanding bunching in taxable behavior, a topic of substantial recent inter-
est in labor economics and public finance. The relative lack of bunching at tax
kinks seen in Saez (2010) is puzzling from the view of previous theory, but easy
to explain when considering the psychological motivations present: the salient
points where individuals are drawn to bunch on tax day are different from those
generated from simple examination of the tax schedule. Even if individuals did
attempt to bunch at these tax kink points through their labor decisions, their
psychologically-motivated sheltering decisions could “smooth out” the excess
mass this would generate. However, the lack of bunching at tax kink points
could also be due to a variety of other considerations. Identifying the degree to
which psychological considerations are responsible for these puzzling findings,
and the implications of this confound for the estimation of labor supply elastic-
ity based on administrative tax data, are fruitful avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD MAKE YOU HAPPIER? WHAT DO YOU
THINK YOU WOULD CHOOSE?
Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones
Abstract: Would people choose what they think would maximize their sub-
jective well-being (SWB)? We present survey respondents with hypothetical sce-
narios and elicit both choice and predicted SWB rankings of two alternatives.
While choice and predicted SWB rankings usually coincide in our data, we find
systematic reversals. We identify factors—such as predicted sense of purpose,
control over one’s life, family happiness, and social status—that help explain
hypothetical choice controlling for predicted SWB. We explore how our findings
vary by SWB measure and by scenario. Our results have implications regarding
the use of SWB survey questions as a proxy for utility.
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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you
are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
Much of the time during the past week, you felt you were happy. Would you say yes or
no?1
2.1 Introduction
Economists increasingly use survey-based measures of subjective well-being
(SWB) as an empirical proxy for utility. In many applications, SWB data are
used for testing or estimating preference models, or for conducting welfare
evaluations, in situations where these are difficult to do credibly with choice-
based revealed-preference methods. Examples include estimating the negative
externality from neighbors’ higher earnings (Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2005), individ-
uals’ tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (Rafael Di Tella, Robert J.
MacCulloch, and Andrew J. Oswald, 2003), and the effect of health status on
the marginal utility of consumption (Amy Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Matthew
J. Notowidigdo, 2008). Such work often points out that in addition to being
readily available where choice-based methods might not be, SWB-based prox-
ies avoid the concern that choices may reflect systematically biased beliefs about
1The first of these three questions is from the World Values Survey; similar questions appear
in the Euro-Barometer Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel,
and the Japanese Life in Nation survey. The second question is from the U.S. General Social
Survey; similar questions appear in the Euro-Barometer survey, the National Survey of Fami-
lies and Households, and the World Values Survey. The third question is from the University of
Michigan’s Survey of Consumers; similar questions appear in the Center of Epidemiologic Stud-
ies Depression Scale, the Health and Retirement Study, and the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being
Index.
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their consequences (e.g., George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew
Rabin, 2003; Daniel T. Gilbert, 2006). It hence interprets SWB data as revealing
what people would choose if they were well-informed about the consequences
of their choices for SWB, and uses SWB measures to proxy for utility under
the assumption that people make the choices they think would maximize their
SWB. This paper provides evidence for evaluating that assumption.
We pose a variety of hypothetical decision scenarios to three respondent pop-
ulations: a convenience sample of 1,066 adults, a representative sample of 1,000
adult Americans, and 633 students. Each scenario has two alternatives. For ex-
ample, one scenario describes a choice between a job that pays less but allows
more sleep versus a job with higher pay and less sleep. We ask respondents
which alternative they think they would choose. We also ask them under which
alternative they anticipate greater SWB; we assess this “predicted SWB” using
measures based on each of the three commonly-used SWB questions posed in
the epigraph above. We test whether these two rankings coincide.2 To the extent
that they do not, we attempt to identify—by eliciting predictions about other
consequences of the choice alternatives—what else besides predicted SWB ex-
plains respondents’ hypothetical choices, and to quantify the relative contribu-
tion of predicted SWB and other factors in explaining these choices.
In designing our surveys, we made two methodological decisions that merit
discussion. First, while the purpose of our paper is to help relate choice be-
havior to SWB measures, those measures are based on reports of respondents’
2In the terminology of Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh K. Sarin (1997), our
work can be viewed as comparing “decision utility” (what people choose) with “predicted util-
ity” (what people predict will make them happier). We avoid these terms, however, because
our “decisions” are hypothetical; and because we ask respondents to predict their responses to
common SWB survey questions, rather than the integral over time of their moment-by-moment
affect.
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general levels of realized SWB, whereas our survey questions elicit respondents’
predictions comparing the SWB consequences of specific choices. To compare
SWB rankings with choice rankings under the same information set and beliefs,
however, we must measure predictions about SWB because it is only predictions
that are available at the moment of choice. Moreover, to link SWB with choice,
we must focus on the SWB consequences of specific choices.
Second, while economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, our
choice data consist of responses to questions about predicted choice in hypo-
thetical scenarios. This is a limitation of our approach because the two may
not be the same.3 However, using hypothetical scenarios allows us to address
a much wider variety of relevant real-world choice situations. It also allows us
to have closely comparable survey measures of choice and SWB.4 For brevity,
hereafter we will sometimes omit the modifiers “predicted” and “hypothetical”
when the context makes it clear that by “choice” and “SWB” we refer to our
survey questions.
We have two main results. First, we find that overall, respondents’ SWB pre-
dictions are a powerful predictor of their choices. On average, SWB and choice
coincide 83 percent of the time in our data. We find that the strength of this
relationship varies across choice situations, subject populations, survey meth-
ods, questionnaire structure variations, and measures of SWB, with coincidence
ranging from well below 50 percent to above 95 percent.
3Although economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, in some situations self-
reports may be more informative about preferences, e.g., when temptation, social pressure, or
family bargaining might distort real-world choices away from preferences. (As we mention
below, our data are silent on which method best elicits preferences.)
4The advantage in having closely comparable (survey-based) measures is that when we
find discrepancies between choice responses and SWB responses, these discrepancies can be
attributed wholly to differences in question content rather than at least partially to differences
in how respondents react to the perceived realness of the consequences of their response.
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Our second main result is that discrepancies between choice and SWB rank-
ings are systematic. Moreover, we can indeed identify other factors that help
explain respondents’ choices. As mentioned above, in addition to eliciting par-
ticipants’ choices and predicted SWB, in some surveys we also elicit their pre-
dictions regarding particular aspects of life other than their own SWB. The as-
pects that systematically contribute most to explaining choice, controlling for
own SWB, are sense of purpose, control over life, family happiness, and social
status. At the same time, and in line with our first main result above, when we
compare the predictive power of own SWB to that of the other factors we mea-
sure, we find that across our scenarios, populations, and methods, it is by far
the single best predictor of choice.
We use a variety of survey versions and empirical approaches in order to test
the robustness of our main results to alternative interpretations. For example,
while most of our data are gathered by eliciting both choice and predicted SWB
rankings from each respondent, in some of our survey variations we elicit the
two rankings far apart in the survey, or we elicit only choice rankings from
some participants and only SWB rankings from others. As another example,
we assess the impact of measurement error by administering the same survey
twice (weeks or months apart) to some of our respondents. While these different
approaches affect our point estimates and hence the relative importance of our
two main results, both results appear to be robust.
As steps toward providing practical, measure-specific and situation-specific
guidance to empirical researchers as to when the assumption that people’s
choices maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approximation, we
analyze how our results differ across SWB measures and across scenarios. Com-
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paring SWB measures, we find that in our data, a “life satisfaction” measure
(modeled after the first question in the epigraph) is a better predictor of choice
than either of two “happiness” measures (modeled after the second and third
questions in the epigraph) that perform similarly to each other. Comparing
scenarios, we find that in scenarios constructed to resemble what our student
respondents judge as representative of important decisions in their lives, pre-
dicted SWB coincides least often with choice, and other factors add relatively
more explanatory power. We also find that in scenarios where one alterna-
tive offers more money, respondents are systematically more likely to choose
the money alternative than they are likely to predict it will yield higher SWB.
Under some conditions, this last finding suggests that the increasingly com-
mon method of valuing non-market goods by comparing the coefficients from
a regression of SWB on income and on the amount of a good5 systematically
estimates a higher value than incentivized-choice-based methods of eliciting
willingness-to-pay (since the weight of money in predicted SWB understates
its weight in choice).
Much previous research has studied the relationship between choice and
happiness.6 Our work is most closely related to experiments reported in Amos
Tversky and Dale Griffin (1991), Christopher H. Hsee (1999), and Hsee, Jiao
5Recent examples have valued deaths in one’s family (Angus Deaton, Jane Fortson and
Robert Tortora, 2010), the social costs of terrorism (Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger, and Alois
Stutzer, 2009), and the social cost of floods (Luechinger and Paul A. Raschky, 2009).
6In a spirit similar to ours, Gary S. Becker and Luis Rayo (2008) propose (but do not pursue)
empirical tests of whether things other than happiness matter for preferences in empirically-
relevant choice situations. Relatedly, Ricardo Perez-Truglia (2010) tests empirically whether the
utility function inferred from consumption choices is distinguishable from the estimated happi-
ness function over consumption. In contrast to our approach, these tests and their interpretation
are affected by whether individuals correctly predict the SWB consequences of their choices.
Our work is also related to a literature in philosophy that poses thought experiments in hypo-
thetical scenarios in order to demonstrate that people’s preferences encompass more than their
own happiness (e.g., Robert Nozick, 1974, pp. 42-45), but that literature focuses on extreme sit-
uations, such as being hooked up to a machine that guarantees happiness, and focuses on an
abstract conception of happiness that is broader than empirical measures.
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Zhang, Fang Yu, and Yiheng Xi (2003) that use methods similar to some of
ours.7 However, because our goal is to provide guidance for interpreting re-
sults from the empirical economics literature, our paper differs from these prior
papers in two fundamental ways. First, both our scenarios and our SWB mea-
sures are tailored to be closely relevant to the economics literature. Thus, rather
than primarily focusing on narrow affective reactions to specific consumption
experiences (e.g., the “enjoyment” of a sound system), as in Hsee (1999) and
Hsee et al. (2003), we purposefully model our measures on the SWB questions
asked in large-scale social surveys, and we focus on a range of scenarios that
we designed to be relevant to empirical work in economics as well as scenar-
ios that are judged by our respondents to represent important decisions in their
lives. Second, crucially, we elicit predictions about other valued aspects of the
choice alternatives. Indeed, it has often been observed that factors beyond one’s
own happiness (in the narrow sense measured by standard survey measures)
may matter for choice.8 As far as we are aware, however, our work is the first
to quantitatively estimate the relative contribution of predicted SWB and these
other factors in explaining choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the survey
design and subject populations. Section 2.3 asks whether participants choose
the alternative in our decision scenarios that they predict will generate greater
7These papers find discrepancies between choice and predicted affective reactions, in hypo-
thetical scenarios carefully designed to test theories about why the two may differ. Tversky and
Griffin (1991) theorize that payoff levels are weighted more heavily in choice, while contrasts
between payoffs and a reference point are weighted more heavily in happiness judgments. Hsee
(1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) theorize that when making choices, individuals engage in “lay ra-
tionalism,” i.e., they mistakenly put too little weight on anticipated affect and too much weight
on “rationalistic” factors that include payoff levels as well as quantitatively-measured attributes.
Our finding that factors other than SWB help predict choice provides a different possible per-
spective on the evidence from these earlier papers.
8For a few recent examples, see Ed Diener and Christie Scollon (2003), Loewenstein and
Peter A. Ubel (2008, pp. 1801-1804), Hsee, Reid Hastie, and Jingqui Chen (2008, p. 239), and
Marc Fleurbaey (2009).
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SWB. Section 2.4 asks whether aspects of life other than SWB help predict choice,
controlling for SWB, and compares the relative predictive power of the factors
that matter for choice. Section 2.5 presents robustness analyses. Section 2.6 char-
acterizes the heterogeneity in choice-SWB concordance across SWB measures,
scenarios, and respondent characteristics. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses
other possible applications of our methodology and implications of our find-
ings. For example, while our paper focuses on testing measures that are based
on existing SWB survey questions, our methodology can be used to explore
whether alternative, novel questions could better explain choice. And while
our data cannot inform us regarding the best way to elicit preferences, if one
assumes that hypothetical choices reveal preferences, then our findings may
imply that individuals do not exclusively seek to maximize SWB as currently
measured. The appendix lists our decision scenarios. For longer discussions,
as well as detailed information on all survey instruments, pilots, robustness
analyses, and additional results, see our working paper, Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori
Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones (2010) with its Web Appendix
(hereafter BHKR).
2.2 Survey design
While our main evidence is based on 29 different survey versions, they all share
a similar core that consists of a sequence of hypothetical pairwise-choice sce-
narios. To illustrate, our “Scenario 1” highlights a tradeoff between sleep and
income. Followed by its SWB and choice questions, it appears on one of our
questionnaires as follows:
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Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the same in almost
every way, but have different work hours and pay different amounts.
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are reasonable, and
you would be able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the average work night.
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires you to go to work
at unusual hours, and you would only be able to sleep around 6 hours on the average
work night.
Between these two options, taking all things together, which do you think would give
you a happier life as a whole?
In within-subject questionnaires, respondents are asked both the SWB ques-
tion and the choice question above. In between-subjects questionnaires, respon-
dents are asked only one of the two questions.
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2.2.1 Populations and studies
We conducted surveys among 2,699 respondents from three populations: 1,066
patients at a doctor’s waiting room in Denver who participated voluntarily;
1,000 adults who participated by telephone in the 2009 Cornell National So-
cial Survey (CNSS) and form a nationally representative sample;9 and 633 Cor-
nell students who were recruited on campus and participated for pay or for
course credit. The Denver and Cornell studies include both within-subject and
between-subjects survey variants, while the CNSS study is exclusively within-
subject.
Table 2.1 summarizes the design details of these studies. It lists each study’s
respondent population, sample size, scenarios used (see 2.2.2 below), types of
questions asked (see 2.2.3 below), and other details such as response scales, sce-
nario order, and question order.10 The rest of this section explains the details
summarized in the table.
2.2.2 Scenarios
Our full set of 13 scenarios is given in the Appendix. Table 2.1 reports which
scenarios are used in which studies, and in what order they appear on different
questionnaires. As detailed in the Appendix, some scenarios are asked in dif-
ferent versions (e.g., different wording, different quantities of money, etc.) and
some scenarios are tailored to different respondent populations (e.g., while we
9The CNSS is an annual survey conducted by Cornell University’s Survey Research Institute.
For details: https://sri.cornell.edu/SRI/cnss.cfm.
10The median age in our Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples is, respectively, 47, 49, and 21;
the share of female respondents is 76, 53, and 60 percent. For summary statistics, see BHKR
table A3.
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Table 2.1: Study-specific information
Notes: See section I for the framing of the choice, SWB, and meta-choice questions. See the Appendix for a full descrip-
tion of each scenario. The scenarios corresponding to the scenario-numbers above are: (1) sleep vs. income, (2) concert
vs. birthday, (3) absolute income vs. relative income, (4) legacy vs. income, (5) apple vs. orange, (6) money vs. time, (7)
socialize vs. sleep, (8) family vs. money, (9) education vs. social life, (10) interest vs. career, (11) concert vs. duty, (12)
low rent vs. short commute, (13) friends vs. income.
a Of these, 230 were surveyed twice, allowing us to conduct measurement-error-corrected estimation.
b Scenario 4 is always presented last because it is followed by both a choice and a SWB question. In order to have a
clean between-subjects design, we did not want subjects to know we were interested in both choice and SWB until after
subjects were done with the rest of the scenarios. We also note that this scenario is presented in four different order-
versions, so strictly speaking, the Denver between-subjects study includes the four questionnaire versions reported in
the table’s bottom row, times four (sixteen versions in total).
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ask students about school, we ask older respondents about work). In construct-
ing the scenarios, we were guided by four considerations.
First, we chose scenarios that highlight tradeoffs between options that the lit-
erature suggests might be important determinants of SWB. Hence, respondents
face choices between jobs and housing options that are more attractive finan-
cially versus ones that allow for: in Scenario 1, more sleep (Kahneman et al.,
2004; William E. Kelly, 2004); in Scenario 12, a shorter commute (Stutzer and
Frey, 2008); in 13, being around friends (Kahneman et al., 2004); and in 3, mak-
ing more money relative to others (Luttmer, 2005; see Heffetz and Robert H.
Frank, 2011, for a survey).
Second, since some of us were initially unsure we would find any diver-
gences between predicted choice and SWB, in our earlier surveys we focused on
choice situations where one’s SWB may not be the only consideration. Hence,
in Scenario 4 respondents choose between a career path that promises an “eas-
ier” life with fewer sacrifices versus one that promises posthumous impact and
fame, and in Scenarios 2 and 11 they choose between a more convenient or “fun”
option versus an option that might be considered “the right thing to do.”
Third, once we found divergences between predicted SWB and choice, in
our later surveys (the Cornell studies) we wanted to assess the magnitude of
these divergences in scenarios that are representative of important decisions
faced by our respondent population. For this purpose we asked a sample of stu-
dents to list the three top decisions they made in the last day, month, two years,
and in their whole lives.11 Naturally, decisions that were frequently mentioned
11The sample included 102 University of Chicago students; results were subsequently sup-
ported by surveying another 171 Cornell students. See BHKR for details and classification of
responses.
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by respondents revolved around studying, working, socializing and sleeping.
Hence, in the resulting Scenarios 7-10, individuals have to choose between so-
cializing and fun versus sleep and schoolwork; traveling home for Thanksgiv-
ing versus saving the airfare money; attending a more fun and social college
versus a highly selective one; and following one’s passion versus pursuing a
more practical career path. To these scenarios we added Scenario 6, which in-
volves a time-versus-money tradeoff tailored for a student population.
Fourth, as an informal check on our methods, we wanted to have one
falsification-test scenario where we expected a respondent’s choice and SWB
ratings to coincide. For this purpose, we added Scenario 5, in which respon-
dents face a choice between two food items (apple versus orange) that are of-
fered for free and for immediate consumption. Since we carefully attempted to
avoid any non-SWB differences between the options, we hypothesized that in
this scenario, predicted SWB would most strongly predict choice. This scenario
has the additional attraction of being similar to prevalent decisions in almost
everyone’s life, which is our third consideration above.
2.2.3 Main questions
Choice question. In all studies, for each scenario, the choice question is worded
as in our example above. In our analysis, we convert the horizontal six-point
response scale into an intensity-of-choice variable, ranging from 1 to 6, or into a
binary choice variable. CNSS responses are elicited as binary choices.12
SWB question. While the choice question is always kept the same, we vary the
12CNSS responses are elicited as binary because in telephone interviews the binary format is
both briefer for interviewers to convey and easier for respondents to understand.
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SWB question in order to examine how choice relates to several different SWB
measures. In our Denver within-subject study we ask three versions of the SWB
question, modeled after what we view as three “families” of SWB questions that
are commonly used in the literature (see examples in the epigraph):
(i) life satisfaction: “Between these two options, which do you think would
make you more satisfied with life, all things considered?”;
(ii) happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking all
things together, which do you think would give you a happier life as a
whole?”; and
(iii) felt happiness: “Between these two options, during a typical week, which
do you think would make you feel happier?”
As in the example above, there are six possible answers, which we convert into
either a six-point variable or a binary variable.
In the CNSS study, where design constraints limited us to one version of the
SWB question, we ask only version (ii). As with the choice question, response is
binary.
As described shortly, in our Cornell studies we ask respondents about twelve
different aspects of life, of which (one’s own) happiness is only one. In those
studies we use versions of (ii) and (iii) that are modified to remain meaningful,
with fixed wording, across aspects. The modified (ii) and (iii) result in these two
new versions:
(iv) own happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking
all things together, which option do you think would make your life as a
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whole better in terms of [your own happiness]”; and
(v) immediately-felt own happiness: “Between these two options, in the few
minutes immediately after making the choice, which option do you think
would make you feel better in terms of [your own happiness].”13
The modified response scale now includes a middle “no difference” response,
and has seven possible answers (Option 1 definitely better; Option 1 probably bet-
ter; Option 1 possibly better; no difference; Option 2 possibly better, etc.). We allow
respondents to indicate “no difference” because we anticipated that in some of
the scenarios, it would make little sense to force respondents to predict that all
aspects would differ across the two options (e.g., “sense of purpose” in Scenario
5, “apple vs. orange”).
On the spectrum between more cognitive, evaluative SWB measures and
more affective, hedonic ones (e.g., Diener et al., 2009), we view version (i) as
the most evaluative, versions (iii) and (v) as the most affective, and versions (ii)
and (iv) as intermediate.
Other questions. For completeness, let us briefly mention, first, that in all ques-
tionnaires of the Denver and Cornell within-subject studies, the choice question
is followed by what we refer to as a meta-choice question: “If you were limited
to these two options, which would you want yourself to choose?” Also, recall
that the SWB question in all Cornell studies is modified to elicit rankings of the
two scenario options in terms of eleven additional aspects of life as well as “own
happiness.” For example, in versions (iv) and (v) of the SWB question, [your
own happiness] may be followed by [your family’s happiness], [your health],
13Since our between-subject tests have less statistical power than our within-subject tests, we
ask only version (i) in our Denver between-subjects surveys and only version (iv) in our Cornell
between-subjects surveys.
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[your romantic life], etc.14 We discuss these additional questions and the data
they yield in later sections.
2.3 Do people respond to the choice and SWB questions in the
same way?
In this section we look at respondents’ binary ranking of Option 1 versus Option
2 in terms of hypothetical choice compared with their binary ranking in terms
of predicted SWB.
2.3.1 Within-subject results
Table 2.2 reports the distribution of binary responses to our within-subject sur-
veys’ choice and SWB questions by study and scenario, along with p-value
statistics from equality-of-proportions tests. The table pools responses across
SWB question variants (see 2.2.3 and table 2.1 above); we discuss results by spe-
cific SWB measure below.15
14In some questionnaire versions, we separate “own happiness” from the other eleven as-
pects, and ask respondents first only about own happiness in each scenario, and then, re-
presenting the scenarios, we ask about the other aspects. In these versions, we refer to the
question on own happiness as an “isolated” measure of SWB (see table 2.1). In other versions,
where the twelve aspects appear together, we refer to the own happiness question as a “first/last
in series” measure. When own happiness is “first in series,” the twelve aspects appear together
in the order they are listed as regressors in table 2.3 below. When own happiness is “last in
series,” the twelve aspects appear together in reverse order.
15Non-response in our surveys was generally low. In the Cornell studies, virtually all ques-
tions had a non-response rate below 2 percent (one Cornell respondent was excluded due to
obvious confusion with instructions). In the CNSS, fewer than 5 percent of respondents an-
swered “Do not know” or refused to answer in any of the questions. Due to the less-structured
recruiting method used in our Denver doctor’s office studies, some questions from those stud-
ies had non-response rates as high as 20 percent. However, the majority of this non-response is
driven by respondents being called in for their appointments, alleviating concerns of selection
67
Table 2.2: Choice and SWB responses across studies and scenarios (within-
subject data)
Notes: Response distribution by study and scenario. For the complete text of
each scenario, see the Appendix. If a scenario’s phrasing changed meaningfully
between surveys, the version of the scenario is indicated in the first row of the
study block. The Liddell Exact Test is a paired equality-of-proportions test of
the null hypothesis that mean response to choice question = mean response to
SWB question. In the Cornell data, where respondents could indicate SWB in-
difference, responses indicating indifference were dropped before conducting
the test.
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The left-most column in the top section of the table reports Scenario 1 figures
from the Denver within-subject questionnaires (our “sleep vs. income” scenario
from the example in section 2.2). The column’s top four cells report a vertically-
stacked 2 × 2 contingency matrix, consisting of the joint binary distribution of
subjects who favor an option in the choice question and those who favor it in the
SWB question. Looking at these four cells, we point out two facts that illustrate
this section’s two main findings. First, the top two cells reveal that the SWB
response is highly predictive of the choice response: between the two cells, 87
percent of respondents rank Option 1 versus Option 2 in the choice question
the same as they do in the SWB question. Second, the next two cells reveal
systematic differences across the two questions among the remaining 13 percent
of respondents: while 12 percent rank Option 1 (sleep) above Option 2 (income)
in the SWB question and reverse this ranking in the choice question, only 1
percent do the opposite. This asymmetry suggests that on average, respondents
react to the two questions systematically differently. The fifth cell reports the
p-value from a Liddell exact test, a nonparametric, equality-of-proportions test
for paired data (Douglas K. Liddell, 1983). The null hypothesis—namely, that
the proportion of respondents who rank Option 2 above Option 1 is the same
across the choice and the SWB questions—is easily rejected.
Examining the top five rows in table 2.2 for the rest of the Denver columns
verifies that the two main findings above are not unique to Scenario 1: in the
remaining five scenarios, 81 to 90 percent of respondents rank the two op-
tions identically across the choice and SWB questions; yet in four out of five
cases, choice-SWB reversals among the remaining 10 to 19 percent of respon-
bias. Comparing the completed responses of subjects who did not finish the survey to the re-
sponses of those who finished the entire survey, we find no evidence of a difference in average
responses.
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dents are asymmetric, and the equality-of-proportions null hypothesis across
the two questions is easily rejected. In these cases, respondents rank income
above legacy, concert above duty, low rent above short commute, and income
above friends in higher proportions in the choice question than in the SWB ques-
tion. There appears to be a systematic tendency among respondents to favor
money in the choice question more than in the SWB question, a point we return
to below. (The results for the absolute vs. relative income scenario are discussed
below.)
Similarly, the CNSS column suggests that, qualitatively, Scenario 1’s findings
carry over from our Denver study—a pencil-and-paper survey with six-point
response scales administered to a convenience sample—to the CNSS study—a
telephone survey with binary response scales administered to a nationally rep-
resentative sample. While the proportion of participants with no choice-SWB
reversals increases to 92 percent, almost all of the rest—7 out of the remaining 8
percent—favor Option 1 (sleep) in the SWB question and Option 2 (income) in
the choice question. The direction of this asymmetry is hence the same as in the
Denver sample, and equality of proportions is again easily rejected.
Last among our within-subject data, results from the Cornell surveys are re-
ported at the bottom section of table 2.2. The structure of this portion of the
table is similar to the corresponding Denver and CNSS portions, with the fol-
lowing three differences that result from the fact that the Cornell questionnaires
allow for an additional “no difference” response in the SWB question: (a) an
additional row below the top four rows reports the proportion of respondents
who choose the “no difference” response; (b) the top four rows report vertically-
stacked contingency matrices as before, only here they exclude these “no differ-
70
ence” responses (their sum is normalized to 100 percent); and (c) the “no differ-
ence” responses are excluded from the Liddell tests.16
Starting again with Scenario 1 in the left-most column, choice-SWB reversals
(in the third and fourth rows, 24 percent together) are still a minority, although
they are almost twice to three times more common in the Cornell sample than
in the Denver and CNSS samples. Nonetheless, consistent with the Denver and
CNSS data, in virtually all of these reversals—23 of the 24 percent—Option 1
(sleep) is ranked above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and below it in
the choice question. Equality of proportions is, again, strongly rejected for this
scenario.17
Moving to the rest of the Cornell columns reveals a similar story. Equality
of proportions is strongly rejected for all the remaining nine scenarios (2-10) as
well, with the exception of Scenario 5. Recall that we constructed Scenario 5
(“apple vs. orange”) as a falsification test, where—barring problems with our
methods—choice and SWB should largely coincide. The results support this
prediction. Indeed, only 5 percent of responses exhibit reversals in this scenario,
by far the lowest fraction among the ten scenarios. Furthermore, we find no ev-
idence that these reversals are in one systematic direction.18 As to the two other
16The distribution of choice-responses among individuals indicating “no difference” for SWB
mirrors the distribution of choice-responses among the rest of the respondents reasonably
closely (BHKR table A5), and, hence, the choice proportions in table 2.2 are virtually unaffected
by excluding these individuals. Moreover, under the null hypothesis that choice is determined
solely by predicted SWB, the distribution of choice-responses should be closer to 50-50 for in-
dividuals indicating SWB “no difference.” Hence, the responses of these respondents actually
provide additional suggestive evidence against the null hypothesis.
17Comparing each of the top four cells in the scenario 1 column across the three within-subject
samples reveals that the reported proportions differ dramatically between the samples. Given
the very different populations and, in the CNSS study, the very different survey methods, this
finding in itself is not surprising. (For example, we speculate that since a telephone survey is
harder to understand, more respondents answered the two questions in the same way, taking
the “artificial consistency” mental shortcut discussed in 2.3.2 below.)
18At the same time, a sizeable 37 percent of respondents indicate “no difference” in the SWB
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scenarios that are used in both the Denver and Cornell studies—Scenarios 3 and
4—choice-SWB reversals maintain their direction: in both studies, (absolute) in-
come is ranked above relative income (Scenario 3) and above legacy (Scenario 4)
in the choice questions more often than in the SWB questions. While equality of
proportions is rejected in the Cornell data but not in the Denver data in Scenario
3, it is rejected in both studies in Scenario 4.
Finally, in Scenarios 6 and 8, which are used only in the Cornell studies and
include a “money” option, we once again find that respondents favor money in
the choice question more than in the SWB question. That this tendency holds
in all seven scenarios that trade off more money/income for something else—
be it more sleep, higher relative income, a legacy, a shorter commute, being
around friends, having more time, or visiting family—suggests that predicted
SWB understates the weight of money and income in hypothetical choice.19 Of
course, predicted SWB is not the same as experienced SWB, and hypothetical
choice is not the same as incentivized choice. Nevertheless, unless the difference
between those gaps is sufficiently negatively correlated with the systematic gap
we find between hypothetical choice and predicted SWB, our results suggest
that survey measures of experienced SWB do not fully capture the weight of
money and income in choice.
Our two main findings—that the ranking of the two options is identical
across the choice and SWB questions for most respondents and in most scenar-
question in scenario 5—by far the highest. This may suggest that scenario 5 is “cleaner” than
we intended it to be: not only non-SWB aspects of life, but even own happiness is deemed by
many respondents irrelevant in what they may perceive as a context of de gustibus non est
disputandum.
19Reassuringly, this tendency in our data is consistent both with the data of Tversky and Grif-
fin (1991) and Hsee et al. (2003), who use a scenario similar to our Scenario 3 (absolute income
vs. relative income), and with their psychological theories (e.g., “lay rationalism”) mentioned
in footnote 7.
72
ios, but that respondents react to the two questions systematically differently—
hold not only in the pooled data, but also for each SWB question variant (i)-(v)
separately. We show this in BHKR table A4, which reports versions of table 2.2
by SWB measure. Interestingly, we find some differences across the measures in
the prevalence of choice-SWB reversals. In the Denver sample, the life satisfac-
tion question variation (i) comes closest to matching choice, with only 11 percent
reversals, averaged across all scenarios. In comparison, happiness with life as a
whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) yield more reversals—17 percent each. In the
Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole (iv) and immediately felt
own happiness (v) both yield 22 percent reversals. We return to the comparison
between different SWB measures in section 2.6.1 below.
2.3.2 Between-subjects results
Our within-subject analysis above is based on both choice and SWB responses
elicited from each individual. However, empirical work that uses SWB data
relies on surveys that measure SWB alone, not together with choice. Thus, two
potential biases could compromise the relevance of our findings to existing SWB
survey data and their applications. On the one hand, asking a respondent both
questions might generate an “artificial consistency” between the two responses.
For example, respondents might think they ought to give consistent answers, or
might give consistent answers as an effort-saving mental shortcut. On the other
hand, an “artificial inconsistency” bias is also possible if respondents infer from
being asked more than one question that they ought to give different answers,
or if the presence of the other question focuses respondents’ attention on the
contrast between the wordings.
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To assess these concerns, we compare the above results from the Denver and
Cornell within-subject studies with their counterpart between-subjects studies,
in which respondents are asked only the choice or only the SWB question. Three
of the six Denver scenarios analyzed above, and all ten of the Cornell scenar-
ios, are repeated with identical wording in their between-subjects counterparts
(see table 2.1). Across these thirteen comparable scenarios and including only
the within-subject respondents who faced the SWB measure used in the be-
tween studies (i.e., variant (i) in Denver and (iv) in Cornell), the median within-
versus-between absolute difference in the proportion of respondents favoring
each option is 5 percentage points in the choice question (a statistically signifi-
cant difference in two scenarios) and is 8 percentage points in the SWB question
(statistically significant in four scenarios).20 Overall, then, the within and be-
tween response distributions sometimes differ. Moreover, the direction of the
differences in the choice compared to the SWB data suggests that on average,
artificial inconsistency might indeed explain some of the choice-SWB reversals
in the within data: in the within data, the average choice-SWB difference in
proportions is 10.8 percentage points; in the between data, it is 7.4 percentage
points—about two-thirds of the within difference.
While choice-SWB reversals are on average of smaller magnitudes in the be-
tween data, they remain sufficiently large to yield statistical results comparable
to those in the within data. In the between data, we can reject the null hypothesis
of no difference between choice and SWB proportions in four scenarios, which
20Using Fisher tests and a 5 percent significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that equal
proportions choose Option 2 in the within and between data for the Denver sleep vs. income
scenario (1) and the Cornell interest vs. career scenario (10). We reject the null hypothesis that
equal proportions anticipate higher SWB under Option 2 in the within and between data for the
Denver friends vs. income scenario (13) and the Cornell money vs. time, education vs. social
life, and interest vs. career scenarios (6, 9, and 10). We report the full details of the between-
subjects data analysis, including all the relevant distributions and statistical tests mentioned in
this subsection, in BHKR (section II.B, table 2, and table A4).
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is fewer than in the within data discussed in section 2.3.1. However, one im-
portant reason is that, mechanically, the unpaired test on the between data has
much less statistical power than the paired test on the within data: even with
an equal number of respondents, each responds to only one question instead of
two, and we cannot partial out correlated individual effects on choice and SWB
in analyzing the between data. To compare the within and between data con-
trolling for power differences, we “unpaired” our within data, matched sample
sizes as closely as possible, and simulated unpaired equality-of-proportion tests
that treat these data as if they were between data. We find that we can reject the
no-difference null in four scenarios, exactly the same as what we find using the
between data.
Our overall interpretation is that while there are differences across the
between- and the within-subject studies—in particular, choice-SWB reversals
are on average less pronounced in the between-subjects studies—either set of
studies supports our two main findings.
2.3.3 Measurement error
Our analysis above suggests that in many scenarios, individuals do not respond
to the choice and SWB questions as if they were responding to the same ques-
tion. However, in a given scenario, such rejection of the null hypothesis could
be explained by differences in measurement error across the two questions—for
example, because it is easier to introspect about choice than about SWB, or vice
versa. An individual whose “true” ranking of the options is identical across
the questions is more likely to mistakenly rank the “wrong” option higher in a
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question with greater measurement error, leading to ranking proportions closer
to 50-50 for that question.
Looking across table 2.2’s columns reveals that cross-question differences in
the measurement error for choice and SWB in the same direction in all scenarios
in a study cannot explain our data. For example, in the Denver data, choice
proportions are closer to 50-50 in Scenarios 1, 11, and 13, but SWB proportions
are closer to 50-50 in Scenarios 4 and 12.
To summarize, the two main findings in this section are (a) that most respon-
dents in most scenarios do not exhibit choice- versus SWB-ranking reversals,
and (b) that when they do, their pattern of reversals is systematic. Overall,
the two findings hold up well—although with differences in relative strength—
across scenarios, populations, and designs. Furthermore, these findings cannot
be explained by a measurement error structure that is stable across scenarios.
2.4 Do other factors help predict choice, and by how much?
In this section we ask: Can we identify other factors that help explain hypothet-
ical choices, controlling for predicted own SWB? We also analyze to what extent
respondents’ choices in our data can be explained by their predicted SWB and
other aspects of life together, compared with their predicted SWB alone.
We address these questions using data from the Cornell sample, where we
ask respondents to rank the options on a set of eleven additional aspects of life,
in addition to ranking them on choice and own SWB (see section 2.2.3). Specif-
ically, in addition to being asked about “your own happiness,” respondents are
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also asked about: your family’s happiness, your health, your romantic life, your
social life, your control over your life, your life’s level of spirituality, your life’s
level of fun, your social status, your life’s non-boringness, your physical com-
fort, and your sense of purpose. While still a limited list, it is intended to cap-
ture “functionings” proposed by economists and philosophers (Amartya K. Sen,
1985; Martha Nussbaum, 2000); non-hedonic and eudaimonic components of
well-being proposed by psychologists (e.g., Matthew P. White and Paul Dolan,
2009) that are not fully captured by measures of SWB (Carol D. Ryff, 1989); as
well as other factors that we thought might matter for choice besides own hap-
piness.
The design of our Cornell between-subjects surveys allows us to also elicit
within-subject data from our 201 participants. This is done by presenting sub-
jects with the between-subjects part of the survey, followed by an additional,
within-subject part.21 When discussing the between-subjects results in section
2.3.2 we used only data from the first, between-subjects part. In contrast, in
this section we pool data from both parts, treating them as within-subject data.
Further pooling these data with the original Cornell within-subject data (432 re-
spondents) yields an augmented sample of 633 Cornell within-subject respon-
dents, which we analyze here. As we report in section 2.5, our main results hold
in the constituent subsamples.
21To be specific, we present the entire sequence of ten scenarios three times. First, each sce-
nario is presented and is followed by only a choice question (for half the respondents) or only a
SWB question (for the other half). Second, after respondents finish answering that question for
each of the ten scenarios, the ten scenarios are presented again, each followed by only the ques-
tion (SWB or choice) respondents had not seen yet. Finally, the ten scenarios are presented for a
third time, with each scenario followed by the eleven additional questions about other aspects of
life. Respondents are specifically instructed to answer the surveys in exactly the order questions
are presented, and the experimenters verify that they do (in the rare cases where a respondent
was observed to flip through the pages, she/he was promptly reminded of this instruction).
With this design, excluding data collected after the first round of scenario-presentation yields
between-subjects data.
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2.4.1 Response distributions
Figure 1 displays, by scenario, the histograms of raw, multi-point responses to
the choice, (own) SWB, and eleven other aspect questions. Note first that the
choice responses—and also the SWB responses, although to a lesser extent—
tend to be bimodal with most of the mass on “definitely” or “probably,” sug-
gesting that the choice-SWB reversals discussed in section 2.3 are not the result
of widespread near-indifferences. Second, notice that we were rather successful
in constructing Scenario 5 (apple vs. orange): almost everyone indicates “no
difference” in the bottom eleven cells in this column. While 37 percent also in-
dicate “no difference” on SWB, the low count of reversals in Scenario 5 suggests
that for the other respondents, variation in choice is strongly related to variation
in SWB. Finally, note that in many other scenarios, there is substantial variation
in the eleven other aspect rankings, and that the histogram of choice responses
sometimes looks rather different from the histogram of SWB responses.
2.4.2 Explaining the variation in choice
Table 2.3 presents a variety of specifications in which we regress choice on SWB
and other aspects of life, aggregating data across the ten scenarios (we discuss
regressions by scenario in section 2.6.2 below).22 We want to estimate the re-
22In the OLS and ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable is 6-point choice. In the
probit regressions the dependent variable is binary choice. All regressions use 7-point ratings
of aspects. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. Each observation is a respondent’s choice and
aspect ratings for one scenario; there are 10 observations per respondent corresponding to the
10 scenarios in the questionnaires. Probit and ordered probit regressions include (unreported)
scenario fixed effects. OLS regressions’ variables are demeaned at the scenario level, generating
coefficients equivalent to those generated by including scenario fixed effects. Measurement
error corrections are done using the Simulation-Extrapolation method described in section 2.4.4,
under the assumption of additive measurement error. Observations with missing data in any
variable are excluded from all regressions.
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lationship from the within-scenario-rather than the between-scenario-variation
in responses. For this purpose, in the probit and ordered probit specifications,
we include scenario fixed effects. In the OLS specifications, we demean all vari-
ables at the scenario level. Doing so yields coefficients identical to those in a
fixed-effects OLS specification, but has the advantage that the R2’s reflect only
the within-scenario explanatory power of the regressors.
The first column of table 2.3 reports an OLS regression of six-point choice on
seven-point SWB. The R2 shows that 0.38 of the variation in choice is explained
by own happiness alone. In comparison, a regression of the same choice mea-
sure on our eleven other aspects (each as a seven-point variable) yields an R2 of
0.21 (second column of table 2.3). Hence, we find that own SWB predicts choice
substantially better than all of the other aspects combined. In the third column
we regress choice on both own SWB and the eleven other aspects. The R2 of 0.41
is substantially higher than that in the second column but is only slightly higher
than that in the first column.23 The pattern in these three columns is similar
when we relax the linear functional form, replacing each regressor with a set of
six dummy variables (not reported). In summary, when we pool data across sce-
narios we find that adding eleven additional aspects to the regression of choice
on own SWB increases explanatory power, but the increase is rather modest.
(The increase is substantial, however, in some of the individual scenarios, as we
report in section 2.6.2.)
23Bootstrapped standard errors yield the following 95-percent confidence intervals around
the three respective R2’s: [0.36, 0.40], [0.19, 0.23], and [0.39, 0.43].
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Table 2.3: Regressions of choice on aspects of life
OLS Ordered Probit Probit
ME correction None None None SIMEX None None SIMEX
Own happiness 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.48***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
Family happiness 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.032)
Health 0.07** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.021) (0.019) (0.031) (0.016) (0.022) (0.042)
Life’s level of romance -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.04
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.018) (0.025) (0.045)
Social life -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
(0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) (0.036)
Control over your life 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
Life’s level of spirituality -0.08** -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(0.024) (0.021) (0.036) (0.018) (0.025) (0.047)
Life’s level of fun 0.13*** 0.05* 0.03 0.04* 0.04* 0.03
(0.021) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015) (0.021) (0.036)
Social status 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027)
Life’s non-boringness 0.07*** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.020) (0.017) (0.030) (0.014) (0.020) (0.037)
Physical comfort 0.09*** 0.04** 0.03 0.04** 0.05** 0.04
(0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.030)
Sense of purpose 0.21*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.025)
Observations 6217 6217 6217 6217 6217 6217 6217
(pseudo) R2 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.35
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. See footnote 22 for more details.
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2.4.3 Comparing the coefficients
In order to compare and interpret the coefficients in table 2.3, we assume that
hypothetical choices in our data can be represented as maximizing a utility func-
tion U(H(X), X), where H is own SWB and X is a vector of other factors that
might affect choice both directly and indirectly through H.24 If people choose
what they think would maximize their SWB alone (as opposed to trading off
their SWB for other factors), then the (vector) partial derivative ∂U
∂X will be iden-
tically zero. To a first-order approximation, this would require that all eleven
coefficients other than that on own happiness in table 2.3’s third column be
zero—a hypothesis we can easily reject (F-test p < 0.0001). This result is robust
to treating the choice measure as ordinal or as binary (table 2.3’s fifth and sixth
columns); to relaxing the linearity of our SWB measure by replacing it with a set
of six dummy variables; and to combinations of these specifications. Further-
more, with the exception of Scenario 8 (where F-test p = 0.086), the result holds
in each individual scenario.25 All this suggests that not all the marginal utilities
∂U
∂X are zero, even if the first-order approximation is imperfect.
Moving from testing the null hypothesis to interpreting the magnitudes of
coefficients requires additional assumptions—both standard econometric as-
sumptions and psychological ones. Econometrically, for example, if X includes
aspects we did not measure, the coefficients might be biased due to omitted
24For a more thorough treatment of our empirical framework within this simple model, see
BHKR.
25See tables A7-A10 in BHKR for these and other specifications. Table A10 shows that this
result holds by scenario even when the regressions include only aspects for which more than
a trivial fraction of respondents (e.g. 15 percent) indicate answers other than “no difference.”
In other words, it holds even when we include only the most reliably-estimated coefficients.
Interestingly, table A10 shows that the only large and robust non-SWB coefficient in the “apple
vs. orange” scenario is that on “physical comfort”; this seems consistent with the de gustibus
interpretation of this scenario.
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variables. Psychologically, the coefficients are comparable only if respondents
respond to the seven-point scales similarly across the twelve aspects.
Comparing the coefficients in the third column of table 2.3, the coefficient on
own happiness is by far the largest. A one-point increase in our seven-point
measure of predicted SWB is associated with a highly significant 0.46-point in-
crease in our six-point choice measure. After own happiness, the largest co-
efficients are on sense of purpose (0.12), control over one’s life (0.08), family
happiness (0.08), and social status (0.06). The relative sizes of the coefficients
are similar in alternative specifications (e.g., the ordered probit column), but re-
member that the data are pooled across surveys that use two opposite orders
in which aspects are presented, and order matters for the coefficient estimates
(see section 2.5). While the rejection of ∂U
∂X = 0 suggests that own SWB is not the
only argument in the “hypothetical-choice utility function,” a comparison of the
coefficients suggests that the marginal utility of own happiness is several times
larger than the marginal utilities of even the most significant among the other
aspects we measure.26
2.4.4 Measurement error
Measurement error in our measures of own happiness and the other aspects will
bias the coefficient estimates and potentially also invalidate our test of the null
hypothesis ∂U
∂X = 0. In order to address these concerns, we collected repeated
observations on a sub-sample (of 230) of our Cornell respondents. This enables
26However, we believe that the most plausible bias from unmeasured factors exaggerates the
coefficient on own happiness. In particular, an unmeasured factor whose effect on H has the
same sign as its direct effect (i.e., not through H) on U will bias upward the coefficient on own
happiness.
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us to estimate measurement-error-corrected regressions. In particular, we use
Simulation-Extrapolation (SIMEX) (J. R. Cook and Leonard A. Stefanski, 1994),
a semi-parametric method that assumes homoskedastic, additive measurement
error but does not make assumptions about the distribution of the regressors.27
As shown in table 2.3, relative to the OLS results, the SIMEX coefficient on own
happiness increases, and remains by far the most predictive regressor. However,
the other aspects with largest coefficients and statistical significance in the OLS
regressions remain statistically significant and also increase, suggesting that our
main results in this section are not due to measurement error.
2.5 Robustness
To examine the robustness of our results from sections 2.3 and 2.4, we conduct
a long list of additional analyses. Full details, including all tables and statistics,
are reported in BHKR. In this section we briefly summarize our findings. Un-
less stated otherwise, they are based on our within-subject data from either the
Denver or Cornell samples.
Are results driven by only a few individuals? We find that most respondents
(both in Denver and Cornell) exhibit at least one reversal and that very few
exhibit reversals in half or more of the scenarios. Moreover, to explore whether
27Intuitively, the SIMEX method proceeds in two steps. First, it simulates datasets with addi-
tional measurement error and uses them to estimate the function describing how the regression
coefficients change with the amount of measurement error. Then the algorithm extrapolates
in order to estimate what the coefficients would be if there were no measurement error in the
original data. We choose this method over several more common measurement error correc-
tion methods (such as IV or regression disattenuation) for several reasons. Primarily, the other
methods are much less efficient in this setting. Moreover, the SIMEX method is flexible in its
treatment of the measurement error structure, it accommodates misclassified categorical data,
and it easily accommodates non-linear models such as probit or ordered probit regressions. For
additional discussion of SIMEX see BHKR, and for IV results see table A12 there.
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some of the respondents who do not exhibit a choice-SWB reversal in a given
scenario would have done so if that scenario’s tradeoff between SWB and other
factors had assigned a different “price” to SWB, some Denver respondents face
three versions of Scenario 4 (legacy vs. income), with three different income
levels in the income option (see details in the Appendix). Ninety-one percent of
these respondents monotonically rank the income option higher in both choice
and SWB as the amount of income increases. Of those, 22 percent exhibit a
choice-SWB reversal for at least one income level, compared to an average of
12 percent reversals at a given income level. This suggests that the fraction of
reversals we observe in other scenarios is a lower bound on the fraction who
would exhibit a reversal in those scenarios with some “price of SWB.”
Scenario-order effects and participant fatigue. We investigate the effects of sce-
nario order on responses with our Denver sample, where respondents face the
six scenarios in one of two opposite orders (see table 2.1). Scenario-order effects
could arise, for example, due to increasing fatigue or boredom among respon-
dents. While we indeed find evidence of scenario-order effects on response pat-
terns, they do not systematically affect the degree of choice-SWB concordance
we find.
Respondents’ explanations for their choice-SWB reversals. After our Cornell re-
spondents finish responding to all the decision scenarios, we directly ask all of
them additional questions, including: whether any choice-SWB reversals they
might have made were a mistake (only 7 percent respond “Yes”); whether they
think they would regret any choice-SWB reversal they might have made (23
percent respond “Yes”); and whether they were trying to make their choice and
SWB responses consistent (20 percent respond that they were). Our results from
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section 2.4 remain largely the same when the analysis excludes groups of re-
spondents based on their responses to these questions. We also ask respondents
to explain their reasoning for any choice-SWB reversals, and we view the result-
ing qualitative data as roughly consistent with our main results.28
Self-control. To assess whether choice-SWB reversals merely reflect a self-
control problem (as in David Laibson, 1997), in addition to asking participants
what they would choose, we also ask some of them what they would want
themselves to choose (the meta-choice question mentioned in Section 2.2.1). Ag-
gregating across all surveys that include the meta-choice question (see table 2.1),
we find reversals between choice and meta-choice in 28 percent of the cases.
While self-control problems may be relevant in these cases, our main conclu-
sions from section 2.4 are robust to either excluding these observations or to
replacing choice with meta-choice as the dependent variable.
Context of choice, SWB, and other-aspect questions. Respondents’ interpretations
of the questions or their understanding of the meaning of the related concepts
may be context-dependent.29 As mentioned in sections 2.2 (see table 2.1) and
2.3, different versions of our surveys vary in whether the choice and SWB ques-
tions are asked close together or far apart, and in the order the questions are
asked; they also vary in the distance between own happiness and the other
eleven aspects, and in the order of the aspects. Repeating our analysis in sec-
tion 2.4 by questionnaire organization indicates that order and context effects
do indeed matter. For example, aspects listed earlier have larger coefficients,
28For example, many respondents mention tradeoffs between their own happiness and the
happiness of family and friends, or mention tradeoffs between short-lived happiness and goals
like long-term career success.
29Notice the important difference between this possibility and the possibility of cross-
respondent differences in the interpretations or understanding of the scenarios. The latter possi-
bility is a lesser concern as long as a respondent’s interpretation or understanding of a scenario
remains the same across the choice and SWB questions.
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and own happiness as part of a twelve-aspects list has a smaller coefficient than
as a stand-alone question. Yet, in all designs, aspects other than own happiness
are statistically significant, and the coefficient on own happiness has the highest
point estimate among the aspects.
2.6 Heterogeneity in choice-SWB concordance
We have thus far focused on characterizing the average concordance between
our choice and SWB measures. However, the averages mask substantial het-
erogeneity: across our questionnaires (see table 2.1) and scenarios, choice-SWB
coincidence ranges from well below 50 percent to above 95 percent. To provide
information that may be useful for researchers and policy makers, we conduct
our main analysis separately across SWB measures, scenarios, and respondent
characteristics. This section briefly summarizes a more thorough treatment in
BHKR.
2.6.1 Comparing SWB measures
We compare how well our different SWB question variants predict choice by
comparing R2’s from univariate OLS regressions of our multiple-point choice
variable on each of our multiple-point SWB measures. As in section 2.4, we
demean our variables at the scenario level. In the Denver sample, the life satis-
faction question variant (i) is the best predictor of the choice question, with R2
= 0.65. Happiness with life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) come second
and third, respectively, with R2 = 0.59 and 0.55. The felt happiness R2 is statis-
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tically significantly lower than the life satisfaction R2 (p = 0.02 calculated using
bootstrapped standard errors), and the R2 for happiness with life as a whole is
not statistically distinguishable from the other two. In the Cornell sample, own
happiness with life as a whole (iv) and immediately felt own happiness (v) have
R2 = 0.39 and 0.37, not statistically distinguishable from each other.
These R2’s and our findings in 2.3.1 paint a consistent picture. While in the
Denver data the life-satisfaction-type SWB question is more predictive of choice
than the happiness-type SWB questions, in both Denver and Cornell the felt
happiness and the happiness with life as a whole questions predict choice sim-
ilarly. On the evaluative-versus-affective spectrum of SWB measures (see 2.2.3
above), these results lend partial support to the notion that more evaluative
measures may generate rankings more similar to hypothetical choice.30
2.6.2 Comparing scenarios
For applied work, it is useful to know in which situations the assumption that
people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approxima-
tion. Table 2.4 shows the benchmark OLS specification from table 2.3, conducted
separately for each of the ten scenarios in the Cornell data. The “Incremental R2”
row reports the difference between the R2’s from the reported multivariate re-
gressions and R2’s from univariate regressions of choice on only own happiness
(which are not reported).
30One possible hypothesis as to why some SWB measures are better predictors of choice is
that they induce participants to more accurately report the present value of instantaneous SWB
flows over time. Our data do not allow us to directly test this hypothesis because we have
no direct evidence on how respondents aggregate SWB over time. However, our finding that
variant (v)—about happiness “in the few minutes immediately after making the choice”—is as
predictive of choice as variant (iv)— about happiness in “life as a whole”—seems inconsistent
88
Table 2.4: OLS regressions of choice on all aspects of life, by scenario
89
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions of 6-point choice on 7-point aspects of
life. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. The left-most column aggregates data across choice
scenarios; each of the other columns corresponds to a specific scenario. Each observation is a
respondent’s choice and aspect ratings for one scenario; there are 10 observations per respon-
dent corresponding to the 10 scenarios in the questionnaires. All variables are demeaned at the
scenario level, generating coefficients equivalent to those generated by including scenario fixed
effects. ”Incremental R2” is the difference in R2 between the reported multivariate regression
and a univariate regression of choice on own happiness; it represents the increased percentage
of variation in choice that can be explained by including the additional aspects. Observations
with missing data in any variable are excluded from the regression. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p
< 0.001
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As discussed above, Scenario 5 (apple vs. orange)—which was designed to
minimize choice-SWB reversals—has little variance in aspects other than own
SWB and the fewest reversals (see figure 2.1 and table 2.2). As expected, the
R2 in a univariate regression of choice on SWB is the highest (at 0.56) in Sce-
nario 5, and the incremental R2 from adding all other aspects is the lowest (at
0.02). If this type of minor decision—which possibly comprises most decisions
in life—generally features low variance in aspects other than own SWB, then
the assumption that people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB might be a
good approximation in such settings.
Interestingly, at the other extreme, the four scenarios we designed to be rep-
resentative of typical important decisions (see section 2.2.2) facing our college-
age Cornell sample—Scenarios 7-10 (socialize vs. sleep, family vs. money, ed-
ucation vs. social life, and interest vs. career)—are among the scenarios with
the lowest univariate R2 and, correspondingly, the highest incremental R2. In-
deed, in Scenarios 7 and 10, where univariate R2 is the lowest—at 0.25 and 0.24,
respectively—incremental R2 is 0.07 and 0.13. Here, the additional eleven as-
pects increase predictive power (as measured by R2) substantially, by 28 and 54
percent. This in turn suggests that one should be especially cautious in assum-
ing that people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB in empirical applica-
tions that focus on important life decisions.
The rest of the scenarios lie somewhere in between. They include the scenar-
ios that were designed to explore common themes from the happiness literature
and, surprisingly, those designed as situations where we most expected to find
tensions between SWB and other factors.
with this view.
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2.6.3 Comparing respondents
Across the Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples, we find relatively little evidence
for differences in the frequency of choice-SWB reversals across demographics
that include gender, age, race, education, and income, with the exception that
in the Cornell sample, black respondents are more likely than others to exhibit
reversals. In the Cornell within-subject sample, we measured the “Big 5” per-
sonality traits using Oliver P. John and Sanjay Srivastava’s (1999) BFI scale. We
find that a one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness is associated
with a 2 percent lower likelihood of a reversal, while a one standard deviation
increase in neuroticism (i.e., moody, tense) is associated with a 2 percent higher
likelihood of a reversal.
2.7 Discussion
Throughout this paper, we have remained agnostic as to which survey question,
if any, best elicits a person’s preferences.31 However, if one assumes that hy-
pothetical choices reveal preferences, our results could help in reconciling two
opposing theoretical views regarding the relationship between SWB data and
preferences. The first, reflected at least implicitly in much of the economics of
happiness literature, is that SWB data represent idealized revealed-preference
utility in the sense of what individuals would choose if their predictions of the
31Note that while economists often assume that incentivized choice reveals preferences,
which in turn defines economic welfare, psychologists instead often equate experienced SWB
with welfare (see, e.g., Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). Taking this latter perspective, Hsee
(1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) interpret reversals between hypothetical choice and predicted SWB
as evidence of mistakes in choice behavior. For careful discussions of the appropriate notion
of welfare, see, e.g., Tversky and Griffin (1991), Loewenstein and Ubel (2008), and Fleurbaey
(2009).
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SWB consequences of their choices were not biased. The second view, explicitly
laid out in, e.g., Kimball and Robert Willis (2006) and Becker and Rayo (2008), is
that even well-informed agents will be willing to trade off SWB for other things
they care about, making SWB and preferences distinct. Our results suggest that
people do not seek to maximize SWB exclusively, at least as it is currently mea-
sured, but that SWB is a uniquely important argument of the utility function.
Since hypothetical choices maximize predicted SWB (especially “life satisfac-
tion”) for most of our respondents in most of our scenarios, our results might be
interpreted as comforting for applied researchers who use SWB as a proxy for
utility. We caution that the amount of choice-SWB concordance we find over-
states the justification to treat SWB as a proxy for utility; applications always
require additional assumptions that we do not test. For example, typical as-
sumptions are that SWB measures are comparable and can be aggregated across
individuals.32
When comparing scenarios, our results suggest that, first, researchers should
be especially cautious when interpreting SWB data as indicating what well-
informed individuals would choose in settings that are perceived by those indi-
viduals to involve personally-important decisions. Second, in settings where
one alternative involves higher income or more money, our survey respon-
dents are systematically more likely to choose the money alternative than they
are likely to predict it will yield higher SWB. Unless this systematic gap is
sufficiently negatively correlated with the difference between the predicted-
32Our results may also overstate the extent to which standard SWB questions provide a good
measure of preferences because standard questions are asked absolutely (“How satisfied are you
with your life?”), while our SWB questions are asked relatively (“Between these two options,
which do you think would make you more satisfied with life?”). Different individuals may
apply different scales to a greater extent for an absolute measure, making it more difficult to
translate an absolute SWB measure into a meaningful utility number than might be suggested
by our results.
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experienced SWB gap and the hypothetical-incentivized choice gap, this find-
ing in turn suggests that the increasingly-common practice of estimating im-
plicit willingness to pay for non-market goods by comparing the coefficient on
income with that on another variable in multivariate SWB regressions may bias
these estimates upwards relative to incentivized-choice-based estimates.
Our scenario-based methodology could be usefully applied in several new
directions. First, the method of assessing choice-SWB correspondence could be
used to assess new SWB measures that might predict hypothetical choice better
than existing SWB measures. Our findings suggest that responses to existing
measures do not fully capture the weight that factors such as sense of purpose
have in explaining choice. Additionally, existing SWB measures may primarily
reflect current feelings, rather than also reflecting anticipated future SWB flows.
In BHKR we describe pilot data we collected on two novel measures aimed at
addressing these issues, neither of which appears to predict choice any better
than existing measures. Nonetheless, developing new measures seems an espe-
cially promising area for further research.33
Second, our method could be used to provide more tailored guidance for
applied work by asking about scenarios that are intended to address specific
issues of interest. To illustrate this point, we pilot four such scenarios at the
end of our Cornell repeat-survey. For example, to reconcile the intuition that
Americans today are better off than in the past with the finding that average
SWB has remained flat in the U.S. over the past decades (Richard A. Easterlin,
1974, 1995; see Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, 2008, for a recent assess-
33Since different SWB questions seem to capture distinct dimensions of well-being that cor-
relate differently with income and other variables (e.g., Kahneman and Deaton, 2010), future
research could also explore whether a combination of SWB questions predicts choice better than
any individual SWB question alone (including ladder- or mountain-type SWB questions, which
we do not study in this paper).
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ment), we ask respondents to rank being born in 1950 versus being born in 1990
in both choice and SWB questions. Although our respondents overwhelmingly
favor being born in 1990 in both questions, more choose 1990 despite believing
that they would be happier in 1950 than the reverse. This result indeed sug-
gests that some people prefer being born later even if it does not make them
happier. For another example, to reconcile the intuition that expanding political
and economic freedoms for women have made women better off with the find-
ing that average SWB among women has declined in the U.S. since the 1970s,
both absolutely and relative to men (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009), we ask re-
spondents to rank living in a world with or without these expanded freedoms
for women. Again, significantly more respondents choose a world with these
expanded freedoms for women in spite of believing that a world without them
would make them happier than the reverse. For further examples and full de-
tails, see BHKR.
Finally, some researchers have attempted to identify the key non-SWB as-
pects of life that are associated with greater welfare (e.g., Sen, 1985). Others
have called for an SWB-based “national well-being index” to provide a measure
of welfare that captures factors not represented in economic indicators such as
GDP (e.g., Diener et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
attempt to empirically estimate weights on SWB and other factors in a way that
might be useful for combining them into an overall index for predicting what
individuals themselves would choose. If hypothetical choices are assumed to re-
veal preferences that are relevant for evaluating welfare, then our method could
be applied more systematically for the purpose of developing a well-being in-
dex.
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CHAPTER 3
CAN MARGINAL RATES OF SUBSTITUTION BE INFERRED FROM
HAPPINESS DATA? EVIDENCE FROM RESIDENCY CHOICES
Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones
Abstract: We survey 561 students from U.S. medical schools shortly after
they submit their choice rankings over residencies to the National Resident
Matching Program. We elicit (a) these choice rankings, (b) anticipated subjective
well-being (SWB) rankings, and (c) expected features of the residencies (such as
prestige). We find substantial differences between choice and anticipated-SWB
rankings in the implied tradeoffs between the residency features. In our data,
evaluative SWB measures (life satisfaction and Cantril’s ladder) imply tradeoffs
closer to choice than does affective happiness, and as close as do multi-question
SWB indices. We discuss implications for using SWB data in applied work.
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3.1 Introduction
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is the magnitude that characterizes
preferences: as (minus) the slope of an individual’s indifference curve, it quan-
tifies the tradeoffs that individuals are willing to make. Traditionally, MRSs are
estimated from choice data. Economists must resort to alternatives, however, in
settings where the relevant choices are not observed (as is often the case when
externalities, non-market goods, and certain government policies are involved)
or where individuals’ choices are likely to reflect mistakes. An increasingly-
used alternative source of data is survey responses to subjective well-being
(SWB) questions—most commonly, questions about respondents’ happiness,
life satisfaction, or life’s ranking on a ladder. In a typical application, a SWB
measure is regressed on respondents’ quantities of a bundle of goods, and the
ratio of the coefficients on two goods yields an estimate of the goods’ rate of
tradeoff that would leave SWB unchanged.1 Under the assumption that the
SWB measure proxies for utility—i.e., that the SWB measure is what individ-
uals seek to maximize—the estimated tradeoff can be interpreted as the MRS
between the two goods.
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the extent to which trade-
offs estimated from SWB data generate MRS estimates that reliably reflect in-
1For example, in the domain of government policy, Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001)
focus on a life satisfaction question to estimate the tradeoff between inflation and unemploy-
ment. In the domain of externalities, a large literature on social comparisons uses a variety of
SWB measures to estimate the MRS between own and others’ income (for a recent review, see
Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2008). In the domain of non-market goods, Deaton, Fortson, and Tor-
tora (2010) use a variety of SWB measures, including the Cantril self-anchoring scale, to study
the implied value of life in sub-Saharan Africa by comparing the coefficient on losing a family
member with the coefficient on income. SWB data have been similarly used to price, for exam-
ple, noise (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005), informal care (van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2007), the risk of floods (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009), air quality (Levinson, 2012), benefits
of the Moving to Opportunity project (Ludwig et al., 2012), and the loss of family members
(Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008).
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dividuals’ preferences.2 To that end, we elicit: (a) choice rankings over a set of
options, in a setting where choice arguably reveals preferences; (b) the antici-
pated SWB consequences of the different choice options; and (c) the expected
quantities of the goods that comprise the relevant consumption bundle under
each choice option. We estimate the tradeoffs between the goods implied by
SWB and those implied by preferences, and we explore the relationship between
them.3
While the literature estimates the tradeoffs implied by experienced SWB, it
is crucial for our purposes to compare choice tradeoffs with anticipated SWB
tradeoffs in order to hold constant the conditions (including information and
beliefs) under which choice is made. That way, we can attribute differences
between choice and anticipated SWB tradeoffs to SWB not fully capturing the
importance of certain goods in preferences. In contrast, divergences between
choice and experienced SWB tradeoffs could result, for example, from mispre-
dictions at the time of choice (e.g., Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin, 2003;
Gilbert, 2006).4
2The literature reflects a wide range of views regarding the relationship between SWB and
preferences. On one extreme, Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001, p. 338) explicitly iden-
tify SWB measures with utility: ”The estimation describes preferences themselves.” Nearer the
other extreme, Deaton, Fortson, and Tortora (2010) discuss ”well-being” rather than preferences,
and explicitly consider the possibility that ”the methods based on self-reported well-being do
not tell us what we want to know” (p. 128). Moreover, they repeatedly point out that their lad-
der question implies dramatically different tradeoffs compared with their affective questions
and hence warn against using one SWB measure, or even a combination, as an exclusive guide.
Committing to neither extreme, Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 426) write in their JEL review: ”Hap-
piness is not identical to the traditional concept of utility in economics. It is, however, closely
related... [it] is a valuable complementary approach... SWB can be considered a useful approxi-
mation to utility...”
3The finding that different SWB measures imply different tradeoffs (Deaton, Fortson, and
Tortora, 2010; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) already rules out the possibility that all SWB mea-
sures simultaneously reflect preference tradeoffs accurately. However, it does not answer the
questions we study, namely to what extent certain measures and combinations of measures re-
flect preference tradeoffs.
4It is logically possible that, despite the differences we find between anticipated-SWB trade-
offs and choice tradeoffs, experienced-SWB tradeoffs would nonetheless coincide with choice
tradeoffs. This possibility would require that while individuals deliberately deviate, at the mo-
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In section 3.2 we describe the setting we study: graduating U.S. medical stu-
dents’ preference rankings over residency programs. These preference rankings
submitted by students to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP),
combined with the preference rankings over students submitted by the resi-
dency programs, determine which students are matched to which programs.
This setting has a number of attractive features for our purposes: the matching
mechanism is designed to be incentive-compatible; the choice is a deliberated,
well-informed, and important career decision; the choice set is well-defined and
straightforward to elicit; and due to a submission deadline, there is an identi-
fiable moment in time when the decision is irreversibly made. We conduct a
survey among a sample of 561 students from 23 U.S. medical schools shortly
after they submit their residency preferences to the NRMP, so that our survey is
conducted under the same conditions as the actual choice.
Section 3.3 describes our sample and survey design. We ask about each stu-
dent’s four most-preferred residency programs. In addition to eliciting each stu-
dent’s preference ranking over the four residencies as submitted to the NRMP,
we also elicit her anticipated SWB rankings over the residencies, both during
the residency and for the rest of her life. We focus on three commonly-used
SWB measures: happiness, life satisfaction, and a Cantril-ladder measure.5 We
ment of making the choice, from choosing what they believe would maximize their SWB, their
(realized) experienced SWB systematically differs from their anticipated SWB in a way that hap-
pens to exactly cancel out those deviations. We assume away this unlikely possibility.
5Examples of each of these three measures include: the National Survey of Families and
Households question ”Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?”
whose seven-point response scale ranges from ”very unhappy” to ”very happy” (e.g., Luttmer,
2005); the Euro-barometer survey question ”On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satis-
fied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” (used by, e.g., Di Tella,
MacCulloch and Oswald, 2001); and the Gallup World Poll question ”Please imagine a ladder
with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents
the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for
you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”
(e.g., Deaton, Fortson, and Tortora, 2010).
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also ask each student to rate each of the four residencies on each of nine fea-
tures that we expected—based on our past research (in settings other than resi-
dency choice) as well as on conversations with medical school officials and with
past and present students—to be the most important determinants of program
choice.6 These include the desirability of residency location, residency prestige-
and-status, expected stress level, future career prospects, and future employ-
ment opportunities.
Section 3.4 reports our analyses and results. We model residencies as bundles
of attributes, and we use the choice- and SWB-rankings as alternative dependent
variables in regressions where the independent variables are students’ beliefs
about these attributes. In our main analysis we compare the coefficients and
coefficient ratios across regressions.
While we find that the coefficients of the attributes do not reverse sign, and
are reasonably highly correlated, across the choice and SWB regressions, we find
large and significant differences in the implied tradeoffs. For example, relative
to the choice-based estimates, all anticipated-SWB estimates underweight resi-
dency prestige-and-status and residency desirability for the respondent’s signif-
icant other, while overweighting social life and life seeming worthwhile during
the residency. We also find that our evaluative SWB measures-life satisfaction
and ladder-generally yield results closer to the choice-based estimates than our
more affective happiness measure. Our results are robust to plausible forms
of measurement error and biases in survey response and hold across empirical
6Indeed, as we report when analyzing the data, the residency attribute ratings that we
elicited explain much of the within-respondent variation in residency choice rankings. In con-
trast, in our attempts to forecast residency choices in our data with objective, external measures
such as characteristics of the city of residency and information from the Best Hospitals U.S.
News Rankings, we find these measures to explain virtually none of the variation in choice (for
one specification, see Web Appendix Table A11).
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specifications and across subsets of our respondents.
We also explore whether multi-question SWB indices more accurately reflect
revealed-preference tradeoffs. We consider three such indices: the first, a “3-
SWB-measure” index, is a weighted sum of our three SWB questions; the sec-
ond, a “4-period-happiness” index, consists of happiness predictions for four
time intervals that together cover the rest of a respondent’s life; the third index
combines the other two. While such indices have been much less commonly
used to estimate tradeoffs, we are motivated by the ideas, respectively, that well-
being is multidimensional (e.g., Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009) and that well-
being consists of instantaneous affect integrated over time (Kahneman, Wakker,
and Sarin, 1997). We estimate the optimal weights of the indices as best linear
predictors of choice in our data; our indices are hence constructed to perform
better than those likely to be used in realistic applications, where choice data
are not available. We find that while some tradeoffs based on these indices are
closer to our choice-based MRSs than the tradeoffs based on the indices’ under-
lying questions, overall the indices do not reflect the MRSs more reliably than
the single evaluative-SWB questions.
In section 3.5, we explore an alternative use of SWB data: assessing which of
two concrete choice options is preferred. We find that despite the differences in
implied tradeoffs between choice and SWB in our data, the two often coincide in
pairwise comparisons. Because our survey elicits anticipated SWB after choice,
concordance rates may be overstated in our data, while the tradeoff differences
we find may be understated. We present a simple model that illustrates the
relationship between pairwise predictions and tradeoffs, and we discuss the
conditions under which SWB data may correctly predict choice even when the
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implied tradeoffs differ.
We conclude in section 3.6. Additional results are available in the NBER
working paper (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones, 2013) and its ac-
companying web appendix, which will be referenced below.
Our work builds upon and differs from past attempts to study the relation-
ship between choice and SWB measures in several important ways. First, while
almost all existing work (Tversky and Griffin, 1991; Hsee, 1999; Hsee, Zhang,
Yu, and Xi, 2003; Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones, 2012) compares
anticipated-SWB rankings with choices that are either hypothetical or involve
very small stakes, we present evidence on real, deliberated choices in a high-
stakes field environment. Consequently, while in these prior studies it is unclear
whether preferences are better reflected by choice or by anticipated SWB, in our
setting there is a strong case for viewing choice as revealing preferences. Sec-
ond, while these studies document cases where choices between pairs of options
do not maximize anticipated SWB, we are the first to focus on the implications
for estimating MRSs. Third, our evidence is from a setting where ordinal prefer-
ences over a well-defined and observable choice set are directly elicited. While
preferences can sometimes be inferred indirectly—for example, as in Dolan and
Metcalfe (2008), who, for pricing the welfare effects of an urban regeneration
project, compare estimates based on contingent-valuation and hedonic-pricing
methods with those based on SWB—such indirect approaches necessarily hinge
on many maintained assumptions. Moreover, our paper is the first to study a
field setting that allows the direct elicitation not only of preference orderings
but also of anticipated-SWB rankings of the options in the choice set—an ideal
setting for studying choice-SWB alignment. Fourth, while prior work considers
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only single SWB questions, we also consider indices that include multiple SWB
measures and multi-period affective happiness. Finally, drawing on theoretical
considerations as well as on empirical results from this and previous papers, we
offer guidance to applied researchers on appropriate uses of SWB data. While
our findings suggest that such data are inadequate for precise inference regard-
ing MRSs, their use in binary welfare comparisons may in some settings be on
comparatively safer ground—although still subject to additional assumptions
and caveats not studied in this paper (see, e.g., Adler, 2012).
3.2 Choice setting: the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP)
3.2.1 Background
After graduating from a U.S. medical school, most students enroll in a residency
program. The residency is a three- to seven-year period of training in a spe-
cialty such as anesthesiology, emergency medicine, family medicine, general
surgery, internal medicine, pediatrics, or psychiatry. Students apply to pro-
grams at the beginning of their fourth (and final) year. In late fall programs
invite selected students to visit and be interviewed. Students subsequently sub-
mit to the NRMP their preferences over the programs where they interviewed,
while programs submit their preferences over students. The NRMP determines
the final allocation of students to residencies. In 2012, students were allowed
to submit their preference ordering through the NRMP website between Jan-
uary 15 and February 22, and the resulting match was announced on March 16;
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among students graduating from non-homeopathic U.S. medical schools, 16,875
submitted their preference, and 15,712 (93%) ended up getting matched (NRMP,
2012).
The matching algorithm, described in detail in Roth and Peranson (1999),
was designed to incentivize truthful preference reporting from students and to
generate stable matches (in which no student and program prefer to be matched
to one another over their current matches). It is based on the student-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), which is guaranteed
to produce a stable match, and where truthful reporting is a weakly dominant
strategy for students. The original, simple algorithm, however, could not ac-
commodate certain requirements of the medical matching market (such as the
requirement for couples to match to residencies in the same city). The modifi-
cations to the algorithm complicate the strategic incentives and allow the possi-
bility that no stable match exists, but simulations in Roth and Peranson (1999)
suggest that effectively all students remain incentivized to truthfully reveal their
preferences.
3.2.2 Key features for our study
For our purposes, medical residency choices are an especially useful context for
the following reasons:
Choice versus preferences: The NRMP setup may be as close as one can get to
a setting where choices reveal preferences.7 Residency choice is arguably one
7Strictly speaking, what we refer to as our choice data are survey respondents’ reports on
choices; we do not directly observe the actual preference ranking submitted by students to the
NRMP. However, these reports seem very reliable. Among the 131 respondents who completed
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of the most important career-related decisions a medical student makes, with
short- and long-term consequences for career path, geographic location, friend-
ships, and family. Because of its importance, students deliberate over their de-
cision for months and have a great deal of information and advising available
to assist them in becoming well informed. Their submitted ranking is not visi-
ble to peers or residency programs, and hence, relative to many other decisions,
the scope for strategic or signaling concerns is reduced. Finally and crucially,
students are incentivized by the matching mechanism to report their true pref-
erence ranking.
Identifiable moment of choice: Unlike many other important life decisions, the
NRMP submission has an identifiable moment when the decision is irreversibly
committed. By surveying students shortly after they submit their preference
ranking to the NRMP (and before they learn the match outcome), we elicit their
SWB predictions under essentially the same information set and beliefs as at the
moment of making the choice.
Identifiable choice set and ranking: Unlike other decisions where observable
choice data consist of only the one chosen option, often with the econometrician
being uncertain as to the exact choice set from which this option was chosen,
here choice data consist of a ranking over a set of residencies. Therefore, we
can elicit anticipated SWB and residency features over that same set of options.
Also, observing a choice ranking over multiple options confers more statistical
power than observing only which option was chosen from a set.
Intertemporal tradeoff: A residency is expected to be a period of hard work,
both our original and repeat surveys (see section 3.3 below), only 2 (1.5%) reported conflicting
choice data. (Of the remaining 129 respondents, 5 had cross-survey differences in missing choice
data but no conflicts; 2 seemed to have made easily-correctible data-entry mistakes in either
survey; and 122 reported the exact same choices across the two surveys.)
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long hours, and intensive training, the benefits of which will be realized once
the student becomes a practicing doctor. The investment aspect of the decision
allows us to distinguish instantaneous utility from lifetime utility (the present
discounted value of instantaneous utility); expected lifetime utility is what de-
termines choice. Hence we can explore whether our affective SWB question—
anticipated happiness during the residency—is better thought of as related to
expected instantaneous utility or to expected lifetime utility. That distinction,
which we consider and discuss in section 3.4.3, is crucial for evaluating potential
applications of SWB data. Currently, most papers using a happiness question
rely on implicitly assuming that it proxies for expected lifetime utility.
Heterogeneity in attribute evaluations: Residency choice offers rich variation
in individuals’ evaluations of programs’ attributes: students’ assessments of
fit, locational preferences, and social considerations are all reasonably idiosyn-
cratic. This heterogeneity, together with differences in choice sets (i.e., the sets of
programs where different students had interviewed), is the source of variation
identifying our regression coefficients.
One limitation of residency choice for our purposes is that it is not well suited
for studying tradeoffs with money—the typical numeraire used in the literature.
Our original intention was to use expected income for each residency to price
the other residency attributes. However, in the process of designing the survey
we learned—by being explicitly told by representatives of medical schools and
by medical students we consulted—that expected income is largely unrelated to
this decision. The primary determinant of expected income for medical students
is their choice of specialty, a decision typically made years before choosing a
residency. Indeed, most NRMP participants apply to residencies for a single
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specialty and hence should not expect their future income to vary meaningfully
across their top choices. While pricing residency attributes in dollars would
have been convenient, it is by no means crucial for our purposes; we instead
focus on comparing MRSs and tradeoffs between the attributes directly. We
elicited expected income in our survey anyway but do not use it in this paper.8
3.3 Sample and survey design
3.3.1 Sample
From September 2011 to January 2012, we contacted virtually all 122 U.S. med-
ical schools with full accreditation from the Liaison Committee on Medical Ed-
ucation by sending an email to a school representative (typically an Associate
Dean of Student Affairs) and asking for permission to survey graduating med-
ical students. We followed up with phone calls, further emails, and/or face-to-
face meetings at the Association of American Medical Colleges Annual Meeting.
As a result, 23 schools (19% of our initial list) agreed to participate in our study.9
These 23 represent a wide range of class sizes (from 60 to 299 students in 2011)
and locations, and they graduated a total of 3,224 students in 2011. The survey
appendix of Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones (2013) reproduces the
8Indeed, responses to our expected-income questions are of limited usefulness. Only 40% of
respondents expect any income variation across the residencies in our two expected-income
questions-compared with a range of 79-96% of respondents expecting variation in the nine
expected-attribute questions. Moreover, looking at the correlations between responses to a
given question by a given respondent across our two survey waves, responses to the expected-
income questions are among the noisiest, having within-subject correlations of 0.00 and 0.24-
compared with correlations in the range 0.24-0.81 in the nine expected-attribute questions.
9A common reason schools gave us for not participating was that their students are already
asked to participate in “too many” surveys.
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initial email sent to schools, lists the participating schools, their class sizes, and
the numbers of their students starting vs. completing our survey.
Between February 22 at 9pm EST (the deadline for submitting residency pref-
erences) and March 3, students in participating schools received an email from
their school’s dean, student council representative, or registrar, inviting them to
respond to our web survey by clicking on a link. The email is reproduced in
the survey appendix. It explained, among other things, that “The results of this
study will provide better information on how medical students select residency
programs, and can assist in the advising and preparation of future generations
of students”; that the survey is estimated to take 15 minutes to complete; and
that we offer participants at least a 1/50 chance to win an iPod.10 Reminder
emails were sent near the March 3 deadline. When the survey closed, at 11:59pm
EST that day, we had received 579 complete responses (approximately 18% of
the roughly 3,224 students contacted).11 Our analysis is based on the 561 who
entered name and specialty information for at least two programs (540 of whom
entered information for all four programs). Due to selection, our sample—while
drawn from a diverse set of schools—is unlikely to be representative of U.S.
medical students. Nonetheless, if MRSs could in general be inferred from SWB
data, then we would expect the same to hold in our sample.
428 of our respondents agreed, when asked at the end of the survey, to be
re-contacted. They received, on a randomly-drawn date between March 7 and
10At the end of the survey, participants were thanked for their participation; were reminded
that they have a 1/50 chance to win an iPod; and were asked to encourage their classmates to
also participate. As an incentive for the latter, they were informed that we would increase the
individual chance to win an iPod to 3/50 in schools with response rate of 70% or higher (which
no school reached).
11In addition to the 579 complete responses, our survey had another 680 visits that did not
result in a complete response. Of these, 284 (42%) exited before proceeding beyond the first
page.
114
9, another email inviting them to participate in a repeat survey, with a March
11 deadline. The repeat survey consisted of the same questions as the original
survey, with a few new questions added at the end. Comparing responses across
these two waves allows us to assess the reliability of our measures, as we do
below. 133 respondents completed the repeat survey, and 131 of them (23% of
our main sample) provided information for at least two programs. The median
time between completion of the original and the repeat surveys was 13 days.
3.3.2 Survey design
Our survey appendix provides screenshots of our survey. Here we briefly sum-
marize important survey details. Following an introductory screen, respon-
dents are asked: “Please enter the top four programs from the preference or-
dering you submitted to the NRMP.”12 Respondents separately enter program
(e.g., “Massachusetts General Hospital”) and specialty (e.g., “Anesthesiology”).
Respondents are then asked: “On what date did you submit your rank
order list to the NRMP?” Figure 3.1 reports the distributions of submission
dates (lighter bars) and survey response dates (gray bars) among our 561 main-
sample respondents. The median number of days between choice submission
and response to our survey is 11. The figure also shows the subsequent distri-
bution of response dates for the 131 main-sample respondents who participated
in our repeat survey (darker bars).
On the next screen, respondents are asked about their relationship status and
12While “the top four” is not the entire preference ordering, it is likely to be the relevant
portion of the list for our respondents. In 2012, 83.6% of NRMP participants graduating from
U.S. medical schools were matched to one of their top four choices. (First choice: 54.1%; second:
14.9%; third: 9.1%; fourth: 5.5%; NRMP, 2012).
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Figure 3.1: Survey response timeline
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Notes: Frequency distribution of survey responses by date. Each bar corre-
sponds to one day. NRMP submission and 1st-wave data are for the 561 re-
spondents in our main sample (with the exception that five respondents did not
report their date of NRMP submission, and two reported invalid dates). 2nd-
wave data are for the 131 respondents in the main sample who completed the
repeat survey. The 1st-wave responses entered on February 22nd occurred after
9pm EST, the deadline for NRMP submission. On that date, where bars overlap,
they are not stacked, and the longer bar continues behind the shorter bar.
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whether they are registered with the NRMP for a “dual match.”13 Their answer
to the relationship question determines whether the question “On a scale from
1 to 100, how desirable is this residency for your spouse or significant other?”
will be included as a residency attribute on a later screen.14
Next, the following instructions appear on the screen:
For the following section, you will be asked to individually consider the top four
programs you ranked. For each of these possibilities, you will be asked to report your
predictions on how attending that residency program will affect a variety of aspects of
your life. Please answer as carefully and truthfully as possible.
For some questions you will be asked to rate aspects on a 1-100 scale. Let 100 repre-
sent the absolute best possible outcome, 1 represent the absolute worst possible outcome,
and 50 represent the midpoint.
The ranked residencies are then looped through in random order, and two
screens appear for each residency. The first screen elicits respondents’ rating
of the residency, using the 1-100 scale, on the main three anticipated-SWB ques-
tions and on the nine residency attributes. The second screen includes questions
about expected income that we do not use in this paper.
Table 3.1 reproduces the three anticipated-SWB questions and the nine at-
tribute questions as they appear on the first screen below the instruction:
“Thinking about how your life would be if you matriculate into the residency
13The dual match is an option for couples trying to match to residencies simultaneously. The
two submit a single list ranking pairs of programs. While 64% of our respondents indicate that
they are either married or in a long-term relationship, only 7% are dual-match participants. As
discussed in section 3.4.2, our main results are robust to excluding them.
14For respondents not in a relationship, this ”desirable for significant other” residency-
attribute variable is set to a constant in all regressions below. Doing so is appropriate since all
our analysis is within-respondent, and since there is no cross-residency difference in the level of
this variable for single respondents.
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program in <specialty> at <program>, please answer the questions below.” The
SWB and attribute questions are purposefully designed to resemble each other
as much as possible in terms of language and structure, and they appear on the
screen mixed together as twelve questions in random order. As a practical mat-
ter of survey design, this symmetric treatment allows us (in section 3.5 below)
to compare the twelve questions on how useful each one is as a single predic-
tor of choice, without confounds due to question language or order. Moreover,
on a conceptual level it could be argued that the classification of questions as
“SWB” versus “attribute” is in some cases arbitrary and has little basis in the-
ory (a point that we return to in Section 3.6). Nonetheless, when planning our
empirical strategy and prior to data collection, we set apart the three SWB ques-
tions to be compared with choice as dependent variables in regressions on the
attributes (see Section 3.4 below), because in the happiness literature these are
the questions that are routinely used as utility proxies.
Mixed together and arranged here roughly by the time interval they refer to,
the twelve SWB and attribute questions include: three affective measures that
refer to a typical day during the residency (in Table 3.1 these are labeled happi-
ness, anxiety, and stress during residency); three evaluative/eudaimonic mea-
sures that refer more generally to the time during the residency (life satisfaction,
social life, and worthwhile life during residency); one measure that refers im-
plicitly to the time during the residency (desirability of location); one measure
that refers implicitly to the time after the residency (future career prospects);
one measure that simply refers to one’s “life” (ladder); and three measures that
come with no specification of period (residency prestige and status, control over
life, and—for respondents in a relationship—desirable for significant other).
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Next, the top three residencies (rather than four, to keep the survey from
becoming too long and repetitive) are cycled through again, in a new random
order. For each residency we elicit anticipated happiness at different future time
intervals (we provide more details when analyzing the resulting data, in section
3.4.3 below).
The survey concludes with a sequence of screens that include four ques-
tions regarding the relationship between a respondent’s submitted NRMP rank-
ing and her or his “true” preferences; a question regarding experiences with
residency-program representatives’ attempts at manipulating the match; and
questions about gender, age, college GPA, MCAT score, and Medical Licensing
Examination scores (for summary statistics, see Web Appendix Table A1). We
explore these data in section 3.4.2 below. On the last screen, respondents are
thanked for their participation and asked for permission to be contacted for the
follow-up survey.
As a brief overview of our data, Figure 3.2 presents kernel density estimates
of the distribution of our primary variables by residency rank (for means and
standard deviations, see Web Appendix Table A2; for a version of Figure 3.2 de-
meaned at the respondent level, see Web Appendix Figure A1). As is visually
clear, all have substantial variation across respondents, and many have clear dif-
ferences in distribution across program ranks. For example, focusing attention
on the three primary SWB measures (top row), it is clear that higher-ranked pro-
grams have higher mean anticipated SWB. Web Appendix Table A3 presents the
test-retest correlations of these variables, as calculated with the repeat survey.
We view the relatively high correlations of responses across waves as evidence
that our survey measures elicit meaningful information.
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Figure 3.2: Distributions of variables by program rank
Notes: Kernel density plots of residency attributes by preference order.
(Epanechnikov; Bandwidth 5.) Based on the 561 respondents in the main sam-
ple.
3.4 Main analysis and results
3.4.1 Single SWB measures
As a first step in constructing choice-based and SWB-based tradeoff estimates,
we estimate the associations of residency attributes with the choice-based and
SWB-based residency rankings. The first four columns of Table 3.2 report four
separate regressions of, respectively, choice, anticipated happiness, anticipated
life satisfaction, and anticipated ladder questions on the nine residency at-
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tributes. Each column estimates a rank-ordered logit model (Beggs, Cardell,
and Hausman, 1981), which generalizes the standard binary-choice logit model
to more than two ranked options. To avoid confusion, we emphasize that rank-
ordered logit is different from ordered logit, an econometric technique com-
monly used in the happiness literature. When using rank-ordered logit, we
assume that each individual i’s ordinal ranking of residencies, denoted by their
rank r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is rationalized by a random latent index, Uir = βXXir + ir.
The parameters of the latent index, βX, are estimated by maximizing the sum
of the individual-level log-likelihoods that Ui1 > Ui2 > Ui3 > Ui4, the condition
necessary for generating the observed ordering of residencies. The unobserved
error term is assumed to follow a type I extreme value distribution, yielding a
closed-form solution to the maximum-likelihood problem. We construct the re-
gressors by dividing the attribute variables by 100 (so the regressors range from
0.01 to 1). The coefficients can be interpreted analogously to standard logit co-
efficients: for any pair of residencies A and B, all else equal, a one-unit increase
in the difference in regressor j, X(i,A, j) − X(i,B, j), is associated with a β j increase
in the log odds ratio of choosing A over B. We report a within-subject modifi-
cation of McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2, a statistic that measures the fraction of
within-subject variation of the latent index explained by the fitted model.15
Consider Table 3.2’s two leftmost columns (“Choice” and “Happiness dur-
ing residency”). The first row indicates that the coefficient on residency prestige
15We modify the R2 measure of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) by demeaning the predicted
index value Uˆir at the respondent level:
ˆVar(Uˆir − U¯i)
ˆVar(Uˆir − U¯i) + Var(ir)
.
This ratio is the fraction of within-respondent variance in the latent index contributed by the es-
timated, deterministic component. The resulting measure of fit is intuitively similar to standard
R2.
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Table 3.2: Rank-ordered logit estimates: choice vs. anticipated SWB
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Rank-ordered logit regressions of either
choice (column 1) or a SWB measure (columns 2-7) on residency attributes. Only
ordinal information on the dependent variables is used. Columns 2-4 use the
ordinal rankings implied by the main three SWB measures. Columns 5-7 use the
ordinal rankings implied by an optimal linear utility index, created by a first-
stage rank-ordered logit regression of choice on the index components (reported
in Table 3.4). All attribute ratings are divided by 100 before being included in the
regression. Joint significance of the differences with choice coefficients (bottom
row): p-value from a Wald test of the joint equality of all coefficients in the
column with all coefficients in the choice column. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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and status is 2.5 in the choice regression and 0.0 in the happiness regression.
This difference is highly statistically significant (Wald test p-value = 0.000). To
interpret these coefficients, consider their implication for the ranking of two res-
idency programs that are identical in all measured dimensions except for a 20-
point difference in their prestige and status on the survey’s 100-point scale. The
choice coefficient implies that the probability of choosing the more prestigious
program would be exp(2.5∗20/100)/(exp(2.5∗20/100)+1) = 62%. The happiness
coefficient implies that the probability of ranking the more prestigious program
higher on anticipated happiness would be 50%.16
Our estimate of the relationship between a residency’s ranking and the res-
idency’s perceived prestige and status hence strongly depends on whether we
use choice ranking or anticipated-happiness ranking. Examining the rest of the
coefficient pairs across the choice and happiness columns reveals that, within a
pair, while there are no sign reversals, there are many significant differences in
coefficient magnitudes. With the exception of control over life, they are all sta-
tistically significant at the 10% level. Five of the differences are significant at the
1% level: not only residency prestige and status, but also desirability of location,
future career prospects, and desirability for significant other are associated sig-
nificantly more with choice than with anticipated-happiness, while the reverse
is true for social life during the residency. As reported in the table’s bottom row,
joint equality of coefficients between the two columns is strongly rejected.
Examining the next two columns (“Life satisfaction during residency” and
“Ladder”) reveals that with few exceptions, these two measures’ coefficients lie
16Of course, our coefficient estimates (and hence our tradeoff estimates below) may be subject
to omitted-variable bias. However, if choice-based MRSs were identical to SWB tradeoffs, any
resulting bias would equally affect the choice-based and SWB-based estimates. Our discussion
below is therefore focused less on the point estimates themselves and more on whether they
differ across choice and SWB.
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between those of choice and those of happiness. These two evaluative mea-
sures seem on some attributes closer to happiness, an affective measure, and
on other attributes closer to choice. For example, while on social life during
the residency, the two are virtually indistinguishable from happiness, all with
coefficients larger than that on choice, on desirability of location the two are
indistinguishable from choice, with coefficients much larger than that on happi-
ness. Across the rows, most of the ladder estimates appear closer to the choice
estimates than the life satisfaction estimates; statistically, however, we cannot
distinguish the two evaluative measures from each other. Indeed, Wald tests
of the joint equality of coefficients between any pair among the four columns
strongly reject the null of equality (p = 0.000), for all pairs except the life satis-
faction and ladder pair (p = 0.52).
To what extent do these differences in coefficient estimates translate to dif-
ferences in estimated tradeoffs? To answer this question regarding a given
tradeoff—for example, between prestige and social life—one can compare,
across Table 3.2’s columns, the within-column ratio between the two relevant
coefficients. To answer this question regarding a given attribute—for exam-
ple, “How large are the cross-column differences in estimated tradeoffs between
prestige-and-status and the other eight attributes?”—we could use that attribute
as a numeraire and report nine tables (one per numeraire), each with relatively
noisy ratio estimates. Instead, we report Table 3.3, a single table that sum-
marizes each attribute’s eight relevant within-column ratios with a single, less
noisy measure that can be compared across columns. The table reports the ratio
of each coefficient from Table 3.2 to the average absolute value of coefficients in
its Table 3.2 column. With this normalization, each of Table 3.3’s entries can be
interpreted as an average weight in tradeoffs. For example, a higher normalized
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coefficient on an attribute in the choice column relative to the happiness column
would mean that on average, the MRS between another attribute and this one
is lower in the choice column than the corresponding tradeoff estimate in the
happiness column. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
Examining Table 3.3’s first row and comparing column 1 with columns 2-4
reveals that residency prestige and status’s regression coefficient in the choice
column is 1.4 times the average of the nine attributes’ regression coefficients;
with any of the three anticipated-SWB measures, however, prestige and status’s
regression coefficients are below average, ranging from 0.0 to 0.4 times the aver-
age. This difference in implied tradeoffs is rather dramatic: the estimate in the
choice column is more than three times larger than the largest SWB estimate.
To examine the statistical significance of this and other differences, Web
Appendix Table A4 replaces each estimate in columns 2-7 of Table 3.3 with
its difference from the corresponding estimate in Table 3.3’s column 1 (the
choice column). Table A4 also reports the p-value of each difference. Rela-
tive to the choice-based estimates, all three SWB measures underweight resi-
dency prestige-and-status and desirability for significant other, and overweight
the importance of social life and life seeming worthwhile during the residency.
Other attributes also show significant differences, but they appear to be less
systematic. As reported in Table 3.3’s bottom row, we again easily reject joint
equality—in this table, of normalized coefficients—between any of the three
SWB measures and choice.
Comparing across Table 3.3’s SWB columns, the life satisfaction and ladder
columns appear similar to each other (as in Table 3.2), with virtually all esti-
mates in between the choice estimates and the (always equally signed) happi-
126
Table 3.3: Tradeoff estimates: choice vs. anticipated SWB
Notes: Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. Entries are coefficients
from Table 3.2, normalized by taking their ratio to the average absolute value
of the nine coefficients in their Table 3.2 column. Joint significance of the dif-
ferences with choice entries (bottom row): p-value from a Wald test of the joint
equality of all entries in the column with all entries in the choice column. * p <
.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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ness estimates. Considered jointly, the coefficients in both the life satisfaction
and ladder columns are again statistically different from the happiness column
(p = 0.000) but are not distinguishable from each other (p = 0.63).
Since comparing the choice and SWB columns of Table 3.3 is one of the central
aims of our paper, Figure 3.3 provides a visual rendering of the table. Each of the
figure’s six graphs is based on Table 3.3’s column 1 and one other column (from
among columns 2-7). Within each graph, each of the nine points represents an
attribute. Each attribute’s x- and y-coordinates correspond, respectively, with
its choice and SWB estimates from Table 3.3, with their 95% confidence intervals
represented by the horizontal and vertical capped bars. Points in the northeast
or southwest quadrants hence represent cases where choice and SWB estimates
have the same sign; on the solid 45-degree line, the estimates are equal. To
assist in visually assessing how far a point is from the 45-degree line, the dashed
lines demarcate the boundaries outside of which estimates differ by more than
a factor of two.
Focusing on the top three graphs, it is visually apparent that almost all points
fall in the same-sign quadrants and that, additionally, there is substantial posi-
tive correlation between the choice and SWB estimates (correlations are reported
in each graph). However, there are also substantial differences between the esti-
mates, often by a factor of two or more. To quantify these differences, we define
a percentage-error measure of SWB-based estimates relative to the choice-based
benchmarks:
∣∣∣∣βSWB−βChoiceβChoice ∣∣∣∣, where the βs represent an attribute’s estimates in Table
3.3, and the superscript SWB represents one of the SWB columns. An error of
60%, for example, corresponds to cases where the SWB estimate is either 40%
or 160% of the choice estimate. Each graph reports the minimum, median, and
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Figure 3.3: Tradeoff estimates: choice vs. anticipated SWB
Notes: Based on Table 3.3 estimates. Each graph presents a comparison of one
SWB measure (columns 2-7 of Table 3.3) to choice (column 1 of Table 3.3). Each
point represents one of the nine attributes included in the regressions, and its
x- and y-coordinates correspond to the normalized choice and SWB coefficients,
respectively. 95% confidence intervals are represented by the horizontal and
vertical capped bars. The dashed lines demarcate the boundaries outside of
which the normalized choice and SWB coefficients differ by more than a factor
of two. See section 3.4.1 for discussion of the error metrics.
maximum error among the nine attributes. The median ranges from 63% for
the ladder measure to 99% for the happiness-during-residency measure. While
such margins of error may be tolerable for some applications—for example, ap-
plications that focus only on the sign of an effect—they are a serious limitation
to the use of these measures when more precise tradeoff estimates are needed.
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3.4.2 Robustness
In this subsection, we probe the robustness of our main results to several possi-
ble sources of bias.
Biases in survey response: Due to a halo effect, respondents’ overall assess-
ments of residencies might leak into their subjective assessments of either an-
ticipated SWB or residency attributes (or both). Similarly, cognitive dissonance
might lead respondents to modify their subjective assessments to rationalize
the choice order they reported earlier in the survey. To the extent that the rat-
ings of the residency attributes are affected, the coefficients in our regressions
are biased upward. Such a bias, however, could not by itself explain the dif-
ferences in coefficients across columns. Moreover, to the extent that the ratings
of anticipated SWB measures are affected, the concordance between the SWB-
based rankings and the choice ranking would increase, biasing downward any
choice-SWB differences across the columns. Therefore, the differences we do
observe should be viewed as a lower bound on the actual divergence between
anticipated-SWB and choice rankings.
Econometric specification: The estimates in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are based on a
rank-ordered logit model, which is designed for analyses where the dependent
variable is—like our choice data—a rank ordering. Using this same specifica-
tion for our SWB data makes our estimates comparable across columns and al-
lows us to avoid making assumptions regarding similar use of the SWB rating
scales across respondents. In contrast, typical happiness regressions in the lit-
erature use OLS or ordered logit/probit, where dependent-variable scale use
is assumed to be identical across respondents (or identical up to differences in
means, in fixed-effects regressions). To examine the sensitivity of our findings
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to specification, we conduct side-by-side comparisons of the SWB columns from
Table 3.3 with analogous estimates using OLS with respondent fixed effects
(Web Appendix Table A5) and ordered logit (Table A6). These alternative speci-
fications yield estimates similar to the rank-ordered logit regressions and do not
change our conclusions from the previous subsection. Measurement error: Our
respondents’ attribute and SWB assessments are likely subject to measurement
error. To the extent that the attribute ratings are affected, the coefficients in our
regressions are biased. As with the survey-response biases above, however, this
bias could not explain the differences in coefficients across columns. Of greater
potential concern is the possibility that anticipated SWB is affected: while clas-
sical measurement error in the dependent variable would not bias coefficient
estimates in OLS, it would bias our rank-ordered logit estimates. Consequently,
if anticipated SWB is a noisy measure of choice utility, then measurement error
could generate differences in coefficients across the choice and SWB columns.
That the coefficients from the fixed-effects OLS specification mentioned above
(Web Appendix Table A5) do not meaningfully differ from those in Table 3.2
suggests, however, that such measurement error cannot drive our results.
Heterogeneity in response-scale use: Our analysis above assumes that respon-
dents are identical in their use of the attributes’ 1-100 response scales. While het-
erogeneity in attribute scale use could not explain the choice-SWB differences
we find, we verify that our conclusions are unchanged when we re-estimate Ta-
ble 3.3 after first normalizing the response scales at the respondent level (Web
Appendix Table A7; each attribute is demeaned at the respondent level, and
then divided by the respondent-specific standard deviation, prior to entering
the regressions).
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Heterogeneity in tradeoffs: Our analysis above imposes identical coefficients
across respondents. Heterogeneity in coefficients could not by itself explain the
choice-SWB differences we find. However, it is possible that our results are
driven by a particular subpopulation, and that for many or most in the sample,
the tradeoffs represented by their anticipated SWB are similar to those implied
by their choices. To assess this possibility, we cut the sample along various re-
spondent characteristics. For each sample cut, we re-estimate Table 3.3 (web
appendix, pp. 19-32). Our main findings continue to hold across these sample
cuts, suggesting that they are pervasive across subgroups within our sample.
For example, comparing the choice column with each of the SWB columns, we
reject at the 1% level the null hypothesis of jointly identical tradeoffs in each
of these cross-column comparisons when cutting the sample by: gender, above
and below median MCAT scores, above and below median age, whether or not
the respondent agreed to be re-contacted for the follow-up survey (76% of our
respondents agreed), and whether or not the respondent completed the follow-
up survey (23%); and when excluding dual-match participants (7%). When cut-
ting the sample by relationship status, we reject the null at the 5% level.
Choice versus preferences: As discussed in section 3.2.2, an important advan-
tage of the NRMP setting is that the mechanism incentivizes students to submit
their true preference ranking. However, some students may deviate from truth-
ful reporting—for example, due to misunderstanding the mechanism. To assess
this possibility, we re-estimate Table 3.3 three more times: excluding respon-
dents who report manipulation attempts by schools (3% of our sample); ex-
cluding respondents who report that their NRMP submission did not represent
their “true preference order” (17%);17 and including only these 17% of respon-
17Given the incentive compatibility of the mechanism, this 17% figure may seem surprisingly
high. Only 5% of our sample, however, indicate that they chose their list ”strategically,” and less
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dents, but as dependent variable in the choice column replacing their submitted
NRMP ranking with what they report as their “true preference order” (web ap-
pendix, pp. 33-35). As above, our conclusions do not change, and we continue
to reject joint equality across the choice and SWB columns at the 1% level.
3.4.3 Multi-question SWB indices
Our results thus far suggest that none of our single-question anticipated-SWB
measures generates tradeoff estimates that reliably reflect choice tradeoffs.
However, two distinct hypotheses separately imply that combinations of ques-
tions may better capture choice utility and hence may yield more similar trade-
offs. We now explore these two hypotheses.
Happiness as instantaneous utility: When a survey respondent reports feeling
happy, is her report better viewed as relating to her instantaneous utility or
to her expected lifetime utility? Our evidence above suggests that happiness-
during-residency tradeoffs do not reflect expected-lifetime-utility MRSs. Our
findings hence pose a challenge to the interpretation of happiness regressions
as estimating choice-utility MRSs (except in situations with no intertemporal
considerations).
To explore an alternative hypothesis—the SWB-as-instantaneous-utility
hypothesis—we examine whether anticipated happiness would better reflect
choice if it integrated happiness predictions over the full expected horizon of
than 1% indicate that they felt they made a mistake. The remaining 11% indicate another reason
and are free to explain in a free-response textbox. Most such explanations point to constraints
based on family preferences or location, perhaps suggesting that the preferences we estimate for
these respondents are best understood as those of their households, as opposed to themselves
as individuals.
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life, rather than over only the residency years. For that purpose, we elicit addi-
tional happiness predictions in our survey. As mentioned in section 3.3.2 above,
after responding to questions about each of the top four residencies, the respon-
dents cycle again through the top three, in a new random order. They are in-
structed as follows:
For the following section, you will again be asked to individually consider the top
three programs you ranked. For each of these possibilities, you will be asked to report
your predictions on how attending that residency program will affect your happiness
during different periods of your life. Please answer as carefully and truthfully as possi-
ble.
For each residency, respondents see a screen with questions. The three pri-
mary questions read: “On a scale from 1 to 100, how happy do you think you
would be on average [during the first ten years of your career]/[for the remain-
der of your career before retirement]/[after retirement]?” Each is followed by
questions assessing the uncertainty of the forecast.
Aggregating such questions into a present-discounted-value-of-happiness
index requires weighting them by appropriate discount factors (taking into ac-
count the different lengths of their respective intervals). In a field setting where
choice data are not available, the researcher would have to choose weights
based on her beliefs regarding the discount factor. Since we have choice data,
we instead conduct a rank-ordered logit regression predicting choice with our
four anticipated happiness questions, and use the estimated latent-index coeffi-
cients as our weights. This is the best linear index that could be constructed for
predicting choice in our data and hence represents a best-case scenario (by this
choice-prediction criterion) for a present-discounted-value-of-happiness mea-
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sure that might be used in a realistic application.
The regression for constructing the index is reported in column 1 of Table
3.4. The coefficients on the happiness variables are roughly declining over
time, in spite of the increase in time-interval length, consistent with steep dis-
counting.18 However, the McKelvey and Zavoina R2 of 0.17 indicates relatively
low goodness-of-fit, suggesting that the index still omits significant amounts of
choice-relevant information.
Returning to Tables 3.2 and 3.3, in column 5 we use the ordering implied
by this multi-period anticipated-happiness index as the dependent variable (“4-
period-happiness index”).19 In Table 3.3, on most of the attributes column 5
is slightly closer to column 1 (choice) than column 2 (happiness during resi-
dency) is, but on some of the attributes column 5 is slightly farther. Overall, the
4-period-happiness tradeoff estimates still exhibit substantial differences from
the estimates in column 1 (joint significance of differences p = 0.000 between
columns 1 and 5; p = 0.08 between columns 2 and 5). Moreover, columns 3 and
4—life satisfaction and ladder—seem in general closer to column 1 than column
5 is (both columns 3 and 4 are statistically different from column 5, with p = 0.01
or less). Indeed, while Figure 3.3 reports that the median error for the 4-period-
happiness index is smaller than for happiness during residency, it is larger than
18While we do not know the exact length of three of the time intervals, we can calculate
them roughly. The during-the-residency happiness measure would typically cover five years
starting from the present. By definition, we know that the first-ten-years-of-career measure
covers the ten years that follow. Since the average age in our sample is 27, the rest-of-career
measure is expected to cover roughly another 23 years until retirement (= 65-27-5-10). With life
expectancy roughly 80 years at that age, the after-retirement measure would cover on average
another 15 years. Hence, relative to the during-the-residency measure, the first-ten-years-of-
career is roughly twice as long, and the last two time windows are roughly three to five times
as long.
19Since the three beyond-residency anticipated-happiness questions are elicited for only the
top three residency choices, the estimates in column 5 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are based on a subset
of the data columns 1-4 are based on. When we restrict the two tables to the 1591 observations
used in column 5 (Web Appendix Tables A12 and A13), our conclusions below are unchanged.
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Table 3.4: Main SWB and residency attribute survey questions
(1) (2) (3)
Choice Choice Choice
Happiness during residency 4.5*** 0.6 0.9
(0.5) (0.4) (0.6)
Happiness in first 10 years 4.6*** 3.5***
(0.8) (0.9)
Happiness in rest of career 2.1** 2.4***
(0.9) (0.9)
Happiness after retirement 1.2 2.0**
(0.8) (0.9)
Life satisfaction during residency 4.4*** 3.9***
(0.5) (0.7)
Ladder 5.5*** 5.4***
(0.4) (0.6)
# Observations 1609 2192 1607
# Students 544 561 544
McKelvey & Zavoina R2, within variance only 0.17 0.37 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Rank-ordered logit regressions of choice on SWB mea-
sures. All aspect ratings are divided by 100 prior to inclusion in the regressions. Since future
happiness measures are only elicited for three of the four ranked residencies, less data are avail-
able for conducting these regressions relative to those with only the primary SWB questions.
However, restricting all three regressions to the same sample of 1607 observations has only
minor impact on the coefficient estimates (although column 2’s R2 decreases to 0.32); see Web
Appendix Table A10. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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for life satisfaction and ladder.
In summary, we find limited support for the SWB-as-instantaneous-utility
hypothesis; our four-time-period anticipated-happiness index is far from yield-
ing reliable MRS estimates.
Multidimensional SWB: Although much of the economics literature treats dif-
ferent SWB questions as interchangeable, several recent papers mentioned in
the introduction find that different questions have different correlates and argue
that they capture distinct components of well-being. To the extent that well-
being is multidimensional, a multi-question SWB index might yield tradeoff
estimates that are closer to our choice-based MRS estimates than those yielded
by any single measure.
To explore this possibility, we construct a “3-SWB-measure” index from our
main three SWB questions, and a “6-SWB-question” index by also including
the three beyond-residency happiness questions (from the 4-period-happiness
index above). To maximize the predictive power of the indices for choice,
we again use as weights the coefficients estimated in first-stage regressions of
choice on the components of each index.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4 report our first-stage regressions. In both re-
gressions the coefficient on happiness during the residency is indistinguishable
from zero, and is substantially smaller than the corresponding coefficient in col-
umn 1 as well as smaller than the coefficients on the two evaluative measures
in columns 2 and 3 (life satisfaction during the residency and ladder). In other
words, once the two evaluative measures are controlled for, happiness during
the residency contributes significantly less to predicting choice. The fit of the
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indices in columns 2 and 3, as measured by the McKelvey and Zavoina R2, is
substantially better than in column 1.
Returning to Tables 3.2 and 3.3, their columns 6 and 7 use, respectively, the
orderings implied by each of the two SWB indices as the dependent variable
in the regression. We easily reject, in both tables, joint equality of coefficients
between each of the two multi-SWB regressions and: choice (see each table’s
bottom row), happiness (p = 0.000), and, less strongly, the 4-period-happiness
index (p = 0.06 or less). Nonetheless, we cannot distinguish the two from each
other or from either life satisfaction or ladder (p-values range from 0.15 to 0.97);
indeed, in Figure 3.3 the four relevant graphs appear rather similar.20
To summarize, we find no support for the multidimensional-SWB-as-utility
hypothesis; our indices that incorporate multiple SWB measures not only fail
to match the choice-based MRS estimates, but also fail to do significantly better
than our single-question evaluative SWB measures. Of course, the SWB mea-
sures we include in these indices are far from exhausting every conceivable
measurable dimension (and time period) of well-being, and hence we cannot
rule out the possibility that an index based on a sufficiently rich set of ques-
tions might yield reliable MRS estimates—indeed, an index that captured all
the aspects that our respondents consider when making decisions should, by
construction, match choice quite closely. Nonetheless, since the SWB measures
we use in this paper are modeled after those most common in existing social
surveys and applied research, our results suggest that a straightforward exten-
20It may seem surprising that, relative to single-question life satisfaction or ladder questions,
the two indices do not in general yield coefficients and tradeoff estimates that are closer to those
based on choice, since the indices are better predictors of choice by construction. This finding
is directly related to the fact that while a measure may be highly correlated with choice, it may
not necessarily yield tradeoff estimates similar to those implied by choice. See section 3.5 for
discussion.
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sion of current practices—using a linear combination of a few commonly-used
SWB measures—would not be a substantial improvement for estimating MRSs.
3.5 From slopes to orderings: predicting choice ranking from
anticipated-SWB ranking
While our finding of substantial differences between the tradeoffs implied by
widely-used SWB measures and those revealed by choices calls into question
the practice of using SWB data to estimate MRSs, SWB data could be used in-
stead for assessing which among a set of options is most preferred. We begin
this section by exploring the usefulness of our anticipated-SWB data in predict-
ing pairwise choices.
Table 3.5 examines all possible within-respondent pairwise comparisons of
residency programs. Each row corresponds to a single SWB or attribute ques-
tion (top two panels) or a multi-question index (bottom panel). Columns 1,
2, and 3, respectively, report the percent of cases where the program that is
ranked higher in choice is ranked higher, the same, or lower than the other pro-
gram by the row’s measure. We assess each measure’s usefulness in predicting
choice with two yardsticks: the “correct-prediction rate” (another way to think
of column 1) and the “conditional correct-prediction rate” (column 4). The lat-
ter equals column 1 divided by the difference between 100% and column 2; it
is the share of cases where choice and a row’s measure yield the same ranking,
conditional on the measure ranking one option above the other.
As can be seen in the top panel of the table, the ladder question has the
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Table 3.5: Predicting binary choice from anticipated-SWB and attribute
questions
Preferred The two Preferred Conditional # Pairwise
program programs have program correct-prediction program
rates higher same rating rates lower rate comparisons
Happiness during residency 52% 27% 21% 71% 3240
Life satisfaction during res. 59% 23% 18% 77% 3244
Ladder 65% 18% 17% 80% 3245
Residency prestige and status 56% 16% 28% 67% 3244
Social life during residency 52% 20% 28% 65% 3247
Desirability of location 61% 14% 25% 71% 3241
Anxiety during residency 38% 29% 33% 53% 3236
Worthwhile life during res. 44% 40% 16% 73% 3235
Stress during residency 40% 26% 34% 54% 3236
Future career prospects 49% 30% 21% 70% 3247
Control over life 40% 30% 30% 57% 3235
Desirable for significant other 65% 16% 19% 77% 2087
Avg. hap. in first 10 years 34% 53% 13% 72% 1603
Avg. hap. in rest of career 28% 56% 16% 64% 1603
Avg. hap. after retirement 22% 64% 14% 62% 1605
4-period-happiness index 62% 10% 28% 69% 1592
3-SWB-measure index 75% 3% 22% 77% 3233
6-SWB-question index 76% 2% 22% 78% 1588
12-question index 81% 0% 19% 81% 3179
15-question index 82% 0% 18% 82% 1566
Notes: Based on only the ordinal ranking of the variable in each row. All six binary comparisons
among the top four programs are considered. Columns 1-3 sum to 100% in each row. Column
4 reports the correct prediction rate in cases where a prediction is made; that is, excluding cases
of indifference (column 2). Column 5 reports sample size.
140
highest correct-prediction rate (65%) among our three SWB and nine residency
attribute questions. It also has the highest conditional correct-prediction rate
[80%]. Among the 64% of respondents in a relationship, the next-best predictor
is desirability to one’s partner (correct-prediction rate 65%)[conditional correct-
prediction rate 77%]. In decreasing order of correct-prediction rate, the other
questions are: desirability of location (61%)[71%]; life satisfaction during res-
idency (59%)[77%]; residency prestige and status (56%)[67%]; happiness dur-
ing residency (52%)[71%]; social life during residency (52%)[65%]; future career
prospects (49%)[70%]; worthwhile life during residency (44%)[73%]; stress dur-
ing residency (40%)[54%]; control over life (40%)[57%]; and anxiety during res-
idency (38%)[53%]. Due to potential biases in survey response such as the halo
effect and cognitive dissonance discussed above (in Section 3.4.2), we interpret
these rates as upper bounds and focus not on their absolute magnitudes but
rather on comparing them across questions.
Regardless of whether we assess usefulness by the conditional or uncon-
ditional correct-prediction rate, we find that the evaluative SWB questions—
ladder and life satisfaction—as well as desirability to one’s significant other,
are among the single-question measures that match choice most closely. At
the other extreme, anticipated negative feelings—anxiety and stress during the
residency—do not predict choice well (with a conditional correct-prediction rate
only slightly better than a 50-50 guess).
The middle panel of Table 3.5 analyzes the three beyond-residency happi-
ness questions. While for happiness in the first ten years of one’s career, the
conditional correct-prediction rate is nearly the same as for happiness during
the residency [72% vs. 71%], the unconditional rate is much lower (34% vs.
141
52%), reflecting many ties (column 2). For happiness measures further in the
future, both rates are lower. Therefore, these measures are of relatively limited
usefulness as single-question predictors of pairwise choices.
Finally, for comparison with these single-question measures, the bottom
panel of the table examines our three multi-question indices (discussed in III.C)
and two additional indices that incorporate the nine attribute questions into the
multidimensional SWB indices. The weights in these two additional indices
are estimated from regressions analogous to those in Table 3.4 (Web Appendix
Table A8). The 4-period-happiness index’s conditional correct-prediction rate
is slightly below that of the happiness-during-the-residency question [69% vs.
71%], but, with far fewer ties (column 2), the index’s unconditional rate is much
higher (62% vs. 52%). The rest of the indices, which are based on increasing
numbers of questions (3, 6, 12, and 15), have relatively high (and increasing)
conditional correct-prediction rates [77%, 78%, 81%, and 82%, respectively]. As
including more questions in an index yields fewer ties, the indices’ uncondi-
tional rates are much higher than that of any single question (75%, 76%, 81%,
and 82%, respectively).
It may seem puzzling that the evaluative SWB questions and, to an even
larger extent, the 3- and 6-question indices correctly predict choice at relatively
high rates, in light of our finding that the tradeoffs they imply are so differ-
ent from the MRSs implied by choice. Figure 3.4 presents a simple model with
two attributes that illustrates the relationship between pairwise predictions and
tradeoffs. We orient the attributes so that both are “goods”: preferences are
monotonically increasing in each. We assume, consistent with our no-sign-
reversals finding in the previous section, that anticipated-SWB is also monotoni-
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cally increasing in each good. The solid line represents an individual’s iso-utility
curve, while the dashed line represents her anticipated iso-SWB curve; we as-
sume these curves satisfy standard regularity conditions. The respective slopes
at choice option A differ: the SWB tradeoff does not coincide with the MRS.
Indeed, while option A is preferred to option C, SWB is higher at C than at A.
In contrast, despite the difference in slopes, option B ranks higher than option
A in both choice and SWB. More generally, a SWB-based comparison of option
A with any option in the unshaded areas—the “discordance region”—would
favor the wrong option from a preference point of view; while a SWB-based
comparison of A with an option in any of the shaded areas—the “concordance
region”—would yield the right choice. Locally, the discordance region is larger
the greater is the difference in slopes. Globally, it is always strictly limited to
the northwest and southeast quadrants—the quadrants where an alternative to
A involves sacrificing one good for the other, i.e., where neither option vector-
dominates the other.
More generally, with any number of goods, the “closer” one choice option
is to vector-dominating the other, the more likely it is that the alternative to A
lies in the concordance region. In our data weak vector dominance (i.e., weak
inequality component by component) occurs in 16% of binary comparisons—a
high percentage relative to what might be expected with nine independently
and symmetrically distributed attributes (2 × 129 , assuming no ties). Indeed,
with the exception of stress and anxiety during residency, within-respondent
attribute ratings are generally moderately positively correlated across residen-
cies (Web Appendix Table A9). These positive correlations may help explain the
reasonably high rates of concordance that we find.21
21Another implication of this model is that, under reasonable assumptions regarding the dis-
tribution from which the alternative to A is drawn, when the alternative lies on a more distant
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Figure 3.4: Implications of iso-utility and iso-SWB curves for ordinal pre-
diction
Notes: This figure illustrates the implications of different tradeoffs in choice-
utility and anticipated SWB for binary comparisons. The solid line represents
an individual’s iso-utility curve, while the dashed line represents her iso-SWB
curve. Comparing option A to options in any of the shaded areas (for example,
option B), the iso-utility and iso-SWB curves imply the same binary ordering.
Comparing option A to options in the unshaded areas, the curves imply differ-
ent orderings (option C, for example, has higher SWB but is less preferred).
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The empirical settings where SWB comparisons would be most needed for
drawing inferences about the preference ranking of options, however, are set-
tings that involve sacrificing some goods for others. For example, Gruber and
Mullainathan (2005) conduct SWB-based welfare comparisons among smokers
who face higher versus lower cigarette taxes—a setting that involves an inher-
ent tradeoff between health and wealth, and where SWB data could potentially
be useful because, in the presence of self-control problems, choices may not re-
veal preferences. In such no-vector-dominance settings, the model above does
not make a clear prediction on whether choice and SWB would yield the same
ranking. Hence, in the absence of evidence like ours from specific settings of
interest, it is hard to assess the usefulness of SWB data for welfare comparisons
in those settings.
Due to the inherent difficulty of observing choice and anticipated SWB in
many of the situations where SWB data might be useful, Benjamin, Heffetz,
Kimball, and Rees-Jones (2012) study hypothetical choices and anticipated SWB
in thirteen settings designed to have no vector dominance. They find an overall
correct-prediction rate of 83%, with wide variation across choice settings, and
they identify features of the settings that are associated with higher rates. Ev-
idence from more settings is needed before we would be confident in drawing
generalizations regarding the reliability of SWB data for inferring preference
rankings.
(i.e., much higher or much lower) iso-utility curve, it is more likely to lie in the concordance
region. In Web Appendix Tables A14-A16 we report three additional versions of Table 3.5, re-
stricting the underlying data to three respective subsets of pairwise program comparisons: only
first- versus second-, only first- versus third-, and only first- versus fourth-ranked programs. We
find, as expected, that virtually all of our measures are better predictors of choice as the ranking
difference increases. For example, ladder’s conditional correct-prediction rate increases from
78% to 87% to 90%.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
Scholars and lay people alike have long been fascinated by happiness and its
correlates. By regressing SWB measures on bundles of goods and examining
coefficient ratios, researchers have been able to compare in common units the
associations between SWB measures and a wide variety of goods. Such com-
parisons have generated a large and growing number of interesting findings. To
what extent do these coefficient ratios represent economists’ notion of MRSs?
Our main finding is that, among the medical students in our sample, the
MRSs of residency program attributes implied by their preference rankings are
far from equal to the tradeoffs implied by their anticipated-SWB responses-
regardless of whether we use a happiness, a life satisfaction, or a ladder mea-
sure of SWB; a simple combination of such measures; or a simple combination
of anticipated happiness over the near and distant future. At the same time,
we find no sign reversals between choice and our SWB measures in their as-
sociation with any of the nine attributes; we find relatively high correlations
across the nine attributes between their choice-regression and SWB-regression
coefficients; and we find relatively high choice-SWB concordance rates in binary
residency comparisons.
Of course, our sample of medical students is a convenience sample, our ev-
idence is limited to the specific context of residency choice, and the nine res-
idency attributes that constitute our bundle of goods are far from exhaustive.
Nonetheless, we view our real-choice field evidence as an important advance
over and a complement to existing evidence from prior work. When we con-
sider them together, some common themes emerge across the findings in this
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paper and those in previous work that studies hypothetical choices in a range
of realistic scenarios (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones, 2012; hence-
forth BHKR) and abstract scenarios (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot,
2012; henceforth BHKS). We highlight four such themes. First, our main conclu-
sion that anticipated-SWB tradeoffs differ from choice MRSs is consistent with
results from the earlier papers that attributes of the options help to predict hypo-
thetical choices, controlling for anticipated SWB. Second, as mentioned above,
our finding of high concordance rates between choice and anticipated-SWB in
binary comparisons is similar to BHKR’s finding. Third, all three papers con-
clude that evaluative SWB measures are closer to choice than affective happi-
ness measures.22 Finally, all three papers find that measures of family well-
being—family happiness (in the previous work) and residency desirability to
one’s spouse or significant other (in this paper)—are among the strongest pre-
dictors of choice.
We believe that each of these findings has practical implications for empirical
researchers who consider using SWB measures to proxy for utility. We list four
such implications, in respective order paralleling the four themes above. First,
SWB tradeoffs should not be interpreted as MRSs. Second, binary SWB rankings
may in some settings be highly predictive of preference rankings—even when
SWB tradeoffs are far from MRSs. This of course also means that high choice-
SWB concordance in pairwise comparisons should not be interpreted as justi-
fying the use of SWB data to estimate MRSs. Third, evaluative SWB measures
may more reliably reflect preferences than affective happiness measures—even
22However, BHKR examine life satisfaction and happiness with life as a whole as their eval-
uative measures and do not study the ladder measure, and BHKS find that, in contrast to other
evaluative measures, the ladder question predicts hypothetical choice less well than many other
measures they study, in regressions that control for other measures. The potential discrepancy
between that finding and the finding reported here makes us reluctant to draw a strong conclu-
sion regarding the ladder question per se.
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when happiness is integrated over several time periods. Finally, measures of
family SWB may in some settings reflect preferences at least as reliably as eval-
uative measures of own SWB. Such family-SWB measures are not commonly
used in empirical applications but warrant exploration.
While we hope that researchers find these practical implications useful, we
also caution that using SWB data in empirical work typically requires additional
assumptions, often heroic—for example, about interpersonal comparability of
SWB survey responses (see, e.g., Adler, 2012)—that we do not evaluate in this
paper.
From a theoretical perspective, if different aspects of well-being are all
viewed as inputs into preferences, then in principle the specific aspects captured
by traditional SWB measures should not be treated differently from other inputs
a priori. From this point of view, rather than regressing SWB on other goods, es-
timating preferences requires regressing choice on a bundle that includes SWB
measures together with those other goods. BHKR and BHKS run such regres-
sions with hypothetical choice. The findings from those papers and this paper
suggest that while the well-being aspects captured by traditional SWB measures
are among the most important inputs into preferences, they are not the only im-
portant inputs. Consequently, consistent with the view expressed by Deaton,
Fortson, and Tortora (2010), it seems unlikely that one SWB question or even a
combination of a small number of them would capture enough of the important
inputs to be sufficient as an all-purpose utility proxy.
If tradeoffs estimated from SWB data are not MRSs, how should they be in-
terpreted? From the above theoretical perspective, SWB tradeoffs may be inter-
preted as technical rates of substitution (TRSs) that characterize the production
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function for SWB (as in Kimball and Willis, 2006, and Becker and Rayo, 2008).
Just as it is valuable for economists and policymakers to estimate TRSs for other
important utility inputs such as health, estimates of TRSs for SWB have gener-
ated and will likely continue to generate valuable insights into the production
of SWB.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO “LOSS AVERSION MOTIVATES TAX SHELTERING”
A.1 Proofs
Proposition 1. In the final-wealth-dependent sheltering model, if mFWD(·) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable and the PDF of bPM is continuous, then the PDF of b = bPM − s
is continuous.
Proof. Let s∗(bPM |w) denote the optimal sheltering solution. Assume first that
s∗(bPM |w) is an interior solution for all bPM, in which case it is determined by the
first order condition m′(w−bPM + s∗(bPM |w)) = c′(s∗(bPM |w)). The implicit function
theorem guarantees that s∗(bPM |w) is continuously differentiable. As a result, we
can express final balance due as a continuously differentiable function of pre-
manipulation balance due: b(bPM) = bPM − s∗(bPM |w). The convexity of c(·) guar-
antees that b(bPM) is strictly increasing, and thus invertible. Denote the inverse
function as ψ(b). The CDF of b may be expressed in terms of the CDF for bPM by
the relationship Fb(x) = FPMb (ψ(b)). Differentiating yeilds fb(x) = f
PM
b (ψ(b))ψ
′(b),
which expresses the PDF of b as a product of continuous functions.
The above assumed the case of an interior solution. Note that in the case
where c′(0) ≤ m′(w − bPM), the first-order conditions do not hold, s∗ = 0, and the
result immediately follows.
Proposition 4. Consider the mixed-type sheltering model. If r is in the support of the
balance due distribution for the loss-averse type, then there exists a threshold value c
such that E[s∗LA(λ, η, θLA|bPM = 0)] − E[s∗FDW(w, θFWD|bPM = 0)] > c > 0 implies:
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a) E[bPM |b = r] > limb→r+ E[bPM |b] and E[bPM |b = r] > limb→r− E[bPM |b]; and
b) E[s|b = r] > limb→r+ E[s|b] and E[s|b = r] > limb→r− E[s|b].
Proof. The following proves the claim in part b above. Part a follows immedi-
ately from part b since b = bPM − s.
To simplify notation, let pr denote the probability an agent is loss averse con-
ditional on reporting zero balance due. Let p+ denote limb→r+ Pr(LA|b), and p−
denote limb→r− Pr(LA|b). Let s¯FWD = E[s|type = FWD, b = r], s¯LAlow = E[s|type =
LA, b < r], s¯LAmid = E[s|type = LA, b = r], and s¯LAhigh = E[s|type = LA, b > r].
Considering right continuity: Note that limb→r+ E[s|b] = p+ s¯LAhigh + (1 − p+)s¯FWD
and E[s|b = r] = pr s¯LAmid + (1 − pr)s¯FWD.
Define threshold c = p
+
pr−p+ (s
LA
high − sLAmid). If s¯LAmid − s¯FWD > c, then limb→r+ E[s|b] −
E[s|b = r] = p+ s¯LAhigh + (1 − p+)s¯FWD − pr s¯LAmid − (1 − pr)s¯FWD = p+ s¯LAhigh − pr s¯LAmid + (pr −
p+)s¯FWD = p+(s¯LAhigh − s¯LAmid) + (pr − p+)(s¯FWD − s¯LAmid) < 0. This implies E[s|b = r] >
limb→r+ E[s|b].
Considering left continuity: Note that limb→r− E[s|b] = p− s¯LAlow + (1 − p−)s¯FWD and
E[s|b = r] = pr s¯LAmid + (1 − pr)s¯FWD.
If s¯LAmid− s¯FWD > 0, then limb→r− E[s|b]−E[s|b = r] = p− s¯LAlow+(1− p−)s¯FWD− pr s¯LAmid−
(1−pr)s¯FWD = p− s¯LAlow−pr s¯LAmid+(pr−p−)s¯FWD = p−(s¯LAlow− s¯LAmid)+(pr−p−)(s¯FWD− s¯LAmid) < 0.
This implies E[s|b = r] > limb→r− E[s|b].
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A.2 Indirect tests of tax evasion
To supplement this evidence of sheltering-related behaviors reported in section
1.4, I will now explore two additional behaviors motivated by existing literature.
First, I explore the amount of charitable contributions reported by itemizing
tax filers. Previous literature (e.g. Bakija and Heim, 2011) has documented a
substantial elasticity of charitable giving to perceived tax incentives. Figure A.7
graphs the average amount of reported charitable contributions, conditional on
any being reported, for each dollar-amount of balance due ranging from -100 to
100. Again, a marked spike in this behavior is visible at zero. Donors report-
ing zero balance due have an average contribution of $1,726, in contrast to the
average contribution of $955 for other donors in this graph.
I will proceed to use these data on charitable giving to calculate a metric of
tax evasion developed in Feldman and Slemrod (2007), hereafter called FS. This
work builds off of two basic intuitions. First, different sources of income have
different associated propensities for underreporting, largely associated with the
ease of detection of evasion. For example, table 1 of FS lists the voluntary re-
porting percentage (the fraction of earned income that is declared to the IRS)
by different income types. Over 99% of wages and salaries were voluntarily re-
ported in tax years 1987 and 1988. This high rate is attributable to the fact that
this amount of income is confirmed by your employer, and underreporting on
the part of the taxpayer is easily detectable. For other types of income, particu-
larly buisness or farm earnings, detection of underreporting is markedly more
difficult and costly for the IRS, and thus underreporting is far more common.
FS estimate these rates of underreporting by utilizing the charitable donations
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claimed in itemized deductions. The basic assumption is that your charitable
giving is a function of your true income. If we observe that an individual’s char-
itability depends on which of these types of income they earn, it either means
that individuals who are in the position to successfully evade taxes are particu-
larly charitable, or (more plausibly) that individuals in the position to success-
fully evade taxes are in fact evading taxes; they only seem to be giving a large
portion of their income to charity because their reported income is much smaller
than their true income.
Either the legal use of charitable giving as a tax shelter, or the inference of
illegal tax evasion, is consistent with the reference-dependent model. To expand
on the implied amount of tax evasion which would rationalize this behavior,
I employ the quantitative methods of FS, which assume the effect is entirely
driven by evasion.
Following the primary regression approach of FS, I decompose income into
the portions from schedules C, D, E, and F. The remainder of income is denoted
as the “visible” portion, which is assumed to be correctly reported due to the
extremely high voluntary reporting rates on these components.
The primary specification is a non-linear least squares regression:
ln(C + 100) = α0 + α1ln(V +
∑
ih
kihRih +
∑
j
b jS j) + α2ln(MTR) +  (A.1)
where i = Schedule C, D, E, and F (A.2)
j = Schedule C and F (A.3)
h = Positive, Negative (A.4)
C denote charitable giving reported on schedule A, S j is a dummy variable
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indicating the presence of schedule j, and MTR denotes the marginal tax rate,
which captures the tax benefits gained by marginal changes to charitable giving
activities.1 True wealth is captured by the term V +
∑
ih kihRih +
∑
j b jS j; visible
income V is assumed to be correctly reported, and the kih terms estimate the rate
of underreporting for different alternative sources of income, with a coefficient
of 1 implying no underreporting. Dummy variables for submitting schedule C
and F are included to capture the idea that individuals submitting one of these
schedules are likely to have move evasion than individuals who do not, even
if their submitted schedule reports zero liability. This regression approach as-
sumes that the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to income is invariant
to the income source, and uses that structure to estimate the rates of underre-
porting on these different sources.
With these model estimates I can forecast true income by multiplying the
income from various schedules by their estimated underreporting rate. This
yields an evasion metric, calculated as the difference between their reported
total income and their total income predicted by this model.
Figure A.8 graphs the mean of this evasion metric for each dollar amount
of balance due from -100 to 100. Consistent with previous results, the evasion
metric is sharply spiked at zero balance due. The average predicted evasion
amount for observations with non-zero balance due between -100 and 100 is
$4,674 (95% CI: $4,381 - $4,967), as opposed to the significantly higher value of
$15,799 (95% CI: $4840 - $26,759) for individuals precisely at zero. Overall, the
analysis of charitable giving data suggests a significant increase in tax sheltering
activity among individuals at zero balance due.
1An error in data recording occured for the MTR in the 1987 model year. Data from this
model year is excluded from this analysis.
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Another approach to detecting tax sheltering among unaudited returns was
suggested by Slemrod (1985), based on the effect that slight discontinuities in
the tax schedule have on sheltering behavior. In practice, most taxpayers do not
determine their final tax due by a direct calculation using marginal tax rates. In-
stead, they use a tax table like the one produced below, determine their income
bin, and input the resulting number.
Across the years of my sample, for all but extremely low income filers, the
width of income bins was $50, as seen in the image above. In the absence of
attempts to manipulate tax liability, we would assume an individual’s position
in the $50 bracket to be roughly uniformly distributed. However, if some indi-
viduals are responding to the manipulation incentives induced by these minute
discontinuities, they will manipulate their liability just enough to cross these
thresholds. Thus we would see “too many” people with income close to the top
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of these 50 dollar brackets, as was indeed documented in Slemrod (1985).2
Figure A.9 graphs two metrics related to Slemrod’s analysis, restricted to ob-
servations that were calculated using tax tables and which fell within $100 of
zero balance due. The first panel graphs the mean position of AGI within the
table bracket, and the second panel graphs the mean propensity to be in the top
fifth of the table bracket. In contrast to previous metrics, there is no evidence of
any discontinuity in these measures at zero. This lack of response might be ex-
pected, due to the fact that bunching at zero appears primarily driven by high-
income individuals, for whom the tax tables are not used for the calculation of
final tax due.
A.3 Supplemental tables and figures
2For example, 23.7% of filers with a high marginal tax rate and fungible income items ap-
peared in the top 20% of their 50 dollar bracket.
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Table A.1: Sample size across SSN codes and years
SSN Code A B C, D, E Total
1979 8852 9013 26935 44800
1980 9107 9205 27709 46021
1981 9131 9282 27825 46238
1982 9129 0 0 9129
1983 9389 9514 0 18903
1984 9636 0 0 9636
1985 9948 10013 0 19961
1986 9990 0 0 9990
1987 10362 10543 0 20905
1988 10627 10707 0 21334
1989 10952 11054 0 22006
1990 11122 11230 0 22352
Total 118245 90561 82469 291275
Unique Taxpayers 15950 15919 32158 64027
Notes: This table presents the number of responses over time by different
SSN groups. Five randomly-determined four-digit SSN endings were chosen to
form the sample, labeled A-E. Group A was sampled from 1979-1990. Group B
was not sampled in 1982, 1984, or 1986. Groups C, D, and E were sampled only
for the first three years of the data collection.
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Table A.2: Structural parameter estimates
79 80 81 82 83 84
µ: Standardized AGI 246.74∗∗∗ 332.34∗∗∗ 861.40∗∗∗ 331.65∗∗∗ -501.26∗∗∗ -351.48∗∗∗
(17.52) (23.36) (51.56) (98.79) (77.52) (100.35)
µ: Constant -701.67∗∗∗ -717.64∗∗∗ -1219.97∗∗∗ -1241.50∗∗∗ -1274.53∗∗∗ -1185.27∗∗∗
(13.45) (16.95) (48.81) (139.89) (58.27) (67.88)
ln(ν): Standardized AGI 0.22 -0.29 0.61∗∗∗ 0.24 -2.02∗ 0.17
(0.32) (2.04) (0.18) (0.52) (0.82) (0.42)
ln(ν): Constant 0.85 -0.95 0.96 2.15∗ 3.75∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗
(0.51) (1.89) (0.55) (1.10) (0.59) (0.82)
ψ: Standardized AGI 208.99∗∗∗ 309.34∗∗∗ 926.75∗∗∗ 469.04∗∗∗ -350.12∗∗∗ -236.84∗∗
(21.92) (29.62) (55.34) (111.99) (68.58) (89.25)
ψ: Constant -433.01∗∗∗ -422.99∗∗∗ -827.97∗∗∗ -816.18∗∗∗ -875.82∗∗∗ -832.36∗∗∗
(13.66) (16.40) (46.56) (120.24) (49.18) (57.04)
ln(σ1): Standardized AGI 1.24∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
ln(σ1): Constant 7.17∗∗∗ 7.24∗∗∗ 7.30∗∗∗ 7.46∗∗∗ 7.55∗∗∗ 7.40∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
ln(σ2): Standardized AGI 0.96∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
ln(σ2): Constant 5.95∗∗∗ 6.01∗∗∗ 6.10∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
θ1: Standardized AGI 0.18∗ 0.05 -0.26∗∗∗ -0.23 0.10 0.51∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.20) (0.12) (0.14)
θ1: Constant -0.79∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
γ: Standardized AGI 2.74∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 3.81∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.41) (0.16) (0.27)
γ: Constant -0.34∗∗ -0.37∗∗ -1.97∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.45) (0.13) (0.18)
N 33679 33969 34496 7023 14168 7417
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.3: Structural parameter estimates (cont.)
85 86 87 88 89 90
µ: Standardized AGI -494.55∗∗∗ -551.51∗∗∗ 236.83∗∗∗ 531.84∗∗∗ 606.15∗∗∗ 584.42∗∗∗
(61.31) (86.53) (44.76) (30.55) (35.88) (39.62)
µ: Constant -1327.02∗∗∗ -1378.99∗∗∗ -1116.09∗∗∗ -998.82∗∗∗ -1042.87∗∗∗ -1087.56∗∗∗
(46.34) (68.36) (34.32) (22.42) (25.24) (28.74)
ln(ν): Standardized AGI -0.49 1.14∗∗ 0.52∗ 0.35 -0.40 0.26
(0.92) (0.40) (0.21) (0.27) (0.59) (0.25)
ln(ν): Constant 3.37∗∗ -0.55 2.19∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗
(1.07) (2.22) (0.54) (0.48) (0.59) (0.45)
ψ: Standardized AGI -335.38∗∗∗ -393.59∗∗∗ 601.98∗∗∗ 763.67∗∗∗ 857.65∗∗∗ 823.09∗∗∗
(56.16) (78.35) (50.42) (39.62) (45.93) (49.63)
ψ: Constant -920.49∗∗∗ -962.37∗∗∗ -520.75∗∗∗ -536.86∗∗∗ -539.20∗∗∗ -590.56∗∗∗
(40.81) (59.46) (37.95) (27.70) (31.93) (35.45)
ln(σ1): Standardized AGI 1.37∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
ln(σ1): Constant 7.52∗∗∗ 7.74∗∗∗ 7.92∗∗∗ 8.03∗∗∗ 7.79∗∗∗ 7.81∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
ln(σ2): Standardized AGI 1.01∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(σ2): Constant 6.11∗∗∗ 6.18∗∗∗ 6.37∗∗∗ 6.36∗∗∗ 6.35∗∗∗ 6.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
θ1: Standardized AGI 0.28∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)
θ1: Constant -0.88∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
γ: Standardized AGI 1.05∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
γ: Constant -1.33∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
N 14927 7552 15542 15648 16076 15944
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A.7: Charitable giving in the vicinity of zero balance due
Notes: Restricted to individuals with positive charitable giving.
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Figure A.8: Feldman and Slemrod (2007) evasion proxy values in the vicin-
ity of zero balance due
Notes: Restricted to the estimation sample of the regression calculating these
evasion proxies.
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Figure A.9: Slemrod (1985) evasion proxy values in the vicinity of zero bal-
ance due
Notes: Restricted to individuals using tax tables with $50 bins.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO “WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD MAKE YOU HAPPIER?
WHAT DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD CHOOSE?”
Scenario 1: Sleep vs. Income
Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the same
in almost every way, but have different work hours and pay different amounts.
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are reasonable,
and you would be able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the average work night.
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires you
to go to work at unusual hours, and you would only be able to sleep around 6
hours on the average work night.
Scenario 2: Concert vs. Birthday
Suppose you promised a close friend that you would attend his or her 50th
[“21st” in student samples] birthday dinner. However, at the last minute you
find out that you have won front row seats to see your favorite musician, and
the concert is at the same time as the dinner. This is the musician’s last night in
town. You face two options:
Option 1: Skip your friend’s birthday dinner to attend the concert.
Option 2: Attend your friend’s birthday dinner and miss the concert.
Scenario 3: Absolute Income vs. Relative Income
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Suppose you are considering a new job, and have offers from two compa-
nies. Even though all aspects of the two jobs are identical, employees’ salaries
are different across the two companies due to arbitrary timing of when salary
benchmarks happened to be set. Everyone in each company knows the other
employees’ salaries. You must choose one of the two companies, which means
you must decide between the following two options:
Option 1: Your yearly income is $105,000, while on average others at your
level earn $120,000.
Option 2: Your yearly income is $100,000, while on average others at your
level earn $85,000.
Scenario 4: Legacy vs. Income
(Phrasing in Denver within-subject study): Suppose you are a skilled artist, and
you have to decide between two career paths for your life.
Option 1: You devote yourself to your own style of painting. This would
require a number of sacrifices, such as having less time for friends and family,
and making less money. For example, you expect that selling your paintings
will give you an income of $40,000 a year. If you choose this path, you don’t
expect that your work will be appreciated in your lifetime, but posthumously
you will make an impact on the history of art, achieve fame, and be remembered
in your work.
Option 2: You become a graphic designer at an advertising company. This
would give you more money and more time with friends and family than Op-
tion 1. The company is offering you a salary of $60,000 a year, which will afford
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you a much more comfortable lifestyle, but you will have no impact and leave
no legacy to be remembered.
(Version 2: Phrasing in Denver between-subjects study and Cornell studies): Sup-
pose you are a skilled artist, and you have to decide between two career paths
for your life. There are two styles of painting that you consider to be your own
style, and you enjoy both equally. Style 1 happens to be much less popular than
Style 2 today, but you know it will be an important style in the future.
Option 1: You devote yourself to Style 1. You expect that selling your paint-
ings will give you an income of $40,000 a year. If you choose this path, you don’t
expect that your work will be appreciated in your lifetime, but posthumously
you will make an impact on the history of art, achieve fame, and be remembered
in your work.
Option 2: You devote yourself to Style 2. You expect that selling your paint-
ings will give you an income of $60,000 a year, but you will have no memorable
impact. [In the Denver between-subjects study, each subject saw this question
three times, with different income levels in Option 2. Income levels could be
$42,000, $60,000, $80,000, or $100,000.]
Scenario 5: Apple vs. Orange
Suppose you are checking out a new supermarket that just opened near
where you live. As you walk by the fresh fruit display, you are offered your
choice of a free snack:
Option 1: A freshly sliced apple.
Option 2: A freshly sliced orange.
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Scenario 6: Money vs. Time
Suppose that due to budget cuts, the school implements a “student activities
fee” of $15 dollars a week to help pay for maintenance of facilities used for
extracurricular student activities. However, the school allows you to not pay
the fee if instead you put in 2 hours of service a week shelving books at the
library. You face two options:
Option 1: Spend 2 hours a week shelving books.
Option 2: Pay $15 a week.
Scenario 7: Socialize vs. Sleep
Say you are hanging out with a group of friends at your friend’s room. You
are having a really good time, but it is getting to be late at night. You have to
decide between two options.
Option 1: Stay up another hour. It is likely you will feel tired all day tomor-
row, but this particular evening you are having an especially fun time.
Option 2: Excuse yourself from the group, and go to bed. You will be disap-
pointed to miss the fun, but you know you will feel better the next day and be
more productive at paying attention in class and doing your homework.
Scenario 8: Family vs. Money
Imagine that for the first time in three years, your parents (or if your parents
are gone, your closest relatives who are older than you) have arranged for a
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special family gathering that will happen the day after Thanksgiving, with ev-
eryone also invited to Thanksgiving dinner. You face two options. Would you
choose to go to the family gathering the day after Thanksgiving (and maybe to
Thanksgiving dinner) if getting there required a $500 roundtrip plane ticket for
plane flights that were 5 hours each way?
Option 1: Go to the thanksgiving gathering, which requires a $500 round trip
plane ticket.
Option 2: Miss the thanksgiving gathering, but save the money.
Scenario 9: Education vs. Social Life
Suppose you have decided to leave Cornell, and are transferring to a new
school. You have been accepted to two schools, and are deciding where to go.
The first school is extremely selective and high quality, but is in a small town out
in the country with a less active social scene. The second school is in a major
city with a great social scene, but is slightly less renowned. Which would you
choose?
Option 1: Highly selective school, isolated socially and geographically.
Option 2: Less selective school, socially active and in a major city.
Scenario 10: Interest vs. Career
Suppose you are considering two summer internships. One is extremely in-
teresting and involves work you are passionate about, but does not advance
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your career. The other will likely be boring, but will help you get a job in the
future. Which would you choose?
Option 1: Interesting internship which does not advance career.
Option 2: Boring internship which will help you get a job.
Scenario 11: Concert vs. Duty
Say you are driving by yourself to see your favorite musician in concert on
their last day in town. You are five minutes away, and the concert starts in ten
minutes. On the drive, you witness a truck hit a parked car, causing roughly
$500 in damages, and then drive away without leaving their information. You
notice the truck’s license plate, and you are the only witness. You face two
options:
Option 1: Keep driving and get to the concert on time.
Option 2: Call the police, in which case you will have to wait around the
parked car to give a testimony. This would take about half an hour. You would
have trouble finding a seat and might miss the whole concert.
Scenario 12: Low Rent vs. Short Commute
(Phrasing in Denver within-subject study): Say you are moving to a new town.
You are trying to decide between two similar apartments which you could rent.
The two apartments are identical in almost everything - including floor plan,
amenities, neighborhood character, schools, safety, etc. However, they have dif-
ferent rents and are located at different distances from your work.
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Option 1: An apartment which requires a 45-minute drive to work. The rent
is about 20% of your monthly income.
Option 2: A similar apartment, with only a 10-minute drive. The rent is about
40% of your monthly income.
(Version 2: Phrasing in Denver between-subject study): Say you are moving to
a new town. The new town is known for its terrible traffic jams, and driving
there is widely considered to be unpleasant. You are trying to decide between
two similar apartments which you could rent. The two apartments are identical
in almost everything - including floor plan, amenities, neighborhood charac-
ter, schools, safety, etc. However, they have different rents and are located at
different distances from your work.
Option 1: An apartment which requires a 45-minute drive each way to work.
The commute has heavy traffic almost the whole way. The rent is about 20% of
your monthly income.
Option 2: A similar apartment which requires a 10-minute drive each way to
work. The commute has heavy traffic almost the whole way. The rent is about
40% of your monthly income.
Scenario 13: Friends vs Income
Say you have been reassigned at your job, and will be moved to a new loca-
tion. There are two offices where you could request to work. One office is in a
city where many of your friends happen to live, and pays 20% less than your
current salary. The other office is in a city where you don’t know anyone, and
pays 10% more than your current salary. Your job will be exactly the same at
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either office. You must decide between the following two options:
Option 1: Make 20% less than your current salary and move to the city with
your friends.
Option 2: Make 10% more than your current salary and move to a city where
you do not know anyone.
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